YPRES, 1914

FICIAL ACCOUNT PUBLISHED BY
R OF THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF

YPRES, 1914

MON8, AND THE RETREAT

By Captain G. S. GORDON

With an Introduction by
Field-Marshal LORD FRENCH

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THE MARNE CAMPAIGN

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1914

By Field-Marshal VISCOUNT FRENCH
of Ypres, K.P., O.M., etc.

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*»*

YPRES, 1914

AN OFFICIAL ACCOUNT PUBLISHED BY
ORDER OF THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF

TEANSLATION BY G. C. W.

WITH INTRODUCTION AND NOTES BY THE

HISTORICAL SECTION (MILITARY BRANCH)

COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE

LONDON
CONSTABLE AND COMPANY LTD

1919

Printed in Great Britain

CONTENTS

PACK

INTRODUCTION ix

GERMAN PREFACE xxiii

PRELIMINARY REMARKS 1

THE THEATRE OF OPERATIONS 13

THE ADVANCE OF THE FOURTH ARMY . . .19

THE OPERATIONS OF THE FOURTH ARMY, 20TH-31ST

OCTOBER 1914 26

THE ATTEMPT TO BREAK THROUGH SOUTH OF YPRES . 59

THE OPERATIONS OF THE FOURTH ARMY FROM THE END

OF OCTOBER TO THE 9ra NOVEMBER 1914 . . 98

THE LAST PHASE 103

CONCLUSION 126

APPENDIX

ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE FOURTH ARMY . . .131

ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE ARMY GROUP FABECK . 132

ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE GROUP GEROK . . .133

ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE ARMY GROUP LINSINGEN . 133

INDEX 135

ILLUSTRATIONS

SKETCH MAPS IN TEXT

PAGE

DISPOSITIONS ON 20iH OCTOBER 1914 . . . . 20

THE ATTACK OF THE ARMY GROUP FABECK ON 30TH

OCTOBER 1914 . . . . . . .67

THE ATTACK OF THE ARMY GROUP FABECK ON 31sT

OCTOBER 1914 . 73

THE CAPTURE OF MESSINES ON 31si OCTOBER 1914 . 81
THE CAPTURE OF DIXMUDE ON lOra NOVEMBER 1914 108

THE ATTACK OF THE SIXTH ARMY ON HTH NOVEMBER

1914 112

THE ATTACK OF THE 2ND GUARD DIVISION ON HTH

NOVEMBER 1914 . 115

vu

INTRODUCTION

THE German book of which a translation is here given
was written in the autumn of 1917 by Captain Otto
Schwink, a General Staff Officer, by order of the Chief
of the General Staff of the Field Army, and is stated
to be founded on official documents. It forms one
of a series of monographs, partly projected, partly
published, on the various phases of the war, but is
the only one that is available dealing with operations
in which the British Army was engaged. Several
concerned with the Eastern theatre of war have
already appeared, and one other entitled ' LIEGE-
NAMTJB,' relating to the Western.

Field-Marshal Viscount French, in his book ' 1914,'
has said that the period 27th to 31st October during
the first battle of YPRES was ' more momentous and
fateful than any other which I directed during my
period of service as Commander-in-Chief in the field.
31st October and 1st November will remain for ever
memorable in the history of our country, for during
those two days no more than a thin and straggling
line of tired-out British soldiers stood between the
Empire and its practical ruin as an independent first-
class Power.' The German account accentuates the
truth of Lord French's appreciation of the great peril
in which the Army and the Nation stood. It tells
us of the enemy's plans, and of the large forces that
he brought up with great skill and secrecy to carry

x THE BATTLE ON THE YSER AND OF YPRES

them out, and, generally, to use Marshal Foch's expres-
sion, lets us 'know what was going on in the other
fellow's house.' But it does more than that : un-
consciously perhaps, it bears convincing testimony to
the fighting powers of the British Army, the deter-
mination of its leaders, the extraordinary effective-
ness of the fire of its artillery and of its cavalry and
infantry, and the skill of its engineers ; for it re-
peatedly credits Field-Marshal Sir John French with
1 reinforcements in abundance,5 insists that our troops
' fought desperately for every heap of stones and
every pile of bricks before abandoning them,' and
definitely records that * the fact that neither the
enemy's commanders nor their troops gave way under
the strong pressure we put on them . . . gives us
the opportunity to acknowledge that there were men
of real worth opposed to us who did their duty thor-
oughly.' We are further told that the effect of our
artillery was such that ' it was not possible to push
up reserves owing to heavy artillery fire ' ; that * all
roads leading to the rear were continuously shelled
for a long way back ' ; that the German ' advancing
columns were under accurate artillery fire at long
range ' ; that our shells ' blocked streets and bridges
and devastated villages so far back that any regular
transport of supplies became impossible.' As regards
rifle and machine-gun fire, we are credited with ' quan-
tities of machine-guns,' 'large numbers of machine-
guns,' etc. ; with the result that ' the roads were
swept by machine-guns ' ; and that ' over every bush,
hedge and fragment of wall floated a thin film of
smoke betraying a machine-gun rattling out bullets.'
At that date we had no machine-gun units, and there

INTRODUCTION xi

were only two machine-guns on the establishment of
a battalion, and of these many had been damaged,
and had not yet been replaced ; actually machine-
guns were few and far between. The only inference
to be drawn is that the rapid fire of the British rifle-
man, were he infantryman, cavalryman or sapper,
was mistaken for machine-gun fire both as regards
volume and effect. Our simple defences, to complete
which both time and labour had been lacking, became
in German eyes ' a well-planned maze of trenches,5 * a
maze of obstacles and entrenchments ' ; and we had
* turned every house, every wood and every wall into
a strong point ' ; * the villages of WYTSCHAETE and
MESSINES . . . had been converted into fortresses '
(Festungen) ; as also the edge of a wood near GHELTJ-
VELT and LANGEMABCK. As at the last-named place
there was only a small redoubt with a garrison of
two platoons, and the ' broad wire entanglements '
described by the German General Staff were in reality
but trifling obstacles of the kind that the Germans
' took in their stride,' 1 the lavish praise, were it not
for the result of the battle, might be deemed exag-
gerated. Part of it undoubtedly is. It is fair, how-
ever, to deduce that the German nation had to be
given some explanation why the ' contemptible little
Army' had not been pushed straightway into the
sea.

The monograph is frankly intended to present the
views that the German General Staff wish should be
held as regards the battles, and prevent, as their
Preface says, the currency of ' the legends and rumours
which take such an easy hold on the popular imagina-

1 Seep. 115.

xii THE BATTLE ON THE YSER AND OF YPRES

tion and are so difficult, if not impossible, to correct
afterwards.' One cannot naturally expect the whole
truth to be revealed yet ; that it is not will be seen
from the notes. The elder von Moltke said, when
pressed by his nephews to write a true account of
1870-1 — to their future financial advantage — ' It can't
be done yet. Too many highly placed personages
(hohe Herrschaften) would suffer in their reputations.'
It was not until twenty-five years after the Franco -
Prussian War that Fritz Honig, Kunz and other
German military historians who had been given access
to the records, were allowed to draw back the veil a
little. The publication of the French General Staff
account began even later. What is now given to
us is, however, amply sufficient to follow the main
German plans and movements ; but the difficulties
that prevented the enemy from making successful
use of the enormous number of troops at his disposal
and his superior equipment in heavy artillery, machine-
guns, aeroplanes, hand-grenades and other trench
warfare material, are untold. Until we learn more
we may fairly attribute our victory to the military
qualities of the British, French and Belgian troops,
and the obstinate refusal of all ranks to admit defeat.
The German General Staff specially claim that the
first battle of YPRES was a German victory, 'for it
marked the failure of the enemy's intention to fall on
the rear of our Western Armies, to free the rich districts
of Northern France and the whole of Belgium,' etc.
etc . Granted that we did so fail, the battle can, on that
General Staff's own evidence, be regarded as a drawn
one. For it is definitely stated in the monograph
that the object of the operations was ' successfully

INTRODUCTION xiii

closing with the enemy . . . and gaming CALAIS, the
aim and object of the 1914 campaign ' — this the
German Army notoriously did not do. The inten-
tion to break through is repeatedly stated : ' although
fresh reinforcements had been sent up by the German
General Staff ... a break-through had not been
possible.' ' Another effort to break through should
be made as soon as possible.' We are told that Fabeck's
Army Group (eventually nine infantry and five cavalry
divisions) was formed ' as a strong new army of attack
. . . for breaking through on the front WERWICQ-
WARNETON.' Linsingen's Army Group (five divi-
sions) after the failure of von Fabeck was formed * to
drive back and crush the enemy lying north of the
(CoMiNES-YpRES) canal . . . and to break through
there.' Finally, however, it is admitted that c no
break-through of the enemy's lines had been accom-
plished. . . . We had not succeeded in making the
decisive break-through, and the dream of ending the
campaign in the west in our favour had to be con-
signed to its grave.' In fact, the book is largely an
apologia and a confession of failure which mere pro-
testations of victory cannot alter.

The effects of a German victory on the course of the
war, with the Channel ports in German hands, as
compared with those of an Allied victory in Flanders,
which at that period of the war and at that season of
the year could have resulted in little more than push-
ing the enemy back into Belgium a few miles, may be
easily imagined. If the battle was a tactical draw,
at least we had a strategic balance in our favour.

The principal reasons advanced for the German
ill-success are ' the enemy's numerical superiority,

xiv THE BATTLE ON THE YSER AND OF YPRES

and the strength of his positions,' and of course the
drastic course taken by the Belgians of ' calling in
the sea to their aid.'

There is constant repetition of these pleas through-
out the book. To those who were there and saw our
' thin and straggling line f and the hastily constructed
and lightly wired defences : mere isolated posts and
broken lengths of shallow holes with occasional thin
belts of wire, and none of the communication trenches
of a later date, they provoke only amazement. Even
German myopia cannot be the cause of such state-
ments.

As regards the superiority of numbers, the follow-
ing appears to be the approximate state of the case
as regards the infantry on the battle front from ARMEN-
TIERES (inclusive) to the sea dealt with in the mono-
graph. It is necessary to count in battalions, as the
Germans had two or three with each cavalry divi-
sion, and the British Commander-in-Chief enumerates
the reinforcements sent up to YPRES from the II and
Indian Corps by battalions, and two Territorial
battalions, London Scottish and Hertfordshires, also
took part. The total figures are : —

British, French, Belgian . . 263 battalions.
German ..... 426 battalions.

That is roughly a proportion of Allies to Germans
of 13 to 21. Viscount French in his ' 1914 ' says 7
to 12 Corps, which is much the same : 52 to 84 as
against 49 to 84, and very different from the German
claim of ' 40 divisions to 25.' Actually in infantry
divisions the Allies had only 22, even counting as
complete the Belgian six, which had only the strength

INTRODUCTION xv

of German brigades. Any future correction of the
figures, when actual bayonets present can be counted,
will probably emphasise the German superiority in
numbers still more, and the enemy indisputably had
the advantage of united command, homogeneous
formations and uniform material which were lacking
in the Allied force.

As regards the cavalry the Western Allies had
six divisions, including one of three brigades. The
enemy had at least nine, possibly more (one, the
Guard Cavalry Division, of three brigades), as it is
not clear from the German account how much cavalry
was transferred from the Sixth Army to the Fourth
Army.1 It may be noted that a German cavalry
division included, with its two or three cavalry brigades,
horse artillery batteries and the two or three Jdger
battalions, three or more machine-gun batteries and
two or more companies of cyclists ; and was thus,
unlike ours, a force of all arms.

The German General Staff reveal nothing about
the exact strength of the artillery. In a footnote it
is mentioned that in addition to infantry divisions

1 Fourth Army Cavalry.

I. Cavalry Corps . Guard and 4th Cavalry Divisions, p. 64.
//. „ . . 3rd and 1th Cavalry Divisions, p. 90.

IV. „ . . 3 Cavalry Divisions, p. 25.

2nd Cavalry Division, p. 92.
Bavarian Cavalry Division, p. 92.
Total, 9 Cavalry Divisions.

The Army Cavalry of the Sixth Army is stated on p. 56 to have
been eight divisions, among which, according to p. 57, were the 3rd,
1th and Bavarian Cavalry Divisions, included above in the Army
Cavalry of the Fourth Army.

It may be noted that in ' Liege-Namur* in the same series of
General Staff Monographs the composition of the II Cavalry
Corps is given as the 2nd, 4th and 9th Cavalry Divisions.

xvi THE BATTLE ON THE YSER AND OF YPRES

the III Reserve Corps contained siege artillery, Pionier
formations and other technical troops ; and in the
text that 'all the available heavy artillery of the
Sixth Army was to be brought up (to assist the Fourth
Army) for the break-through.' The Germans had
trench-mortars (Minenwerfer) which are several times
mentioned, whilst our first ones were still in the process
of improvisation by the Engineers of the Indian Corps
at BETHTOE.

The statement that ' the enemy's ' (i.e. British,
French and Belgian) ' superiority in material, in guns,
trench-mortars, machine-guns and aeroplanes, etc.,
was two, three, even fourfold ' is palpably nonsense
when said of 1914, though true perhaps in 1917 when
the monograph was written.

The fact seems to be that the Germans cannot
understand defeat in war except on the premise that
the victor had superiority of numbers. To show to
what extent this creed obtains : in the late Dr. Wylie's
Henry F., vol. n. page 216, will be found an account
of a German theory, accepted by the well-known
historian Delbriick, that the English won at Agin-
court on account of superior numbers, although con-
temporary history is practically unanimous that the
French were ten to one. Dr. Wylie sums it up thus :

* Starting with the belief that the defeat of the French
is inexplicable on the assumption that they greatly out-
numbered the English, and finding that all contemporary
authorities, both French and English, are agreed that they
did, the writer builds up a theory that all the known facts
can be explained on the supposition that the French were
really much inferior to us in numbers . . . and concludes
that he cannot be far wrong if he puts the total number

INTRODUCTION

xvn

of French (the English being 6000) at something between
4000 and 7000.'

It may not be out of place to add that a German Staff
Officer captured during the Ypres fighting said to his
escort as he was being taken away : ' Now I am out
of it, do tell me where your reserves are concealed ;
in what woods are they ? ' and he refused to believe
that we had none. Apparently it was inconceivable
to the German General Staff that we should stand to
fight unless we had superior numbers ; and these not
being visible in the field, they must be hidden away
somewhere.

Further light on what the Germans imagined is
thrown by prisoners, who definitely stated that their
main attack was made south of YPRES, because it
was thought that our main reserves were near ST.
JEAN, north-east of that town. From others it was
gathered that what could be seen of our army in that
quarter was in such small and scattered parties that
it was taken to be an outpost line covering important
concentrations, and the Germans did not press on,
fearing a trap .

It is, however, possible that the German miscalcu-
lation of the number of formations engaged may not
be altogether due to imaginary reserves, as regards
the British Army. Before the war the Great General
Staff knew very little about us. The collection of
' intelligence ' with regard to the British Empire was
dealt with by a Section known in the Moltkestrasse as
the * Demi-monde Section,' because it was responsible
for so many countries ; and this Section admittedly
had little time to devote to us. Our organisation was

6

xviii THE BATTLE ON THE YSER AND OF YPRES

different from that of any of the great European
armies . Their field artillery brigades contained seventy-
two guns, whereas ours had only eighteen guns or
howitzers ; their infantry brigades consisted of two
regiments, each of three battalions, that is six battalions,
not four as in the original British Expeditionary Force.
To a German, therefore, an infantry brigade meant
six battalions, not four, and if a prisoner said that he
belonged to the Blankshire Regiment, the German
might possibly belie ve he had identified three battalions,
whereas only one would be present. This is actually
brought out on page 118, when the author speaks of
the 1st Battalion of the King's (Liverpool) Regiment
as the Konigsregiment Liverpool, and indicates his
ignorance of the British Army, when this single battalion
engages the German Garde Regiment zu Fuss, by
describing the fight not only as one of regiment against
regiment, but as Garde gegen Garde (Guard against
Guards).1 Such is the fighting value of an English
Line battalion. A victory over it is certainly claimed,
but the significant sentence immediately follows :
' any further advance on the 1 1th November by our
Guard troops north of the road was now out of the
question.'

It may be as well to point out that the ' volunteers '
who it is said flocked to the barracks to form the
Reserve Corps XXII to XXVII were not all volunteers
in our sense of the word. The General Staff only

1 There is a further mistake (see footnote 2, p. 118) : the King's were
not present at the place referred to, but in another part of the field. The
honour of fighting the German Guards at one to eight, for the battalion
was under four hundred strong, appears to belong to the 2nd Oxford-
shire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry.

INTRODUCTION xix

claims that 75 per cent, were untrained, a very different
state of affairs from our New Armies, which had not
1 per cent . of trained soldiers . Many of the ' volunteers '
were fully trained men liable to service, who merely
anticipated their recall to the colours. It was well
known before the war that in each army corps area
Germany intended to form one ' Active ' Corps and
one or more ' Reserve ' Corps. The original armies
of invasion all contained Reserve Corps notably the
IV Reserve of von Kluck's Army, which marched and
fought just as the active ones did. These first formed
Reserve Corps were, it is believed, entirely made up
of trained men, but those with the higher numbers
XXII, XXIII, XXVI and XXVII, which appear in
the Fourth Army, probably did contain a good per-
centage of men untrained before the war.

Ersatz divisions were formed of the balance of
reservists after the Reserve divisions had been organised,
and of untrained men liable for service. After a time
the words ' Active/ ' Reserve,' and * Ersatz ' applied
to formations lost their significance, as the same classes
of men were to be found in all of them.

No attempt has been made to tone down the author's
patriotic sentiments and occasional lapses from good
taste ; the general nature of the narrative is too
satisfactory to the British Army to make any omissions
necessary when presenting it to the British public.

The footnotes deal with a number of the more
important points raised, but are not exhaustive.

Note. — The German time, at the period of the year in
question one hour earlier than ours, has been
adhered to.

xx THE BATTLE ON THE YSER AND OF YPRES

The Notes of the Historical Section are distin-
guished from those of the Author by being
printed in italics.

In preparing the translation for issue it has not
been thought necessary to supply all the
maps provided in the original, as the general
lie of the country must be fairly well known
to British readers.

(Translation of Title Page)
Monographs on the Great War

THE BATTLE ON THE YSER AND OF
YPRES IN THE AUTUMN 1914

(DIE SCHLACHT AN DER YSER UND
BEI YPERN IM HERBST 1914)

FROM OFFICIAL SOURCES

PUBLISHED

BY ORDER OF THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF
OLDENBURG, 1918, GERHARD STALLING

PREFACE

BY GERMAN GREAT HEADQUARTERS

THE gigantic scale of the present war defies com-
parison with those of the past, and battles which
formerly held the world in suspense are now almost
forgotten. The German people have been kept
informed of the progress of events on all fronts since
the 4th August 1914, by the daily official reports of
the German General Staff, but the general public
will have been unable to gather from these a coherent
and continuous story of the operations.

For this reason the General Staff of the German
Field Army has decided to permit the publication of
a series of monographs which will give the German
people a general knowledge of the course of the most
important operations in this colossal struggle of
nations.

These monographs cannot be called histories of
the war ; years, even decades, must pass before all
the true inwardness and connection of events will
be completely revealed. This can only be done when
the archives of our opponents have been opened to
the world as well as our own and those of the General
Staffs of our Allies. In the meantime the German

xxiii

xxiv THE BATTLE ON THE YSER AND OF YPRES

people will be given descriptions of the most important
of the battles, written by men who took part in them,
and have had the official records at their disposal.

It is possible that later research may make altera-
tions here and there necessary, but this appears no
reason for delaying publications based on official
documents, indeed to do so would only serve to foster
the legends and rumours which so easily take hold
of the popular imagination and are so difficult, if
not impossible, to correct afterwards.

This series of monographs is not therefore intended
as an addition to military science, but has been written
for all classes of the German public who have borne
the burden of the war, and especially for those who
have fought in the operations, in order to increase
their knowledge of the great events for the success of
which they have so gladly offered their lives.

GENERAL STAFF OF THE FIELD ARMY.

GERMAN GREAT HEADQUARTERS,
Autumn, 1917.

PRELIMINARY REMARKS

THERE is no more brilliant campaign in history than
the advance of our armies against the Western Powers
in August and early September 1914. The weak
French attacks into Alsace, the short-lived effort to
beat back the centre and right wing of our striking-
force, the active defence of the Allied hostile armies
and the passive resistance of the great Belgian and
French fortresses, all failed to stop our triumphal
march. The patriotic devotion and unexampled courage
of each individual German soldier, combined with the
able leading of his commanders, overcame all opposi-
tion and sent home the news of countless German
victories. It was not long before the walls and hearts
of Paris were trembling, and it seemed as if the con-
spiracy which half the world had been weaving against
us for so many years was to be brought to a rapid
conclusion. Then came the battle of the Marne,
in the course of which the centre and right wings of
the German Western Army were, it is true, withdrawn,
but only to fight again as soon as possible, under more
favourable strategic conditions . The enemy, not expect-
ing our withdrawal, only followed slowly, and on 13th
September x our troops brought him to a standstill
along a line extending from the Swiss frontier to the
Aisne, north-east of Compiegne. In the trench warfare

1 The British advance was checked on the Aisne on \±th*not 13th
September.

A

2 THE BATTLE ON THE YSER AND OF YPRES

which now began our pursuers soon discovered that
our strength had been by no means broken, or even
materially weakened, by the hard fighting.

As early as 5th September, before the battle of the
Marne, the Chief of the German General Staff had
ordered the right wing should be reinforced by the
newly-formed Seventh Army.* It soon became clear
to the opposing commanders that any attempt to
break through the new German front was doomed to
failure, and that a decisive success could only be
obtained by making an outflanking movement on a
large scale against the German right wing. Thus
began what our opponents have called the ' Race to
the Sea/ in which each party tried to gain a decision
by outflanking the other's western wing. The good
communications of France, especially in the north,
enabled the Allied troops to be moved far more rapidly
than our own, for the German General Staff had at
their disposal only the few Franco -Belgian railways
which had been repaired, and these were already over-
burdened with transport of material of every descrip-
tion. In spite of this, however, the French and
British attacks failed to drive back the German right
wing at any point. Not only did they find German
troops ready to meet them in every case, but we were
also generally able to keep the initiative in our hands.

In this manner by the end of September the opposing
flanks had been extended to the district north of the
Somme, about Pe*ronne-Albert. A few days later
began the interminable fighting round Arras and Lens,

* The Seventh Army was not put in on the extreme right wing
but between the First and Third Armies after the heavy French
attacks south of Laon in the middle of September.

PRELIMINARY REMARKS 3

and by the middle of October our advanced troops
were near Lille, marching through the richest industrial
country of France. The Army Cavalry was placed
so as to threaten the hostile left flank, and to bring
pressure against the communications with England.
Our cavalry patrols pushed forward as far as Cassel
and Hazebrouck, the pivots of the enemy's movements,
but they had to retire eastwards again when superior
hostile forces moved up to the north-east. The
reports which they brought back with them all pointed
to preparations by the enemy for an attack on a large
scale, and for another effort to turn the fortunes of
the campaign to his favour. With this in view all
available troops, including newly -arrived detachments
from England, were to be used to break through the
gap between Lille and Antwerp against our right wing,
roll it up and begin the advance against the northern
Rhine.

It must be remembered that at the time this plan
was conceived the fortresses of Lille and Antwerp were
still in French and Belgian possession. It was hoped
that Lille, with its well-built fortifications, even though
they were not quite up-to-date, would at least hold
up the German right wing for a time. Antwerp was
defended by the whole Belgian Army of from five to
six divisions which were to be reinforced by British
troops, and it was confidently expected that this
garrison would be sufficiently strong to hold the
most modern fortress in Western Europe against any
attack, especially if, as was generally believed, this
could only be carried out by comparatively weak
forces. Thus it seemed that the area of concentra-
tion for the Franco -Belgian masses was secure until

4 THE BATTLE ON THE YSER AND OF YPRES

all preparations were ready for the blow to be delivered
through weakly-held Belgium against the rear of the
German armies in the west. The plan was a bold
one, but it was countered by a big attack of consider-
able German forces in the same neighbourhood and
at the same time. The two opponents met and held
each other up on the Yser and at Ypres, and here the
last hope of our enemy to seize Belgium and gain
possession of the rich provinces of Northern France
before the end of the year was frustrated. The
question arises how the Germans were able to find the
men to do this, since it had been necessary to send
considerable forces to the Eastern front to stop the
Russian advance.

Whoever has lived through those great days of
August 1914, and witnessed the wonderful enthu-
siasm of the German nation, will never forget that
within a few days more than a million volunteers
entered German barracks to prepare to fight the
enemies who were hemming in Germany. Workmen,
students, peasants, townspeople, teachers, traders,
officials, high and low, all hastened to join the colours.
There was such a constant stream of men that finally
they had to be sent away, and put off till a later date,
for there was neither equipment nor clothing left for
them. By 16th August, before the advance in the
west had begun, the Prussian War Minister in Berlin
had ordered the formation of five new Reserve Corps
to be numbered from XXII to XXVI, whilst Bavaria
formed the 6th Bavarian Reserve Division, and Saxony
and Wurtemburg together brought the XXVII Reserve
Corps into being. Old and young had taken up arms
in August 1914, in their enthusiasm to defend their

PRELIMINARY REMARKS 5

country, and 75 per cent, of the new Corps consisted
of these volunteers, the remainder being trained men
of both categories of the Landwehr and the Landsturm,
as well as some reservists from the depots, who joined
up in September. All these men, ranging from sixteen
to fifty years of age, realised the seriousness of the
moment, and the need of their country : they were
anxious to become useful soldiers as quickly as possible
to help in overthrowing our malicious enemies. Some
regiments consisted entirely of students ; whole classes
of the higher educational schools came with their
teachers and joined the same company or battery.
Countless retired officers placed themselves at the
disposal of the Government, and the country will
never forget these patriots who took over commands
in the new units, the formation of which was mainly
due to their willing and unselfish work.

The transport of the XXII, XXIII, XXIV, XXVI
and XXVII Reserve Corps to the Western Front began
on 10th October, and the 6th Bavarian Reserve Divi-
sion followed shortly after. Only comparatively few
experienced commanders were available for the units,
and it was left to their keen and patriotic spirit to
compensate as far as possible for what the men still
lacked to play their part in the great struggle.

The situation of the armies on the Western Front
at this time was as follows. In the neighbourhood of
Lille the northern wing of the Sixth Army was fight-
ing against an ever -increasing enemy. On 9th October,
Antwerp, in spite of its strong fortifications and
garrison, was taken after a twelve days' siege directed
by General von Beseler, commanding the III Reserve
Corps, and well known in peace time as Chief of the

6 THE BATTLE ON THE YSER AND OF YPRES

Engineer Corps and Inspector-General of Fortifica-
tions. The victorious besiegers had carried all before
them. As they were numerically insufficient to invest
Antwerp on the west, south and east, a break-through
was attempted on a comparatively narrow front. It
was completely successful, and Antwerp was occupied ;
but the main body of the Belgian army, in good fight-
ing order, was able to escape westwards along the
coast, to await the arrival of British and French rein-
forcements behind the Yser. Only about 5000 Belgians
were taken prisoner, but some 20,000 Belgian and 2000
British troops 1 were forced into Holland. In conse-
quence of this new situation, and of the reports of hostile
concentrations in the area Calais-Dunkirk-Lille, the
German General Staff decided to form a new Fourth
Army under Duke Albert of Wurtemburg. It was to
be composed of the XXII, XXIII, XXVI, and XXVII
Reserve Corps,* and was joined later on by the III
Reserve Corps with the 4th Ersatz Division. By 13th
October the detrainment of this new Army was in full
progress west and south-west of Brussels. On the
evening of 14th October the four Reserve Corps began
their march to the line Eecloo (fifteen miles east of
Bruges )-Deynze — point four miles west of Audenarde.
In the meantime we had occupied the fortified town
of Lille. It had been entered on 12th October by
part of the XIX Saxon Corps and some Landwehr
troops, after the town had suffered considerably owing
to the useless efforts of French territorial troops to

* The XXIV Reserve Corps was sent to the neighbourhood of Metz.

1 ' 2000 British ' belonged to the newly raised Royal Naval Division
which had been thrown into Antwerp in the endeavour to prolong the
resistance of that fortress.

PRELIMINARY REMARKS 7

defend it. The order to the garrison was : ' The town
is to be held till the Tenth French Army arrives ' ; it
resulted in the capture of 4500 French prisoners, who
were sent to Germany. On the 14th the right wing
of the Sixth Army, consisting of the XIII Wiirtem-
burg and XIX Saxon Corps, pushed forward to the
Lys, behind a screen of three Cavalry Corps.1 They
took up a position covering Lille, from Menin through
Comines to Warneton and thence east of Armentieres,
where they came into touch with the 14th Infantry
Division which was further south near the western
forts of Lille. To the north of the Sixth Army, the
III Reserve Corps, with its three divisions from
Antwerp, was advancing westwards on a broad front.
By the 14th it had driven back the hostile rearguards
and reached a line from Bruges to near Ghent. Airmen
and reconnaissance detachments had recognised move-
ments of large bodies of troops about Hazebrouck,
Lillers and St. Omer and reported disembarkations
on a big scale at Dunkirk and Calais. In addition to
this, considerable hostile forces had reached Ypres,
and appeared to be facing more or less southwards
opposite the northern wing of the Sixth Army.2

An order issued on 14th October, by the Chief of the
German General Staff, gave the following instructions
for the German forces between Lille and the sea. The
Sixth Army was at first to remain entirely on the
defensive along the line Menin-Armentieres-La Bass6e

1 Only the British III Corps and Cavalry Corps of two Divisions
were available to oppose them.

2 These ' considerable hostile forces ' consisted of the 1th Division and
Byng's Cavalry Division, which reached Ypres on \±th October, after
having moved up to Ghent to help cover the retreat of the Belgian army
from Antwerp.

8 THE BATTLE ON THE YSER AND OF YPRES

and to await the attack of our new Fourth Army
against the left flank of the enemy. The offensive
action of the Fourth Army after its deployment was
to be so directed that the III Reserve Corps, which
now belonged to it, should move as its right wing in
echelon along the coast, whilst its left was to advance
through Menin.

In accordance with these orders the III Reserve
Corps occupied Ostend on the 15th, its left wing reach-
ing the line of the Thourout-Roulers road. The Corps
was then ordered not to advance further for a few
days, so as to avoid the attention of the British and
French, who were advancing against the north wing
of the Sixth Army, being drawn prematurely to move-
ments in this neighbourhood. Only patrols there-
fore were sent out to reconnoitre across the Yser and
the canal south of it. On the 17th the XXII, XXIII,
XXVI and XXVII Reserve Corps reached the line
Oostcamp (south of Bruges )-Thielt — point six miles
east of Courtrai. On the advance of these four new
Corps, the III Reserve Corps was to draw away to
the right wing, and during the 17th and the following
morning it moved up to the sector of attack allotted
to it immediately south of the coast, and cleared the
front of the Fourth Army. The reconnaissance
activity of the previous days had in places led to severe
fighting, especially on the southern wing in front of
the 6th Reserve Division. It was found that the
Belgian rearguards still held part of the ground east
of the Yser and of the canal to Ypres. Any attempt
to advance beyond this water-barrier was out of the
question, as the bridges had been blown up and the
whole line put in a state of defence.

PRELIMINARY REMARKS 9

The screening of the advancing Fourth Army by the
III Reserve Corps was a brilliant success. At midday
on the 18th, Field-Marshal French, who was to direct
the enemy's attack from the line of the Yser, was still
in ignorance of our new Army. He believed he had
time to prepare for his attack, and his only immediate
care was to secure the line from Armentieres to the
sea for the deployment. After the events on the
Marne, Field-Marshal French had particularly requested
General Joffre, the Allied commander,1 that he might
be placed on the northern flank of the line. He would
then be close to Calais, which had already become an
English town,2 he would be able to protect the com-
munications to his country ; and, further, the fame to
be gained by a decisive and final victory attracted
this ambitious commander to the north. As a result
the II British Corps under General Smith-Dorrien
was now in action against the strong German positions
between Vermelles (four miles south-west of La Bassee)
and Laventie (west of Lille).3 Further to the north
the III British Corps was fighting against the Saxons
advancing from Lille and our I, II and IV Cavalry
Corps.4 The I British Cavalry Corps was covering the

1 Needless to point out that General Joffre was never ' Allied
Commander.'

2 At this date Calais had not yet become a base for the British
army, and there were no British establishments of any kind there.

3 The II Corps completed its detrainment at Abbeville on 8th October,
and moved forward, covered by the cavalry, on the llth ; by the 18th it
had reached the line Givenchy-Villaines-Lorgies-Herlies after con-
siderable fighting.

4 On 18th October the III Corps had its left Division, the 4th, astride
the Lysfrom Ploegsteert Wood to Frelinghien, while the Qth Division on
the right had reached the line Premesques-Ennetieres-Badinghem (S.E.
of Armentieres). General Conneau's French Cavalry Corps filled the
gap between its right and the left of the II Corps.

10 THE BATTLE ON THE YSER AND OF YPRES

hostile advance on the line Messines-Gheluvelt, south-
east of Ypres.1 Immediately to the north again, the
newly formed IV British Corps, consisting of the 7th
Infantry Division and 3rd Cavalry Division, had
arrived in the area Gheluvelt-Zonnebeke, pursued in
its retreat by von Beseler's columns (III Reserve
Corps). On its left the I British Corps had marched
up to Bixschoote,2 and the gap between this place and
Dixmude had been closed by a French Cavalry Divi-
sion which connected up with the Belgian Army.
The last, reinforced by two French Territorial divi-
sions, was engaged in preparing the line of the Yser up
to the sea for the most stubborn defence. These
strong forces were to cover the arrival of the VIII and
X French Corps 3 and were to deliver the first blow
against our supposed right wing.

On the 18th one of our cyclist patrols which had gone
out far in advance of its Corps was surrounded near
Roulers, and it was only by its capture that the enemy
definitely discovered the arrival of the new German
Corps, whose formation, however, had not been un-
known to him, thanks to his good Secret Service system.
Field-Marshal French was now confronted with a new
situation. The preparations for his big attack were not
yet completed. The superiority of the masses already
concentrated did not yet appear to him to be suffi-

1 The British Cavalry Corps (there was only one, the number is
superfluous and suggests there were more) did not extend as far as Ghelu-
velt: its left was on the Ypres-Comines canal near Houthem.

2 The I Corps did not reach Bixschoote on 18th October : its leading
Division, the 2nd, did not reach the area Poperinghe-Boeschepe till
\§th October : the 1st Division was still detraining in the Hazebrouck
area on 18th October.

z ' Armee ' in the original, but this is no doubt a misprint.

PRELIMINARY REMARKS 11

cient to guarantee success against the enemy's advance.
The British commander therefore decided to remain
on the defensive x against our new Fourth Army, until
the completion of the French concentration. His line
was already closed up to the sea, it was naturally
strong, and fresh troops were arriving daily. The
danger threatening Dunkirk and Calais had the effect
of making England put forth her full energy ; the
British troops fought desperately to defend every inch
of ground, using every possible means to keep up the
sinking spirits of the Belgians. They demanded and
received rapid assistance from the French, and were
backed up by fresh reinforcements from England.

From the German point of view the patriotic enthu-
siasm and unconditional determination to win the
war which pervaded the new Fourth Army gave every
prospect of successfully closing with the enemy, who
was apparently still engaged in concentrating and
reorganising his forces, and gaining Calais, the aim
and object of the 1914 campaign.

Our offensive, however, struck against a powerful
army, fully deployed and ready to meet us. The
British boast that they held up our attack with a
great inferiority of numbers, but this was only true
in the case of the 7th Division during the first two
days in the small sector ZONNEBEKE-GHELUVELT. On
22nd October between ABMENTIERES and the sea
there were eight Corps opposed to the seven attack-
ing German Corps ; and, besides, the enemy had pre-
pared a series of lines of strong trenches covered by

1 This statement as to Sir J. French's intentions is inaccurate. The
II and III Corps were ordered to stand on the defensive, but the orders
issued to the I Corps on 2,0th October were for an attack.

12 THE BATTLE ON THE YSER AND OF YPRES

an extensive system of artificial obstacles. In the
course of the operations that developed, the relative
strength of the opposing forces never appreciably
altered in our favour.1 The moral strength of our
troops made up for the numerical superiority of the
enemy. Our attack drove the hostile lines well back
and destroyed, it is hoped for ever, the ambition of
our opponent to regain Belgium by force of arms.

The great desire of the Germans to defeat the
hostile northern wing, and to hit hardest the most
hated of all our enemies, and, on the other side, the
obstinate determination of the British to hold on to
the passages to their country, and to carry out the
offensive to the Rhine with all their resources, resulted
in this battle being one of the most severe of the whole
war. The deeds of our troops, old and young, in the
battle on the YSER and of YPRES can never be suffi-
ciently praised, and in spite of great losses their
enthusiasm remained unchecked and their offensive
spirit unbroken.

1 Between Armentieres and the sea the British had only the I Corps,
less than half the III Corps, the Cavalry Corps, the IV Corps (composed
of one Division only], the French had a weak Cavalry Corps and two
Territorial Divisions, the six Belgian Divisions were reduced to about
one half of their establishment, so that the claim that the Allied forces
outnumbered the Germans is hardly tenable. The value of the statement
that ' the relative strength of the opposing forces never appreciably
altered in our favour ' will become apparent as the book is read, and
as it is shown that the same British units, reinforced only by a weak
composite Division drawn from the II Corps, were attacked by a suc-
cession of fresh German Corps, that the same units who repulsed the
attacks at Langemarck on 23rd October, were in line at Gheluvelt on
3lst October when the Prussian Guard attacked on llth November.
See also Introduction.

THE THEATRE OF OPERATIONS

THE country in which it was hoped to bring about
the final decision of the campaign of 1914 was not
favourable to an attack from east to west.

Western Flanders, the most western part of Belgium,
is almost completely flat, and lies only slightly above
sea -level, and in some parts is even below it. Mount
KEMMEL, in the south, is the only exception ; rising
to a height of over 500 feet, it is the watch-
tower of Western Flanders. Before the war it was
a well-wooded ridge with pretty enclosures and
villages. From its slopes and summits could be
seen the whole countryside from LILLE to MENIN and
DIXMUDE.

The possession of this hill was of great importance.
Our cavalry actually occupied it during the early
days of October, but when the enemy advanced he
immediately attacked it. The XIX Saxon Corps was
still too far away to help, and so Mount KEMMEL fell
into the enemy's hands. During the battle of YPRES
it was his best observation post, and of the utmost
assistance to his artillery.

We repeatedly succeeded in gaining a footing on
the eastern crest of the ridge in front of YPEES, but
in the autumn of 1914, as also later in the war, this
was always the signal for the most desperate fighting.

13

14 THE BATTLE ON THE YSER AND OF YPRES

It was thus that the heights of ST. ELOi,1 the high-
lying buildings of HOOGE and the village of WYT-
SCHAETE won their sanguinary fame.

Lying in the midst of luxuriant meadows, with its
high ramparts and fine buildings, YPRES was formerly
one of the most picturesque towns in Flanders. In
the fourteenth century it had a considerable import-
ance, and became the centre of the cloth-weaving
trade on its introduction from Italy. BRUGES, lying
close to the coast, became the market for its wares.
The Cloth weavers' Guild, which accumulated great
wealth, erected in YPRES a fine Gothic hall, whose
towers with those of St. Martin's Church were land-
marks for miles round. In modern times, however,
the importance of the town greatly diminished. The
cloth-weaving industry drifted away to the factories
of MENIN and COURTRAI ; and YPRES, like its dead
neighbour BRUGES, remained only a half-forgotten
memory of its former brilliance.

The war has brought fresh importance to the town,
but of a mournful kind. On the impact of the German
and Anglo-French masses in Flanders in the autumn
of 1914, it became the central pivot of the operations.
The enemy dug his heels into the high ground in front
of it ; for, as an Englishman has written, it had become
a point of honour to hold the town. YPRES lay so
close to the front that our advance could be seen from
its towers, and the enemy was able to use it for con-
cealing his batteries and sheltering his reserves. For
the sake of our troops we had to bring it under fire ;

1 ' The heights of St. Eloi ' is a phrase which suggests that the
author cannot have visited the ground nor studied a contoured map of
the area round Ypres,

THE THEATRE OF OPERATIONS 15

for German life is more precious than the finest Gothic
architecture. Thus the mythical death of YPRES
became a reality : no tower now sends forth its light
across the countryside, and a wilderness of wrecked
and burnt -out houses replaces the pretty town so full
of legend and tradition in the history of Flanders.

The streams which run northwards from the hills
about YPRES unite for the most part near the town
and flow into the YSER canal, which connects the
LYS at COMINES with the sea at NIEUPORT. This
canal passes through the YPRES ridge near HOLLEBEKE
and, following northwards the course of a small canal-
ised tributary of the YSER, meets the YSER itself south
of DIXMUDE. The dunes at NIEUPORT have been cut
through by engineers for its exit to the sea. It is
only from DIXMUDE northwards that the canal becomes
an obstacle which requires proper bridging equip-
ment for its passage. Its high embankments to the
south of DIXMUDE, however, give excellent cover in
the otherwise flat country and greatly simplify the
task of the defender.

The canal acquired a decisive importance when the
hard-pressed Belgians, during the battle on the night
of 29th-30th October, let in the sea at flood-tide
through the sluices into the canal, and then by blow-
ing up the sluice-gates at NIEUPORT, allowed it to
flood the battlefield along the lower YSER. By this
means they succeeded in placing broad stretches of
country under water, so much so that any extensive
military operations in that district became out of the
question. The high water-level greatly influenced all
movements over a very large area. By his order the
King of the Belgians destroyed for years the natural

16 THE BATTLE ON THE YSER AND OF YPKES

wealth of a considerable part of his fertile country,
for the sea-water must have ruined all vegetation
down to its very roots.

The country on both sides of the canal is flat, and
difficult for observation purposes. The high level of
the water necessitates drainage of the meadows, which
for this purpose are intersected by deep dykes which
have muddy bottoms. The banks of the dykes are
bordered with willows, and thick-set hedges form the
boundaries of the cultivated areas. Generally speak-
ing, the villages do not consist of groups of houses :
the farms are dispersed either singly, or in rows form-
ing a single street. The country is densely populated
and is consequently well provided with roads. But
these are only good where they have been made on
embankments and are paved. The frequent rains,
which begin towards the end of October, rapidly turn
the other roads into mere mud tracks and in many
cases make them quite useless for long columns of
traffic.

The digging of trenches was greatly complicated by
rain and surface-water. The loam soil was on the
whole easy to work in ; but it was only on the high
ground that trenches could be dug deep enough to
give sufficient cover against the enemy's artillery fire ;
on the flat, low-lying ground they could not in many
cases be made more than two feet deep.

A few miles south of the coast the country assumes
quite another character : there are no more hedges
and canals : instead gently rolling sand-hills separate
the land from the sea, and this deposited sand is not
fertile like the plains south of them. A belt of dunes
prevents the sea encroaching on the land.

THE THEATRE OF OPERATIONS 17

The greatest trouble of the attacker in all parts of
Flanders is the difficulty of observation. The enemy,
fighting in his own country,1 had every advantage,
while our artillery observation posts were only found
with the utmost trouble. Our fire had to be directed
from the front line, and it frequently happened that
our brave artillerymen had to bring up their guns
into the front infantry lines in order to use them
effectively. Although the enemy was able to range
extremely accurately on our guns which were thus
quickly disclosed, nothing could prevent the German
gunners from following the attacking infantry.

Observation from aeroplanes was made very difficult
by the many hedges and villages, so that it took a
long time to discover the enemy's dispositions and
give our artillery good targets.

Finally, the flat nature of the country and the con-
sequent limitations of view were all to the advantage
of the defenders, who were everywhere able to surprise
the attackers. Our troops were always finding fresh
defensive lines in front of them without knowing
whether they were occupied or not. The British,
many of whom had fought in a colonial war against
the most cunning of enemies in equally difficult country,
allowed the attacker to come to close quarters and
then opened a devastating fire at point-blank range
from rifles and machine-guns concealed in houses and
trees.

In many cases the hedges and dykes split up the
German attacks so that even the biggest operations
degenerated into disconnected actions which made the

1 The British and French in Belgium were hardly in their own.
country.

B

18 THE BATTLE ON THE YSER AND OF YPRES

greatest demands on the powers of endurance and
individual skill of our volunteers. In spite of all
these difficulties our men, both old and young, even
when left to act on their own initiative, showed a spirit
of heroism and self-sacrifice which makes the battle
on the YSER a sacred memory both for the Army and
the Nation, and every one who took part in it may say
with pride, * I was there.'

THE ADVANCE OF THE FOURTH ARMY

AN Army Order of 16th October 1914 gave the
following instructions for the 18th : —

The III Reserve Corps to march to the line

COXYDE-FURNES-OEREN, West of the YSER.

The XXII Reserve Corps to the line AERTRYCKE-

THOUROUT.
The XXIII Reserve Corps to the line LICHTER-

VELDE-ARDOYE.
The XXVI Reserve Corps to the Area EMEL-

GHEM-ISEGHEM, and, on the left wing, the

XXVII Reserve Corps to the line LENDE-

LEDE-COTJRTRAI.

The XXII, XXIII, XXVI and XXVII Reserve
Corps all reached their appointed destinations on the
evening of the 18th without meeting any strong
resistance. Along almost the whole front our advanced
guards and patrols came into touch with weak hostile
detachments who were awaiting our advance well
entrenched, and surprised us with infantry and artillery
fire. At ROTJLERS a hot skirmish took place. Aero-
planes circling round, motor-lorries bustling about,
and cavalry patrols pushing well forward showed
that the British now realised the strength of the new
German forces.

In the meantime, on the extreme right wing of the

19

DISPOSITIONS ON OCTOBER 20™ 1914.

FOURTH
ARMY

2NDFRENCH

D.v»sK)N FRENCH CAV Div

I BRITISH CoRp

CORPS JYBRITISH CORPS*--
I BRITISH CORP

Audenardf

m» Approximate front.

... Junction of Fourth and Sixth Armies.

m . Direction of advance of the Fourth Army.

On 20th October none of the I British Corps were on the right
of the IV Corps : the map should read British Cavalry Corps.
It is also inaccurate to represent the whole III British Corps
as north of Armentieres — only one of its Divisions was —
while the II Corps was certainly too closely pressed to detach
any troops to the north as depicted in the diagram.

THE ADVANCE OF THE FOURTH ARMY 21

Army, the troops of General von Beseler had opened
the battle on the YSEE. During its advance north-
wards to cross the Yser at the appointed places the
III Reserve Corps had encountered strong opposition
east of the river -barrier. The men knew they were
on the decisive wing of the attack, and they pushed
ahead everywhere regardless of loss. In a rapid
assault the 4th Ersatz Division captured WESTENDE
from the Belgians, although a gallant defence was put
up, and in spite of the fact that British torpedo-boats
and cruisers took part in the action from the sea with
their heavy artillery l both during the advance and
the fight for the town. Further south the 5th Reserve
Division deployed to attack a strongly entrenched
hostile position. The 3rd Reserve J tiger Battalion
captured the obstinately defended village of ST. PIERRE
CAPPELLE after severe hand-to-hand fighting, whilst the
main body of the division succeeded in pushing forward
to the neighbourhood of SCHOORE. The 6th Reserve
Division, commanded by General von Neudorff, also
closed with the enemy. It captured LEKE, and KEYEM,
defended by the 4th Belgian Division ; but even this
Brandenburg Division, for all its war experience, found
the task of forcing the crossings over the YSER too
much for it.

The fighting on 18th October resulted in bringing
us a thousand or two thousand yards nearer the YSER,
but it had shown that the fight for the river line was
to be a severe one. The Belgians seemed determined
to sell the last acres of their kingdom only at the
highest possible price. Four lines of trenches had
been dug, and it could be seen that every modern

1 British torpedo boats do not carry ' heavy artillery. '

22 THE BATTLE ON THE YSER AND OF YPRES

scientific resource had been employed in putting the
villages on the eastern bank of the river into a state
of defence. A great number of guns, very skilfully
placed and concealed, shelled the ground for a con-
siderable distance east of the river, and in addition
to this our right flank was enfiladed by the heavy
naval guns from the sea. Battleships, cruisers and
torpedo-boats worried the rear and flank of the 4th
Ersatz Division with their fire, and the British had
even brought heavy artillery on flat -bottomed boats
close inshore.1 They used a great quantity of ammu-
nition, but the effect of it all was only slight, for
the fire of the naval guns was much dispersed and
indicated bad observation. It became still more
erratic when our long-range guns were brought into
action against the British Fleet. Detachments of the
4th Ersatz Division had to be echeloned back as far
as Ostend, in order to defend the coast against hostile
landings. During the day the General Commanding
the III Reserve Corps decided not to allow the 4th
Ersatz Division to cross the YSER at NIETJPORT, on
account of the heavy fire from the British naval guns,
but to make it pass with the main body of the Corps
behind the 5th Reserve Division in whose area the
fight appeared to be progressing favourably. The
Ersatz Division was informed accordingly. On the
19th another effort would have to be made to force
the crossings of the river by frontal attack, for every-
where to the south strong opposition had been en-
countered. From near DIXMUDE French troops carried
on the line of the compact Belgian Army. It was

1 The vessels described as flat-bottomed boats were presumably the
Monitors ' Severn,' ' Humbert and ' Mersey.*

THE ADVANCE OF THE FOURTH ARMY 23

against these that the new Reserve Corps were now
advancing.

On the night of the 18th and morning of the 19th
October a strong attack was delivered from the west
by the 4th Belgian Division, and from the south-west
by a brigade of the 5th Belgian Division and a brigade
of French Marine Fusiliers under Admiral Ronarch,
against KEYEM, held by part of the 6th Reserve Divi-
sion. They were driven back after heavy fighting.
During the 19th the southern wing of the Branden-
burg (III) Reserve Corps succeeded in advancing
nearer the river and, on its left, part of the artillery
of the XXII Reserve Corps came into action in support
of it, thereby partly relieving the III Reserve Corps,
which until that day had been fighting unassisted.

On the 19th more or less heavy fighting developed
on the whole front of the Fourth Army. The XXII
Reserve Corps advanced on BBEEST and DIXMUDE
and fought its way up into line with the III Reserve
Corps. In front of it lay the strong bridge-head
of DIXMUDE, well provided with heavy guns. The
whole XXIII Reserve Corps had to be deployed into
battle-formation, as every locality was obstinately de-
fended by the enemy. In the advance of the 45th
Reserve Division the 209th Reserve Regiment late in
the evening took HANDZAEME after severe street
fighting, and the 212th Reserve Regiment took the
village of GITS, whilst CORTEMARCK was evacuated by
the enemy during the attack. The 46th Reserve
Division in a running fight crossed the main road to
THOUROUT, north of ROULERS, and by the evening
had arrived close to STADEN. Heavy street fighting
in the latter place continued during the night : the

24 THE BATTLE ON THE YSEK AND OF YPRES

enemy, supported by the population, offered strong
resistance in every house, so that isolated actions con-
tinued behind our front lines, endangering the cohesion
of the attacking troops, but never to a serious extent.
The XXVI Reserve Corps encountered strong oppo-
sition at RTJMBEKE, south-east of ROTJLERS ; but all
the enemy's efforts were in vain, and the 233rd Reserve
Infantry Regiment, under the eyes of its Corps Com-
mander, General von Hiigel, forced its way through
the rows of houses, many of which were defended with
light artillery and machine-guns. A very heavy fight
took place for the possession of ROTJLERS, which was
stubbornly defended by the French ; barricades were
put up across the streets, machine-guns fired from
holes in the roofs and windows, and concealed mines
exploded among the advancing troops. In spite of
all this, by 5 P.M. ROULERS was taken by the 233rd,
234th and 235th Reserve Infantry Regiments, attack-
ing from north, east and south respectively. Further
to the south, after a small skirmish with British cavalry,
the 52nd Reserve Division reached MORSLEDE, its
objective for the day. On its left again, the XXVII
Reserve Corps had come into contact with the 3rd
British Cavalry Division which tried to hold up the
Corps in an advanced position at ROLLEGHEM-CAPPELLE .
After a lively encounter the British cavalry was
thrown back on to the 7th British Division, which
held a strong position about DADiZEELE.1

1 This narrative omits the advance of the 1th Division on Menin,
19th October, which was going well when it had to be suspended on
account of the threatening advance of strong German columns from the
eastward. The division was skilfully extricated and fell back to the line
Kruseik-Noordwesthoek-Broodseinde-Zonnebeke^ the Germans failing
to press their pursuit^

THE ADVANCE OF THE FOURTH ARMY 25

Thus by the evening of 19th October the situation
had been considerably cleared up, in so far as we now
knew that the Belgians, French and British not only
held the YSER and the YPRES canal, but also the high
ground east and north-east of YPRES. Everything
pointed to the fact that an unexpectedly strong
opponent was awaiting us in this difficult country,
and that a very arduous task confronted the com-
paratively untrained troops of Duke Albert of Wiirtem-
burg's Army. In the meantime the Commander of
the Sixth Army, Crown Prince Rupert of Bavaria,
after a discussion at Army Headquarters with General
von Falkenhayn, Chief of the General Staff, decided
to renew the attack, as the left wing of the Fourth
Army had now come up on his immediate right. In
consequence of this decision, the XIII Corps was moved
from its position on the line MENEST-WARNETON and
replaced by three Cavalry Divisions of the IV Cavalry
Corps. There can be no doubt that the attacks of
the Sixth Army, which began on the 20th and were
continued with frequent reinforcements of fresh troops,
had the effect of holding the enemy and drawing a
strong force to meet them. They were not, however,
destined to have any decisive success, for the offensive
strength of the Sixth Army had been reduced by
previous fighting, and it was not sufficient to break
through the enemy's strongly entrenched positions.1
All the more therefore were the hopes of Germany
centred in the Fourth Army, which was fighting further
northwards, for in its hands lay the fate of the cam-
paign in Western Europe at this period.

1 The constant exaggeration by this narrative of the strength of very
hastily constructed British trenches is a noteworthy feature*

THE OPERATIONS OF THE FOURTH ARMY
FROM 20TH OCTOBER TO SlST OCTOBER 1914

ON 20th October the battle broke out along the
whole line, on a front of about sixty miles. The enemy
had got into position, and was prepared to meet the
attack of Duke Albert of Wiirtemburg's Army. On
the very day that the British, French and Belgians
intended to begin their advance they found them-
selves compelled to exert all their strength to maintain
their positions against our offensive. The British
and French had to bring up constant reinforcements,
and a hard and bitter struggle began for every yard of
ground. The spirit in which our opponents were
fighting is reflected in an order of the 4th Belgian
Division, picked up in PERVYSE on 1 6th October. This
ran : ' The fate of the whole campaign probably depends
on our resistance. I (General Michel) implore officers
and men, notwithstanding what efforts they may be
called upon to make, to do even more than their mere
duty. The salvation of the country and therefore of
each individual among us depends on it. Let us then
resist to our utmost.'

We shall see how far the soldiers of the Fourth Army,
opposed to such a determined and numerically superior
enemy, were able to justify the confidence which had
been placed in them, a confidence expressed in the
following proclamations by their highest commanders
on their arrival in Belgium ;

THE OPEKATIONS OF THE FOURTH ARMY 27

GREAT HEADQUARTERS,

Uth October 1914.

To THE FOURTH ARMY, — I offer my welcome to the

Fourth Army, and especially to its newly -formed Reserve

Corps, and I am confident that these troops will act with the

same devotion and bravery as the rest of the German Army.

Advance, with the help of God — my watchword.

(Signed) WILLIAM, I. R.
ARMY ORDER.

I am pleased to take over the command of the Army
entrusted to me by the Emperor. I am fully confident
that the Corps which have been called upon to bring about
the final decision in this theatre of war will do their duty
to their last breath with the old German spirit of courage
and trust, and that every officer and every man is ready
to give his last drop of blood for the just and sacred cause
of our Fatherland. With God's assistance victory will
then crown our efforts.

Up and at the enemy. Hurrah for the Emperor.

(Signed) DUKE ALBERT OF WURTEMBURG,

General and Army Commander.
ARMY HEADQUARTERS, BRUSSELS,
15th October 1914.

Who can deny that the task set to the Fourth Army
was not an infinitely difficult one. It would have
probably been achieved nevertheless if the Belgians
at the moment of their greatest peril had not called
the sea to their aid to bring the German attack to a
halt. Let us, however, now get down to the facts.

On 20th October the III Reserve Corps, the batter-
ing ram of the Fourth Army, began an attack
with its 5th Reserve Division, supported by almost
the whole of the Corps artillery, against the sector of
the Yser west of the line MANNEKENSVERE-SCHOOR-

28 THE BATTLE ON THE YSER AND OF YPRES

BAKKE. The 4th Ersatz Division to the north and the
6th Reserve Division to the south co-operated. By
the early hours of the 22nd, the 5th and 6th Reserve
Divisions had driven the enemy back across the river
in spite of the support given him by British and French
heavy batteries.1 In front of the 4th Ersatz Division
the enemy still held a bridge-head at LOMBARTZYDE.
At 8.15 A.M. on the 22nd the glad tidings reached the
Staff of the 6th Reserve Division, that part of the
26th Reserve Infantry Regiment had crossed the
YSER. Under cover of darkness the 1st and 2nd
Battalions of this regiment had worked their way up
to the north-eastern part of the bend of the YSER,
south of SCHOORE, and had got into the enemy's out-
posts on the eastern bank with the bayonet. Not a
shot had been fired, and not an unnecessary noise had
disturbed the quiet of the dawning day. Volunteers
from the engineers silently and rapidly laid bridging
material over the canal. In addition an old foot-
bridge west of KEYEM, which had been blown up and
lay in the water, was very quickly made serviceable
again with some planks and baulks. The Belgians
had considered their position sufficiently protected by
the river, and by the outposts along the eastern bank.
By 6 A.M. German patrols were on the far side of the
YSER, and the enemy's infantry and machine-gun fire
began only when they started to make a further
advance. Three companies of the 1st and two com-
panies of the 2nd Battalion, however, as well as part
of the 24th Reserve Infantry Regiment, had already
crossed the temporary bridges at the double and taken

1 There were no British heavy batteries in this quarter, unless it is
to the guns of Rear-Admiral Hood's squadron that reference is made.

THE OPERATIONS OF THE FOURTH ARMY 29

up a position on the western bank : so that, in all,
2J battalions and a machine-gun company were
now on the western bank.

The enemy realised the seriousness of the situa-
tion, and prepared a thoroughly unpleasant day for
those who had crossed. Heavy and light guns of
the British and French artillery * hammered inces-
santly against the narrow German bridge-head and
the bridges to it. Lying without cover in the swampy
meadows the infantry was exposed beyond all help
to the enemy's rifle and machine-gun fire from west
and south-west. The small force repulsed counter-
attacks again and again, but to attempt sending rein-
forcements across to it was hopeless. Some gallant
gunners, however, who had brought their guns close
up to the eastern bank, were able to give great help
to their friends in their critical situation. Thus
assisted the infantry succeeded in holding the posi-
tion, and during the following night was able to make
it sufficiently strong to afford very small prospect of
success to any further hostile efforts. During the
night several Belgian attacks with strong forces were
repulsed with heavy loss, and the 6th Reserve Divi-
sion was able to put a further 2J battalions across
to the western bank of the YSEB bend. On the
23rd we gained possession of TEKVAETE, and the
dangerous enfilade fire on our new positions was
thereby considerably diminished. Dawn on 24th
October saw all the infantry of the 6th Reserve Divi-
sion west of the river. A pontoon bridge was thrown
across the north-eastern part of the YSER bend, but
it was still impossible to bring guns forward on account

1 There was no British artillery present in this quarter*

30 THE BATTLE ON THE YSER AND OF YPRES

of the enemy's heavy artillery fire. The 5th Reserve
Division still lay in its battle positions along the
river bank north of SCHOORBAKKE, but every time
attempts were made to cross the French and Belgian
artillery smashed the bridges to pieces. The 4th
Ersatz Division suffered heavily, as it was subjected
to constant artillery fire from three sides, and to
entrench was hopeless on account of the shifting sands
and the high level of the ground water. Whenever
fire ceased during the night strong hostile attacks soon
followed ; but they were all repulsed. The withdrawal
of the main body of the Ersatz Division behind the
6th Reserve Division to cross the YSER, as General
von Beseler had once planned, had become impractic-
able for the moment, for it had been discovered through
the statements of prisoners that the 42nd French
Division had arrived in NIEUPOET to assist the Belgians.
The 4th Ersatz Division, which had been weakened
on the 18th by the transfer of one of its three brigades
to the 5th Reserve Division, could not be expected to
bring the new enemy to his knees by the running fight
that it had been hitherto conducting. The canal alone
was sufficient obstacle to make this impracticable ;
in addition, the fire of the enemy's naval guns from the
sea prevented any large offensive operations in the
area in question. Thus the Ersatz troops were com-
pelled to resign themselves to the weary task of main-
taining their positions under the cross-fire of guns of
every calibre, to driving back the hostile attacks, and
to holding the Belgian and French forces off in front
of them by continually threatening to take the offen-
sive. It was not until some long-range batteries
were placed at the disposal of the division that its

THE OPERATIONS OF THE FOURTH ARMY 31

position improved. A couple of direct hits on the
enemy's ships soon taught them that they could no
longer carry on their good work undisturbed. Their
activity at once noticeably decreased, and the more
the German coast -guns gave tongue seawards from
the dunes, the further the ships moved away from
the coast and the less were they seen.

General von Beseler never for a moment doubted
that the decision lay with the 5th and 6th Reserve
Divisions, especially as the four Corps of the Fourth
Army, fighting further south, had not yet been able
to reach the canal-barrier with any considerable forces.

The XXII Reserve Corps, commanded by General
of Cavalry von Falkenhayn, had in the meantime
come into line south of General von Beseler 's troops,
and had already fought some successful actions. It
had arrived on the 19th in the district east of BEEBST
and about VLADSLOO, just in time to help in driving
back the Franco -Belgian attack against the southern
flank of the 6th Reserve Division.* That same even-
ing it was ordered to attack from north and south
against the DIXMTJDE bridge-head, an exceptionally
difficult task. In addition to the fact that the
swampy meadows of the YSER canal limited freedom
of movement to an enormous extent, the HAND-
ZAEME canal, running at right angles to it from east
to west, formed a most difficult obstacle. DIX-
MTJDE lay at the junction of these two waterways,
and behind its bridge-head lines were the Belgian
* Iron ' Brigade under Colonel Meiser, the French
Marine Fusilier Brigade under Admiral Ronarch, and
part of the 5th Belgian Division, determined to defend

* See pages 23-24.

32 THE BATTLE ON THE YSER AND OF YPRES

the place at all costs. About eighty guns of every
calibre commanded with frontal and enfilade fire the
ground over which Falkenhayn's Corps would have
to attack. On the 20th, in spite of all these difficulties,
the 44th Reserve Division, on the northern wing of
the Corps, captured BEEBST and reached the canal
bank west of KASTEELHOEK in touch with von Beseler's
Corps. The 43rd Reserve Division, advancing on the
left wing, took VLADSLOO and several villages south-
east of it on the northern bank of the HANDZAEME
Canal. By the light of the conflagration of those
villages the reach of the canal between EESSEN and
ZARREN was crossed on hastily constructed foot-
bridges, and a further advance made in a south-
westerly direction. EESSEN itself was occupied, and
the attack brought us to within a hundred yards of
the enemy. He realised his extremely critical situa-
tion,* and his cyclists and all possible reserves at hand
were put in to the fight. Owing to the severe hostile
artillery fire the German losses were by no means
slight. On one occasion when our advancing infantry
units were losing touch with one another in this diffi-
cult country, a big hostile counter-attack was delivered
from DIXMTJDE. After a heavy struggle the onrush of
the enemy was held up, mainly owing to our artillery,
which heroically brought its guns up into position
immediately behind the infantry front line.

During the night the 43rd Reserve Division re-
organised in order to recommence its attack on the
bridge-head from east and south-east on the following
morning. Days of terrific fighting ensued. The
garrison of the bridge-head had received orders to

* See Les pages de gloire de VArmee Beige : a Dixmuide.

THE OPERATIONS OF THE FOURTH ARMY 33

hold out to the last man, and had been informed that
any one who attempted to desert would be shot without
mercy by men placed for this purpose to guard all the
exits from the town. The Belgians were indeed fight-
ing for their very existence as a nation. Neverthe-
less by the 21st October the 43rd Reserve Division,
which consisted of volunteers from the Guard Corps
Reservists, had taken the chateau south of DIXMUDE,
and WOUMEN. The opposing sides lay within a
hundred yards of each other. Artillery preparation,
attack and counter-attack went on incessantly. Our
artillery did fearful havoc and DIXMUDE was in flames.
The Franco -Belgian garrison was, however, constantly
reinforced, and conducted itself most gallantly. From
the north the battalions of the 44th Reserve Division
were able to advance slightly and drive the enemy
back on to the town, and German batteries were
brought up into, and at times even in front of, the
infantry front line. Although we were unable to force
our way into DIXMUDE, on the evening of the 23rd
our troops were in position all round it.

On the left of the XXII Reserve Corps, the XXIII
Reserve Corps, under General of Cavalry von Kleist,
had advanced at 9 A.M. on 20th October on the front
HANDZAEME-STADEN in order to reach the canal on
the line NOOBDSCHOOTE-BIXSCHOOTE. The 45th Re-
serve Division was on the right and the 46th Reserve
Division on the left . After some hours of street fighting
STADEN was finally surrounded and taken by the 46th
Reserve Division. By nightfall a line from CLERCKEN
to the eastern edge of HOUTHULST Forest was reached.
On the 21st the Corps had to cross a stretch of country
which put these partially trained troops and their

c

34 THE BATTLE ON THE YSER AND OF YPRES

inexperienced officers to a very severe test. The great
forest of HOUTHTJLST with its dense undergrowth made
it exceedingly difficult to keep direction in the attack
and to maintain communication between units fighting
an invisible opponent. Small swampy streams such
as the STEENEBECK offered favourable opportunities
to the enemy to put up a strong defence behind a
succession of depressions. Thus our gallant troops
after every successful assault found themselves con-
fronted by another strong position : but unwavering
and regardless of loss, they continued their advance.

By the evening of the 21st the 46th Reserve Divi-
sion had completely driven the enemy out of HOUT-
HULST Forest,1 whilst its sister-division had advanced
north of the STEENEBECK, and with its northern wing
supporting the Corps fighting immediately north of
it, had pushed forward to beyond WOTJMEN. On the
morning of the 22nd the heavy artillery opened fire
against the French positions on the YSER canal to
prepare the break-through. Unfortunately however
only the northern Division was able to reach the sector
allotted to the Corps, and an Army Order directed the
46th Reserve Division to the south-west against the line
BIXSCHOOTE-LANGEMARCK, in order to help carry for-

1 The narrative omits to state precisely the nature of the opposition
which was encountered in the Houthulst area. Actually the Allied
force in this quarter merely consisted of General de Mitry's French
Cavalry Corps and a few battalions of French Cyclists and Territorials.
These were driven back without being able to offer much resistance, and
in consequence uncovered the flank of the I British Corps just as it began
its advance north-east of Ypres on Poelcapelle and Passchendaele
(2lst October). This forced Sir Douglas Haig to divert his reserves
to protect his left flank t and therefore to suspend his attack which had
been making good progress on a line south-east from Langemarck to
Zonnebeke, where he linked up with the left of the 1th Division.

THE OPERATIONS OF THE FOURTH ARMY 35

ward the attack of the XXVI Reserve Corps, which
was completely held up in front of the latter place. As
a result of this the advance of von Kleist's Corps also
came to a standstill, although it had achieved consider-
able fame during the day. In spite of a desperate
resistance the 210th Reserve Regiment stormed the
strongly entrenched village of MERCKEM and the village
of LUYGHEM lying north of it ; a daring attack by the
209th and 212th Reserve Regiments broke through
the enemy's positions on the MURTJE VAART, whilst
the 46th Reserve Division attempted to overrun the
KORTEBECK sector, supported by the concentrated
fire of its artillery in position along the south-western
edge of HOUTHTJLST Forest. The 216th Reserve Regi-
ment took MANGELAERE by storm, in doing which its
gallant commander, Colonel von Grothe, was killed
at the head of his troops. The 1st British Division
held a strong position along the KORTEBECK, in touch
with the French, and artillery of every calibre near
NOORDSCHOOTE enfiladed the German attack.1 The
British themselves speak of our attack as a magni-

1 By no means the whole of the 1st British Division was holding the
line of the Kortebeck. From Steenstraate, which was held by the 1st
Scots Guards, who were never seriously pressed on 22nd October, the
1st Cameron Highlanders were extended over a wide front nearly to
Langemarck, where the 1st Coldstream Guards connected them up with
the 3rd Infantry Brigade (1st Queen's, 1st S.W.B., 1st Gloucester, and
2nd Welsh) which was holding a position north and north-east of Lange-
marck. The rest of the infantry of the 1st Division was in reserve,
and only one 18-pounder battery (46th Batty. R.F.A.) was available
to support the Camerons. On the right of the 3rd Infantry Brigade the
2nd Division carried on the line south-east to Zonnebeke with the 5th
Infantry Brigade on its left and the 4th (Guards) Brigade on its right.
This division was about on the line of the Zonnebeke-Langemarck road :
it repulsed several counter-attacks on the afternoon of 2lst October and
night 2lst-22nd.

36 THE BATTLE ON THE YSER AND OF YPRES

ficent feat of arms carried out with infinite courage
and brilliant discipline. The men sang songs as they
charged through a hail of bullets in closed ranks up
to the enemy's defences. The 212th Reserve Regi-
ment under Colonel Basedow, reinforced and carried
forward by fresh detachments of the 209th Reserve
Regiment, pushed its way into the strongly fortified
village of BIXSCHOOTE. The enemy on our side of
the canal, on the line BIXSCHOOTE-LANGEMARCK-
ZONNEBEKE, was threatened with annihilation. BIX-
SCHOOTE commanded the main road and the canal-
crossing to POPERINGHE, where the enemy was detrain-
ing his reinforcements.1 The British therefore fought
with the courage of desperation : for not only was the
fate of the high ground east and north-east of YPRES
now in the balance, but also the chance of being able
to carry out the great Anglo-French offensive which
had been planned. YPRES and the high ground east
of the canal were on no account to be lost, and furious
counter-attacks were therefore delivered against the
intermingled German units. Nevertheless our gallant
volunteers pressed on, using their bayonets and the
butts of their rifles, until the furious hand-to-hand
fighting was finally decided in our favour. At 6.30
that evening BIXSCHOOTE was ours. Unfortunately,
however, owing to an order being misunderstood, it
was lost again during the night : the exhausted attack-
ing troops were to be relieved under cover of darkness,
but they assembled and marched back before the
relieving force had arrived. The enemy, ever watchful,
immediately advanced into the evacuated village and

1 The British troops had not detrained at Poperinghe, but in the
Hazebrouck area.

THE OPERATIONS OF THE FOURTH ARMY 37

took position among the ruins. Simultaneously a
big hostile counter-attack drove the 46th Reserve
Division from the high ground south of KORTEBECK,
which it had captured, and pressed it back beyond
the stream again. The spirit and strength of the
young and inexperienced troops seemed to be broken,
and only a few of the subordinate commanders had
yet learnt how to deal with critical situations. Officers
of the General Staff and Divisional Staffs had to help
to reorganise the men ; they immediately turned and
followed their new leaders, and were taken forward
again to the attack. Thus on the 23rd the high
ground south of the KORTEBECK was won back by
the 46th Reserve Division, but BIXSCHOOTE remained
lost to us, and LANGEMARCK could not be captured.1

1 This account is altogether at variance with the facts. On the after-
noon of 22nd October the Germans at length succeeded in breaking
through the thin and widely extended line of the 1st Cameron High-
landers, and pushed them back south of the Langemarck-Bixschoote
road, capturing the Kortekeer Cabaret. They failed to press forward ;
liowever reinforcements, the 1st Northamptonshires and 1st Black
Watch, arrived, and counter-attacks were made which checked all
further German advance. Next morning (23rd October) further rein-
forcements came up, the 1st Loyal North Lancashires and 2nd K.R.E.C.
of the 2nd Infantry Brigade, part of the 2nd South Staffordshires from
the Qth Infantry Brigade. Finally, on the arrival of 1st Queen's of the
3rd Infantry Brigade, a most successful counter-attack was launched,
the Queen's retook the Kortekeer Cabaret, and the Germans were driven
right back, nearly 500 being taken and very heavy losses inflicted on
them. The old trenches 800 yards north of the road were actually
recovered, but late in the evening a fresh German attack recovered the
advanced position reached by our counter- attack, and a new line was taken
up about the line of the Langemarck-Bixschoote road. Meanwhile dur-
ing this action, in which less than two British infantry brigades had
defeated the 46^ Reserve Division, the rest of the 1st Division at Lange-
marck had been heavily attacked, apparently (cf. p. 40) by the 5lst
Reserve Division, which had been completely worsted. In this part
of the action very notable service was done by two platoons of the Glou-

38 THE BATTLE ON THE YSER AND OF YPRES

On 22nd October, for the first time, our attack was
directed from the north against YPRES. If the British
and French did not intend to give up their offensive
plans, and thereby their last hope of retaking Belgium
and the wealthy provinces of Northern France from
the hated German, they would have to maintain their
positions along the YPRES bridge-head east of the
canal between COMINES and the coast. For this reason
the country round YPRES was the central area of the
Anglo-French defence from the beginning to the end
of the battle. Our opponents defended this position
on a wide semicircle by successive lines of trenches
and with their best troops. Every wood, every village,
every farm and even every large copse has won for
itself a fame of blood. The reinforcements which
Field-Marshal French received in abundance he placed
round YPRES, but not only for defensive purposes ;
they were more often used to deliver attack after
attack against our young troops who had been weakened
by the hard fighting ; and on 23rd October they were
already being employed in this manner against the
46th Reserve Division.1 He hoped to use the oppor-

cesters just north of Langemarck, who expended an average of 400
rounds a man, and though attacked in front and flank by very superior
numbers, maintained their position intact. The British accounts
testify to the gallantry with which the German attacks were pressed,
officers carrying regimental colours ran on ahead of the men and
planted the colours in the ground to give their men a point to make for,
a mounted officer rode forward, exposing himself recklessly, to encour-
age his soldiers, but the musketry of the British infantry was too much
for the Germans, and the attack was completely repulsed.

1 Throughout this narrative it is astonishing to read of the repeated
reinforcements which Sir John French received. Actually, except for
a few drafts, no reinforcements joined the British in the Ypres salient
before the end of October : subsequently two Territorial battalions, the
Hertfordshires and the London Scottish, two Yeomanry regiments, the

THE OPERATIONS OF THE FOURTH ARMY 39

tunity of our retirement behind the KOETEBECK to
break through our line and to roll up the part of the
front lying to the north of it as far as the sea, and
thus to regain the initiative and freedom of manoeuvre
on this extreme wing.1 However, the blow was parried
by the 46th Reserve Division. In ragged, badly
placed lines the German units, which had scarcely
had time to reorganise, brought the hostile masses to
a standstill and won back in a counter-attack the
ground which they had lost during the night. On
this occasion, also, the gunners shared with the in-
fantry the honours of the day. The fire of the guns,
brought up into the foremost lines, made wide gaps
in the attacking columns and the enemy's losses must
have been terrible. Our own troops had also suffered
severely in the constant fighting and under the ever-
lasting hostile artillery fire. Some of our regiments
had been reduced to half their strength. But in spite
of it the British did not succeed in breaking through
between the XXIII and XXVI Reserve Corps.

The XXVI and XXVII Reserve Corps were by this
time completely held up in front of strongly entrenched
positions on the line LANGEMARCK-ZONNEBEKE-GHELTJ-
VELT and opposed to an enemy who was becoming
stronger every day and making the most desperate

North Somersets and the Leicester shires, and the 3rd Dragoon Guards,
the, belated last unit of the 3rd Cavalry Division, were added to the force,
while the exhausted infantry of the 1th Division were replaced by three
composite brigades from the II Corps, set free after three weeks of
strenuous fighting near La Bassee by the arrival of the Meerut Division,
and greatly below strength.

1 The British counter-attack at the Kortekeer Cabaret did not aim at
doing more than recover the ground lost on 22nd October : it was not
an attempt at break-through, and was quite successful in its immediate
object.

40 THE BATTLE ON THE YSER AND OF YPRES

efforts to regain his freedom of action and begin a
big offensive himself. The XXVI Reserve Corps,
which advanced on the morning of the 20th, the 51st
Reserve Division from the area west of ROULEES,
and the other Division from MORSLEDE, encountered
a stubborn resistance along the ridge WESTROOSE-
BEKE-PASSCHENDAELE-KEIBERG. Fighting under the
eyes of their general, who was himself in the thick of
the struggle, the 51st Reserve Division stormed the
slope on to the ridge and entered WESTROOSEBEKE.
The French division defending it was driven out at
four in the afternoon and, attacking incessantly, the
gallant 51st, supported by the 23rd Reserve J tiger
Battalion, reached a line from the railway-station
north-west of POELCAPPELLE to POELCAPPELLE itself
during the evening. The attack was all the more
daring through the fact that HOTJTHULST Forest was
still in the enemy's hands, and the flank of the division
therefore appeared to be threatened. Meanwhile the
52nd Reserve Division had taken PASSCHENDAELE,
KEIBERG and the high ground between them from
the British ; the artillery again deserving the highest
praise for its co-operation.1 The attack, however,

1 On 20th October the 1th Division held the line from Zandvoorde to
Kruiseik, thence to Broodseinde cross-roads east of Zonnebeke, the line
being continued by the 3rd Cavalry Division to Passchendaele. The
German 52nd Reserve Division and the XXVII Reserve Corps were
thus faced by less than half their numbers. Nevertheless the only effect
of their attack was that after the 51st Reserve Division had driven the
French out of Westroosebeke, the British Cavalry found its flank exposed
and had to retire on St. Julien, the 1th Division throwing back its left
flank to conform. There was no fighting for Keiberg, and the expulsion
of the 1th Division from Becelaere (mentioned nine lines below) after
heavy street fighting, seems to be based on the slender foundation that a
British reconnaissance was made in the direction of Gheluwe covered by

THE OPERATIONS OF THE FOURTH ARMY 41

was brought to a standstill in front of the enemy's
main position at the cross-roads east of ZONNEBEKE.
The XXVII Reserve Corps commanded by General
von Carlowitz, formerly Saxon War Minister, lay in
close touch with the 52nd Reserve Division on the
evening of the 20th. Advancing in four columns and
by constant fighting it had forced its way westwards.
The Wiirtemburg Division had succeeded in driving
the 7th British Division out of BECELAERE after heavy
street fighting, and the left wing was bent back on
TERHAND. Communication was there obtained with
the 3rd Cavalry Division, fighting on the right wing of
the Sixth Army, which had captured a hostile posi-
tion north-east of KRTJISEIK.

On the morning of the 22nd a strong position lay to
our immediate front. It followed a line BIXSCHOOTE-
LANGEMARCK-ZONNEBEKE-RETJTEL-GHELUVELT ; and
the I and IV British, as well as the IX French Corps,1

two battalions nearer Terhand, which fell back without being seriously
pressed. The Germans advancing in the evening from Becelaere were
sharply repulsed by tlie centre infantry brigade of the Tth Division east of
Polygon Wood. The events of 2lst-22nd October on the front from
Langemarck to Kruiseik are somewhat slurred over in this narrative.
Briefly, on 2lst October the Germans pressed all along the line of the 1th
Division without success except on the left, where by enfilade fire from
Passchendaele they forced the left of the 22nd Infantry Brigade to fall
back to the south-west of Zonnebeke. Meanwhile the advance of the
I Corps relieved the pressure, and though, as already explained (see
note, p. 34), the uncovering of the left of the I Corps prevented the
advance being pressed beyond the line Zonnebeke-Langemarck, this line
was made good and the German efforts to advance successfully repulsed.
On 22nd October the Germans attacked the line of the 2nd Division
north-west of Zonnebeke, but were easily repulsed, while further to their
left they renewed their attacks on the 2lst Infantry Brigade east of
Polygon Wood with equal ill-success.

1 The IX French Corps was not yet up at the front. It did not begin
relieving the 2nd Division till the afternoon of 23rd October.

42 THE BATTLE ON THE YSER AND OF YPBES

all picked troops, had already been located there.
They had dug a well-planned maze of trenches behind
broad wire entanglements before a single German shell
arrived to disturb their work.1 The few stretches
of rising ground in the district had been included in
the skilfully selected positions as observation posts,
and the defenders were thus able to bring our advan-
cing columns under accurate artillery fire at long range.
This was especially the case from the high ground near
ZONNEBEKE, whence the whole ground in front of
the position as far as LANGEMARCK could be enfiladed.
All these difficulties, however, were not sufficient to
deter the offensive spirit of the German troops, and
* Vorwdrts ' was still their watchword : forwards and
back with the enemy, so that the rigid western front
might once more be mobile. The main body of the
XXVI Reserve Corps attacked the fortress of LANGE-
MARCK 2 from north and east, whilst the XXVII
Reserve Corps fought for the upper hand in the woods
between ZONNEBEKE and BECELAERE. The great
efforts made by the artillery to follow up the infantry-
men with its guns and support them with their fire
were in vain, owing to the difficult country, and the
well-aimed fire from the enemy's prepared positions
reaped a big harvest. Leaders of all grades were

1 The * well-planned maze of trenches behind broad wire entangle-
ments ' would have been most welcome to the British. Unfortunately
there had been no time or opportunity to do more than dig in hastily
where the advance of the I Corps had been checked, while such trenches
as the 1th Division had dug at Zonnebeke were hastily prepared in such
loose and sandy soil that they collapsed when bombarded ; wire, was
conspicuous by its absence.

8 The only thing in the nature of a ' fortress ' at Langemarck was a
small redoubt, built by the 2Qth Field Company R.E. on the night of
22nd-2,3rd October, and held by two platoons of the Gloucesters.

THE OPERATIONS OF THE FOURTH ARMY 43

killed, and officers of high rank took their places and
reorganised the intermingled units.

With the failure of the 46th Reserve Division to
gain a decisive victory between BIXSCHOOTE and
LANGEMARCK on 22nd and 23rd October the fate of
the XXVI and XXVII Reserve Corps was also settled.
For the time being any further thought of a break-
through was out of the question. The troops up till
now had met the enemy full of a keen fighting spirit,
and had stormed his positions singing ' Deutschland,
Deutschland uber alles ' regardless of casualties, and
had been one and all ready to die for their country ;
but they had suffered heavily in the contest against a
war-experienced and numerically superior opponent
entrenched in strongly fortified positions. Even when
the last reserves of the Army, the 37th Landwehr
Brigade and the 2nd Ersatz Brigade, had been placed
at the disposal of the XXVI Reserve Corps, they could
only be used to stiffen the defence. During the-night
of 23rd - 24th October the expected Anglo - French
counter-attacks began, and continued throughout
the 24th, against the front of the XXVI and the right
wing of the XXVII Reserve Corps. By utilising tem-
porary local successes and putting in fresh forces the
enemy vainly hoped to prepare the way for a break-
through ; but the German troops though weakened
held up all these furious onslaughts from positions
which had never been selected for defence, but were
merely those reached at the close of the attack.1

1 This is hardly a recognisable account of what took place. The
relief of the 1st Division by a French Territorial division did not take
place till the night 24:th-25th, but the 2nd Division was relieved by a
division of the French IX Corps, and by the morning of 2£th October it
was concentrated at St. Jean in reserve. In the course of the morning

44 THE BATTLE ON THE YSER AND OF YPRES

The Commander of the Fourth Army was forced
to continue ordering all his Corps to attack, in order
to co-operate with the Sixth Army which was attack-
ing and, besides this, to pin the enemy's forces opposed
to him to their ground : for in the north a decision
appeared to be imminent on the front of General von
Beseler's III Reserve Corps : in addition to the entire
infantry of the 6th Reserve Division, which had crossed
the canal by the morning of 24th October, the infantry
of the 5th Reserve Division and five battalions of the
44th Reserve Division succeeded in crossing the YSER
during that day. The enemy was compelled to
evacuate the western bank of the canal from ST.
GEORGE to south-east of STTJYVEKENSKERKE, in
spite of the fact that there had been one French and
four Belgian Divisions l opposing the III Reserve
Corps, and that the ten howitzer batteries had proved
insufficient to engage the Belgian, French and British
artillery successfully. In consequence of this inferi-
ority the old and new canal crossings lay under con-
stant concentrated fire, and all our efforts to transport
guns over the waterway failed. Many a fine piece of
engineering carried out by our indefatigable sappers

of 2&th October the Reserve Division attacked the line of the 21st Infantry
Brigade in overwhelming strength, and broke through north of JReutel,
penetrating into Polygon Wood. It was cleared out by a counter-
attack by the 5th Infantry Brigade, 2nd Division, and the 2nd B.
Warwicks of the 1th Division, and in the afternoon an advance was
made north of Polygon Wood by the Qth Infantry Brigade in co-operation
with the French IX Corps on the left. Fair progress was made, the
6th Infantry Brigade crossing to the east of the Werwicq-Staden road.
Further south the 1th Division held its own successfully and all attacks
were repulsed.

1 It has already been pointed out that the Belgian divisions were
much below establishment.

THE OPERATIONS OF THE FOURTH ARMY 45

was destroyed by the enemy's shells. The supply of
ammunition and field-dressings became a matter of
the greatest difficulty, as all the roads leading to the
rear across the swampy meadows were continuously
shelled for a long way back. Nevertheless our front
troops held on firmly to their new positions. The next
operation was to break through the enemy's posi-
tion here once and for all, though it was clear from
the beginning that the attack would be a very severe
one. Belgian and French working parties had dug
a series of positions between the YSER and the NIEU-
PORT-BixscHOOTE railway, from which the ground in
front could be commanded with frontal and enfilade
fire from skilfully placed machine-guns and well-
concealed batteries. On both wings, according to the
latest information at hand, strong hostile attacks were
threatening us, that is to say, near NIEUPORT as well
as near and to the south of DIXMUDE. To meet these
the Army Commander had replaced the 4th Ersatz
Division, which had been echeloned back along the
coast as a precaution against hostile landings, by
detachments of the Marine Division, and a few troops
placed at his disposition by the Governor of Belgium,
and had ordered it to march to THOUROUT. At the
same time, by order of General von Beseler, long-
range guns were placed to prevent the enemy from
concentrating for an attack in the NIEUPORT district.
However, the expected attack took place in the neigh-
bourhood of DIXMUDE, and was directed against those
battalions of the 44th Reserve Division which had
crossed to the west of the YSER. The enemy realised
the great danger that threatened his bridge-head from
the north-west, and put all available Belgian and

46 THE BATTLE ON THE YSER AND OF YPRES

French reserves into the attack. Thus between five
and six battalions from three Belgian regiments and
the Marine Fusiliers under Admiral Ronarch, with a
strong force of artillery, advanced to the attack of
our southern flank. The Belgians themselves describe
this attack in the following words : ' One saw the
companies doubling forward in small groups, lying
down on the officers' signal, and then getting up to go
forward again until they finally deployed into their
attacking lines. But unfortunately they were asked
to accomplish a superhuman task, and whole rows of
the men were mown down by the machine-guns.
Company after company was decimated, and in spite
of the energy of their leaders they had to give way,
death having taken too heavy a toll of their ranks.
The Marine Fusiliers, who attacked with uncommon
gallantry, soon shared the same fate. But all this
sacrifice was not in vain — it stopped the enemy's
advance.' *

It will be understood then that the first thing for
the weak and widely separated battalions of the 44th
Reserve Division to do on the 25th was to get breath-
ing space and reorganise, even though they were
exposed all the time to the heaviest fire from west,
south and south-east. Further to the north, however,
on the morning of the 25th, the 5th and 6th Reserve
Divisions had succeeded in bringing their field-batteries
across the river, and as soon as the whole artillery of
these two divisions had been concentrated under the
expert leadership of General von Ziethen, it began to
prepare the way for the infantry attack. By midday

See Les pages de gloire de FArmee Beige : d Dixmuide.

THE OPERATIONS OF THE FOURTH ARMY 47

both the divisions were advancing steadily towards
the railway embankment on the line RAMSCAPPELLE-
PERVYSE. The Belgians had to evacuate position
after position. Then suddenly heavy enfilade fire
was poured in by the enemy's artillery about NIEU-
PORT ; and simultaneously a brigade of the 6th Reserve
Division south-east of PERVYSE had to be directed
southwards in order not to lose touch with the right
wing of the 44th Reserve Division. There were no
reinforcements to fill up the gaps, and thus the attack
came shortly afterwards to a standstill.

A very heavy thunder of guns rumbled incessantly
from the south : the German artillery, including 42-
centimetre guns, had bombarded DIXMTJDE through-
out the 24th October and morning of the 25th, and
now the 43rd Reserve Division had begun its assault
on the town. It resulted in the most violent street
fighting ; fast and furious came the bullets from the
machine-guns posted in the houses along the edge of
the town, and from the shells from the batteries
massed west of the YSER, but nothing could hold up
our attack. The Belgians have given the following
description of the power of the German assault :
' What plunder must not they have been promised,
to allow themselves to be killed in such a way ? What
drink must they not have taken to give themselves
such animal courage ? Like devils, thirsting for blood,
they storm forward with the howls of wild beasts ;
lusting to massacre, they tread the wounded under
foot and stumble over the dead : and, though shot
down in hundreds, they keep coming on. Then follow
isolated fights with bayonets and the butts of rifles :
some are impaled, others strangled or have their skulls

48 THE BATTLE ON THE YSER AND OF YPRES

bashed in.' The fight swayed backwards and forwards
till well into the night : guns brought up into the
front line fired at point-blank range : both sides put
in their last reserves.

During the night, rifles were unloaded, bayonets
fixed, and we attacked again. A small German
detachment of about fifty men advanced across the
YSEE bridge, but in endeavouring to assault the
enemy's batteries, it succumbed to greatly superior
numbers. Thus the morning of 26th October found
the attackers back in their assault -positions : their
courage, spirit and indifference to death having added
another leaf of fame to the chaplet of the Guards. It
was clear, however, that another artillery bombard-
ment was indispensable to success, and it was carried
out on the 26th and 27th.

That heavy losses were suffered by the Belgians and
the French Marine Fusiliers in the fighting just described
is shown by the fact that on the morning of the 26th
Senegalese troops who had been hurriedly brought
up took over the defence of the bridge-head. A
German attack on the 28th was able to make some
progress on the southern flank against these fresh
troops, but a decision could not be obtained. No
further effort was made on the 29th, for there was a
shortage of artillery ammunition. The eastern edge
of the town was, however, bombarded by trench-
mortars, which had just arrived, with good effect.

Army Orders for the 30th prescribed that the XXII
Reserve Corps should only leave a weak force of from
three to four battalions on the eastern bank of the
YSER opposite DIXMUDE ; that DIXMUDE should be
kept under heavy artillery fire ; and that the remainder

THE OPERATIONS OF THE FOURTH ARMY 49

of the 43rd Reserve Division should cross the YSBR,
north of DIXMUDE, in order to attack the town from
the rear.

North-west of DIXMUDE, by the evening of the 29th,
the troops of General von Beseler and the 44th Reserve
Division had worked their way forward some 300
yards towards the railway embankment. Only one
brigade of the 4th Ersatz Division was still north-east
of NIEUPORT : all the rest were taking part in the
struggle further south, and west of the YSEB. NIEU-
PORT was shut in on the south : the left wing of the
44th Reserve Division lay west of BEERST, as protec-
tion against the strong hostile forces near the river
about DIXMUDE : the Belgians and recently-arrived
French forces held the railway embankment between
NIEUPORT and DIXMUDE. Broad stretches of wire
entanglements lay in front of this strong position, and
the efforts of our troops had been almost superhuman
in their advance over this ground : it was intersected
with patches of marsh, dykes often fifteen yards
broad, and thick, wired hedges. So strong, however,
was the pressure against the enemy that the French
were compelled to reduce their forces about NIEUPORT
and north of it to weak detachments, and send constant
reinforcements to the area PERVYSE-RAMSCAPPELLE.
A German airman, who was killed on the morning of
the 30th, had shortly before his death reported that
the enemy were beginning to withdraw. Our assault
began at 6.30 A.M., though the ground in the area of
the 5th and 6th Reserve Divisions had become extra-
ordinarily swampy. It seemed impossible that the
recent rains could have raised the level of the ground-
water to such an extent. Nevertheless the attack

D

50 THE BATTLE ON THE YSER AND OF YPRES

made considerable progress. The llth Brigade of
the 6th Reserve Division succeeded in forcing its way
into the eastern part of the strongly-fortified village
of PERVYSE, whilst of the 5th Reserve Division, the
48th and 52nd Reserve Regiments reached the railway
embankment, and the 48th pushed on beyond it
towards RAMSCAPPELLE. Although every house had
to be attacked, it succeeded in reaching the western
end of the village. The 12th Reserve Regiment
also made considerable advance.

The resistance of the enemy was broken, and when
the 33rd Ersatz Brigade on the northern wing advanced
from the north-east against NIEUPORT, the enemy
retired. Airmen reported enemy's columns retreat-
ing towards FTTRNES. Nothing could stop the vic-
torious advance of General von Beseler's troops, not
even the heaviest guns of the British battleships,
cruisers and torpedo-boats, which, from far out at sea,
enfiladed the German attack at a range of 20,000
yards, nor the incessant counter-attacks of the Franco -
Belgian Divisions. On the evening of the 30th RAMS-
CAPPELLE was completely in German possession, the
railway embankment south of it had been reached and
even crossed in places ; in PERVYSE the fight was
progressing favourably, and south of it the 12th
Reserve Brigade, delayed by the numerous broad
dykes, was working forward to the railway. Still
further south the 44th Reserve Division was in full
advance towards the railway embankment east of
OOSTKERKE, whilst the main body of the 43rd Reserve
Division had crossed the YSER, without casualties,
and had been sent forward in the direction of CAES-
KERKE.

THE OPERATIONS OF THE FOURTH ARMY 51

The attack was to have been continued on the follow-
ing morning, and General von Beseler intended to
withdraw the last part of the 4th Ersatz Division,
the 33rd Ersatz Brigade, from the area north-east
of NIETJPORT, for the fire of the enemy's naval guns
from the sea *• and the difficulties of the country
appeared to militate against any prospects of a rapid
success there. At 11.30 P.M., however, a General
Staff Officer of the 6th Reserve Division reported
that the attack could be continued no further owing
to the constant rising of the water. What had hap-
pened ? On the morning of the 30th the advancing
troops had been up to their ankles in water ; then it
had gradually risen until they were now wading up
to their knees, and they could scarcely drag their
feet out of the clayey soil. If any one lay down for
a moment under the heavy artillery, machine-gun
and rifle fire, he was lost. The rise of the waters was
attributed to the torrential rain of the previous few
days, and it was hoped that on the approach of dry
weather the excellent system of canals would soon
drain it off. But the rising flood soon prevented the
movement of wagons with ammunition and supplies,
and when the attackers looked back from the railway
embankment, it seemed to them as if the whole
country had sunk behind them : the green meadows
were covered with dirty, yellow water, and the general
line of the roads was only indicated by the houses
and the rows of partly covered trees. It soon became
evident that the enemy must have blown up the canal-

1 This testimony to tJie effective character of the help given by Admiral
Hood's squadron is noteworthy, and contradicts what was said in the,
narrative on page 22.

52 THE BATTLE ON THE YSER AND OF YPRES

sluices, and called in the sea to his aid. The advance
of General von Beseler's III Reserve Corps had been
the culmination of the crisis for our opponent ; all his
reserves had been put in to stop it, but in vain. If the
Germans could only succeed in pushing the exhausted
Belgians and French out of their way, the road to
DUNKIRK and CALAIS was open. Warnings, friendly
and otherwise, had been given by the Allies to the
Belgians that they must * hold out ' ; but they were
no more able to resist the attacks of the victors of
ANTWERP now than when behind fortress ramparts.
Their fighting spirit was broken ; so, influenced by
the wishes of the British and the French, King Albert
finally decided to employ this last desperate means
of defence, and place a wide expanse of his fair country
under water. The water-level rose slowly and in-
sidiously until, on the evening of the 30th, the YSER
north of DIXMTJDE had almost everywhere overflowed
its banks. The inundation destroyed buildings as
well as soil, but it enabled the worn-out defenders to
recover their sore-threatened security.

General von Beseler quickly realised the danger
which now awaited his attacking troops on the far
side of the canal, behind whom a sheet of water,
2000 to 3000 yards broad, was constantly deepening.
The decision was an exceedingly hard one for him to
make, yet it had to be done. The attack would have
to be given up and the greater part of the western
bank of the river evacuated. The order was issued
and carried out during the night of the 30th-31st
October. In spite of the dangers due to the altered
appearance of the country and the consequent diffi-
culty in finding the way, and although the Franco-

THE OPERATIONS OF THE FOURTH ARMY 53

Belgian artillery kept the YSEB crossings under con-
stant heavy fire, the withdrawal was a brilliant success.
Not a wounded man nor rifle fell into the enemy's
hands, and the movement was so well covered that
the enemy did not notice we had disengaged until it
was too late. A small detachment of gallant Branden-
burgers under Lieutenant Buchholz remained behind
for a long time in PERVYSE. In front of them the
enemy was sweeping the village with artillery and
infantry fire and behind them was the edge of an
apparently boundless sea. A French colonel offered
Lieutenant Buchholz honourable conditions if he
would surrender ; but he indignantly rejected the
offer : his only answer to the colonel was to slip off
with his little band of followers. They rejoined their
unit successfully. The enemy only followed up slowly
along the roads, with weak detachments of infantry.
Our rear-guards remained west of the canal on the
line ST. GEORGE-STTJYVEKENSKERKE, whilst the main
body on the 31st took up its new position east of the
YSER as follows : the 5th Reserve Division north of
the main road ST. PIERRE CAPPELLE-MANNEKENSVERE ;
the 4th Ersatz Division in the area MANNEKENSVERE-
SCHOORE ; and the 6th Reserve Division to the south
of it. One battalion and one battery of the 4th Ersatz
Division remained facing NIETJPORT, extending north-
wards to the coast. A new defensive position was
selected along the line WESTENDE-MANNEKENSVERE-
SCHOORE-KASTEELHOEK : a continuation of the attack
was now out of the question, as the water was still
rising west of the YSER. On 31st October and 1st
November, however, the XXII Reserve Corps again
tried to press its attack southwards on the east bank

54 THE BATTLE ON THE YSER AND OF YPRES

of the river, in order to isolate the DIXMUDE bridge-
head, but here also the ever-rising flood soon prevented
movement, and on the evening of the 1st these brave
troops also had to yield to the forces of nature and
withdraw behind the YSER. This operation was
carried out in bright moonlight on the night of the 1st-
2nd, and was unmolested by the enemy, for he lay
in his position exhausted and heedless. Thus for the
time being DIXMUDE remained in possession of the
French.

The Army Commander had issued definite instruc-
tions on the evening of the 24th October to the XXIII,

XXVI and XXVII Reserve Corps to the effect that
they were to maintain and strengthen their positions,
and take every opportunity of seizing important points
on their immediate front. In the execution of this
order the German troops experienced a good deal of
heavy fighting during the subsequent days. The

XXVII Reserve Corps succeeded in capturing REUTEL
and holding it ; *• but in the meantime heavy hostile
attacks were begun against the XXIII, XXVI and
the extreme right wing of the XXVII Reserve Corps.
The British, continually reinforced by the arrival of
French units, endeavoured to break through, and
used all their strength. Indeed, in many places the

1 The hamlet of Eeutel had fallen into German hands on 24th
October (cf. page 43, note), but the counter-attacks of the 2nd Division
had re-established the line on the eastern border of Polygon Wood, and
between 24th October and the morning of 29th October what changes
there were on the eastern face of the Ypres salient had been in favour of
the British. The 6th Infantry Brigade made considerable progress
east of the Werwicq-Staden road in co-operation with the French IX
Corps which pushed east and north-east from Zonnebeke. By the
showing of this narrative the German forces in this area were decidedly
superior in numbers to those engaged in the attacks*

THE OPERATIONS OF THE FOURTH ARMY 55

situation of these German volunteer corps became
critical. Thanks to his good observation posts the
enemy was able to keep our roads of advance and
communications under artillery fire. As the roads
were already broken up by the constant rain, the
ammunition supply of our artillery, inferior in any
case to our opponents', failed. Nevertheless, in spite
of all difficulties our counter-attacks continued. The
fighting was especially severe on the front of the XXVI
and XXVII Reserve Corps on 25th, 26th and 27th
October. In this sector the British and French made
a succession of attacks in the direction POELKAP-
PELLE, PASSCHENDAELE and east of ZONNEBEKE. The
37th Landwehr Brigade and the 2nd Ersatz Brigade,
under the command of General von Meyer, had to
be sent up into the fighting line, in addition to de-
tachments of the Marine Division and of the 38th
Landwehr Brigade. These Landwehr men, far from
being weighed down by their years, gave effective
support to the terribly thinned ranks of their younger
friends, and the line was restored. In the heat of
the fighting on the evening of the 26th General von
Meyer was mortally wounded : may his memory be
duly honoured.

An exceptionally heavy British and French attack
was delivered on the 24th and 25th near ZONNEBEKE,
against the inner flanks of the XXVI and XXVII
Reserve Corps. The points of junction of formations
are always the weakest parts of the defence, and when
the General Staff Officer of the XXVII Reserve Corps
asked for the support of the Corps on his right, he
received the reply that no infantry could be spared
* for the enemy. . . ,' And at that moment the tele-

56 THE BATTLE ON THE YSER AND OF YPRES

phone circuit failed. There was nothing to do but
close the gap between the two Corps by an artillery
barrage, and to trust to the skill of the troops and
their leaders. The Saxon gunners of the 53rd Reserve
Division shelled the advancing enemy as fast as they
were able, and by this aid the infantry was finally
enabled to come up and close the gap again. At the
same time the enemy made a strong attack further
to the south. The report came in that he had sur-
rounded BECELAEEE ; but before his supports could
assist him, the bayonets of the 54th Reserve Division
had driven back his assaulting troops.1 The Corps
was able to hold its old line from the cross-roads east
of ZONNEBEKE through REUTEL to POEZELHOEK.
Comparative quiet followed on the 28th and morning
of the 29th, for both sides were very exhausted. On
the 28th the 6th Bavarian Reserve Division arrived
at DADIZEELE as Army Reserve.

The Army Cavalry of the Sixth Army, consisting of
eight Cavalry Divisions and several Jdger battalions
under General von der Marwitz, was in action on the
left of the Fourth Army. It closed the gap between
the latter and the infantry of the Sixth Army, which
lay half-way between WARNETON and ARMENTIERES.

1 The above account presumably refers to the attack of the 18th French
Division and 2nd British Division on 25th October, when a German
battery was captured by the 1st Royal Berkshires and the French unit
with which they were co-operating. Further to the British right, however,
less progress was made, but the implication that the, British reached
Becelaere and were then thrust back by the 54th Reserve Division at the
point of the bayonet is unfounded : the force engaged on this quarter
only consisted of two battalions and the artillery support available was
insufficient to allow the advance to be pressed home ; it was therefore
abandoned after a small gain of ground had been made,

THE OPERATIONS OF THE FOURTH ARMY 57

The enemy could not be attacked here by any form
of mounted action ; so far from this being possible,
ground could be gained only by wearisome fighting
on foot, to which the cavalrymen were unaccustomed.
Nevertheless they carried out this task in brilliant
fashion, and whilst the southern wing, in a bad posi-
tion and scarcely entrenched at all, stubbornly held
up the British who were streaming down from the
high ground about WYTSCHAETE and MsssiNES,1 the
3rd, 7th and Bavarian Cavalry Divisions, with the
4th, 9th and 10th J tiger battalions and five battalions
of the llth Landwehr Brigade brought forward from
Lille, advanced under General von Stetten to the
assault of the line KRUISEIK-ZANDVOORDE and west
of it. This direction was taken in order to be able
to attack from the south against the rear of the enemy
holding up the XXVII Reserve Corps. The 25th to
29th October were memorable and glorious days for
this Cavalry Corps. Among other achievements, the
3rd Cavalry Division was able to capture KRTJISEIK
on the 26th after heavy street fighting.2 In co-
operation with the left wing of the XXVII Reserve

1 The British who were streaming down from the high ground about
WytscJiaete and Messines consisted of five brigades of cavalry (per-
haps 4000) and one brigade of the newly arrived Lahore Division.

2 There was very severe fighting south of the Menin road during the
period 25th-2Sth October, particularly at Kruiseik, which formed the
south-eastern angle of the east face of the salient. This position was
obstinately defended by tlie 20th Infantry Brigade, 1th Division, which
held on under heavy bombardments and repulsed many attacks, notably
on the night of the 21th-28th October when over 200 of the 242nd Reserve
Infantry Regiment (XXVII Reserve Corps) who had penetrated into
Kruiseik were captured by a counter-attack of one company 2nd Scots
Guards. The Germans renewed their attack in great force next day,
and succeeded in dislodging the 20th Infantry Brigade from Kruiseik,
but a n,ew line was formed in reart blunting the salient, and with the aid

58 THE BATTLE ON THE YSER AND OF YPRES

Corps, next to which the 16th Bavarian Reserve
Infantry Regiment of the 6th Bavarian Reserve
Division had been placed, taking a prominent part in
the fighting under Colonel List, General von Stetten,
on the 29th, carried forward the attack against GHELTJ-
VELT, the key of the enemy's position. More than
600 British prisoners and 5 machine-guns were taken
by our victorious cavalry.1 Simultaneously on this
day, the troops of General von Stetten filled another
role. They were covering the concentration of new
German forces which was in the course of completion
behind their battle -front.

of the 1st Division (in reserve since 24th October) the position was
successfully maintained. Elsewhere the 1th Division, which was hold-
ing a line reaching back to Zandvoorde where the 3rd Cavalry Division
connected it up with the left of General Allenby's Cavalry Corps on the
Ypres-Comines canal, held its ground.

1 This account does not tell the story of 29th October very intelligibly.
The British front had been readjusted, and was now held by the 2nd
Division on the left, from the junction with the French to west of Reutel,
thence to the Qth kilometre on the Ypres-Menin road by the 1st Division,
thence to Zandvoorde by the 1th Division with the 3rd! Cavalry Division
on their right. Under cover of a mist the Germans (apparently the
6th Bavarian Reserve Division) attacked in force against the junction
of the 1st and Tth Divisions, broke through at the 9th kilo cross-roads, and
rolled up the battalions to right and left after very severe fighting, in
which the 1st Grenadier Guards and 2nd Gordon Highlanders of the
1th Division distinguished themselves greatly by repeated counter-
attacks. The resistance of the troops in the front line delayed the
Germans long enough to allow the reserves of the 1st Division to be put
in, and their counter-attacks recovered all but the most advanced trenches.
The Germans did not ever penetrate as far as Gheluvelt, and their final
gain of ground was inconsiderable.

THE ATTEMPT TO BREAK THROUGH
SOUTH OF YPRES

THROUGHOUT the fighting of the Fourth Army during
October, the Sixth Army under Crown Prince Rupert
of Bavaria had remained on the offensive on the
line AREAS-LA BASSEE-east of ARMENTIERES ; 1 but
although fresh reinforcements had been sent up to
that part of the front by the German General Staff,
a break-through had not been possible. Both sides
had gradually changed their objectives and now
merely sought to prevent any movement of the oppos-
ing forces from that front to the decisive zone of
operations between NIEUPORT and YPRES. Any weak-
ness in the enemy's line, however, was utilised to gain
new and improved positions from which another effort
to break through might be made as soon as possible.

1 It is interesting to notice that this account treats the fighting on the
La Bassee-Armentieres front as quite distinct from the main battle for
Ypres. During the period 20th-2Qth October the II and III Corps had
a hard defensive battle to fight, the only assistance they received being
on the arrival on 23rd October of the Jullundur Brigade and the divi-
sional troops of the Lahore Division, which replaced General Conneau's
French Cavalry at the junction between the two Corps. As the net
result of this fighting the II and III Corps were forced back to a line
running north by east from Givenchy, west of Neuve Chapelle, past
Bois Grenier, south-east of Armentieres to the Lys at Houplines, part
of the 4th Division continuing the line on the left bank of the Lys to the
junction with the Cavalry Corps just south of Messines. The German
attacks on this front were strongly pressed, and the strain on the II and
III Corps was very severe.

60 THE BATTLE ON THE YSER AND OF YPRES

Owing to the failure of the offensive south of NIETJ-
PORT, a decision under the conditions existing there
could not be hoped for ; the German General Staff
therefore began considering a plan for concentrating
a strong new army of attack between the Fourth and
the Sixth Armies behind the position occupied by the
Army Cavalry, and for breaking through with it on
the front WERWICQ-WARNETON, south of YPRES.

On 27th October Lieut. -General von Falkenhayn
arrived at the Headquarters of the Sixth Army to
discuss this operation. The plan was arranged and
orders were issued accordingly. A new f Army Group '
was to be affiliated to the Sixth Army, under the
command of General von Fabeck, commander of the
XIII Wiirtemburg Corps.1 It would consist of the
II Bavarian and the XV Corps (now on its way up
from the south to join the Sixth Army), the 6th
Bavarian Reserve Division (still in reserve to the
Fourth Army), and the 26th Wiirtemburg Division
(of the Sixth Army, which was about to be relieved by
the 48th Reserve Division recently arrived from the
Fifth Army). In addition to these formations all
the available heavy artillery of the Sixth Army would
be brought up to assist, and if necessary the attacks
further south would be partially discontinued. The
offensive was to take place on the 30th October from
the general line WERWICQ-DEULEMONT in a north-
easterly direction. In the meantime the 3rd Division

1 In view of the reiterated statements about the superior numbers
of the Allies, it is worth pointing out that this new Army Group by itself
amounted to about two-thirds of the original strength of the British
forces engaged between La Bassee and Zonnebeke. For its Order o_f
Battle see at end of book,

THE ATTEMPT TO BREAK THROUGH 61

of the II Corps was also to be brought up by rail to
LILLE. The orders of the German General Staff
pointed out that the united co-operation of the Fourth
and Sixth Armies was an essential condition for the
success of the operation. Crown Prince Rupert of
Bavaria therefore ordered the entire right wing and
centre of the Sixth Army to continue their holding
attacks, and Duke Albert of Wurtemburg ordered a
general attack of his Army for the 30th October.

How the flooding of the YSER on the front of the
right wing of the Fourth Army brought the offensive
of the III and XXII Reserve Corps to a standstill
has already been described. From the 1st November
the 4th Ersatz Division took over the protection of
the line of the flooded area from the coast to TEBVAETE,
whilst the III Reserve Corps was moved southwards
to the district ZARREN-STADEN in order to reinforce
the XXIII or XXVI Reserve Corps, as the situation
might require.1 To the XXII Reserve Corps was
allotted the task of holding the two French divisions
stationed in the DIXMUDE bridge-head, which formed
a constant threat to the German front. The Corps
carried out this task admirably.

On the morning of the 30th October the XXIII,
XXVI and XXVII Reserve Corps advanced to the
attack as ordered. The first-named under General
von Kleist succeeded in storming and holding the
ruins of BIXSCHOOTE. After five hours' desperate

1 If the flooding of the country by the Belgians had barred the further
advance of the Germans along the coast, it had equally covered the
German extreme right against any chance of a counter-attack, and
enabled tliem to divert the III Reserve Corps to the south ; the Belgians,
however, were in no position to deflect any forces to the assistance of
their Allies.

62 THE BATTLE ON THE YSER AND OF YPRES

fighting, the 211th and 216th Reserve Infantry Regi-
ments entered the devastated village which had been
occupied by two French infantry regiments. Its low-
lying situation, and the hopelessness of finding cover
among the battered houses, resulted in the victorious
German regiments being exposed to a very heavy
artillery fire to such an extent, that the casualties
in the village were greater than during the assault.
In consequence the commander decided to withdraw
and take up a line along the northern edge of Bix-
SCHOOTE, leaving in the village itself only sufficient
outposts to repulse hostile counter-attacks. The
division on the left wing of the Corps also made progress
and reached the main road BIXSCHOOTE-LANGEMAECK
in places. The XXVI Reserve Corps attacked LANGE-
MAKCK with its right wing, but was unable to take it.
In spite of gallant efforts only a few hundred yards
of ground were gained by the evening of the 31st,
when these useless attacks were stopped by order.
The centre and left wing of this Corps as well as the
right wing of the XXVII Reserve Corps were held to
their positions by superior hostile artillery fire, and
also by mass attacks of the British and French during
the 30th and 31st. The II and IX French Corps had
just arrived, and in the presence of General Joffre an
attempt to break through our line was to be made on
this sector of the front.1 The German defenders,
however, held stoutly to their positions, and thus
enabled the offensive of the Army Group of General

1 No mass attacks were made by the British on SQth and 3lst October.
It will be noticed that the French IX Corps is spoken of here as though
it had been an additional reinforcement ; it had been in action on the
Zonnebeke area since 24£h October,

THE ATTEMPT TO BREAK THROUGH 63

von Fabeck to take place. In conjunction with this
the centre and left wing of the XXVII Reserve Corps,
under its new commander, General von Schubert,
simultaneously advanced in the direction of GHELTJ-
VELT.

During the night of the 27th-28th October the 26th
Infantry Division was relieved in its battle -posit ion
west of LILLE by the 48th Reserve Division, and by
the evening of the 29th the assembly of the Army
Group Fabeck was completed without disturbance.

The heavy artillery placed at the disposal of the
Army Group consisted of 8 batteries of mortars, 20
battalions of heavy field-howitzers, each of 3 batteries,
and a 30' 5 cm. coast defence mortar.1 In addition
to the troops already mentioned, the 1st Cavalry Corps,
the four Jdger battalions of the Army Cavalry and the
llth Landwehr Brigade were put under the command
of General von Fabeck. On the night of the 30th
October this new army of attack relieved the two
northern Cavalry Corps, and took over their outpost
lines. On the following morning the offensive began.2
The XV Corps under General von Deimling attacked
south of the MENIN-YPKES road, with its left wing on

1 The heavy artillery at the disposal of the British Commander-in-
Chief amounted at this time to two batteries of Q-inch howitzers, six
of QQ-pounder8f and three of kl-inch guns, a total of forty -four guns
and howitzers in all (each battery having four guns).

8 At this time the Allied line from the Menin road south was held
by the 1th Division, supported by about two infantry brigades of the
I Corps, the line being carried on thence to Messines by part of the
XVI French Corps and British Cavalry Divisions, and two battalions
of the Lahore Division. Nearly all these units had been heavily en-
gaged for a week or more, and were much under strength, but even at
full war establishment would have been outnumbered by nearly two to
one.

64 THE BATTLE ON THE YSER AND OF YPRES

ZANDVOORDE,the II Bavarian Corps was on its left, with
its left wing on WAMBEKB ; further south again was the
26th Infantry Division with its left wing on MESSINES.
In co-operation with these the 1st Cavalry Corps with
the 4th and Guard Cavalry Divisions, strengthened
by two battalions of the XIX Saxon Corps, which
was attacking to the left of it, was ordered to advance
on ST. YVES and PLOEGSTEERT Wood. The 6th
Bavarian Reserve Division moved to the line MENEST-
WERWICQ. The Army Cavalry which had been re-
lieved was withdrawn to act as reserve to the Sixth
Army, one Cavalry Corps being placed behind the
right wing of the Army to be at hand to fill up a slight
gap which existed between the Fourth Army and the
Army Group Fabeck should it be necessary.

The enemy had intercalated part of the XVI French
Corps between the 7th Division of the IV British
Corps and the British Cavalry Corps, before the ad-
vance of von Fabeck's Army ; the II and IX French
Corps had also recently arrived l on the northern side of
the YPRES salient.* Again, therefore, the enemy had
a numerical superiority 2 in what was the second and
severest part of the battle on the YSER. The British

* See page 62.

1 See note, page 62. The IX French Corps is mentioned for the third
time as a new arrival.

* It is difficult to see how this assertion can be supported on the state-
ments previously given, even apart from the fact that the German units
were fresh and the British troops facing them reduced by previous heavy
losses. The British claim to have held out against great odds is no more
than the bare truth. The battalions of the 1st Division who had held
up the attack of the 4Qth Reserve Division north-west of Langemarck on
23rd October were still in the line when the Prussian Guard attacked
on llth November — or rather a scanty remnant of them was : in the
interval they had fought and held up a succession of attacks.

THE ATTEMPT TO BREAK THROUGH 65

in their reports have added together all the German
Corps which were brought up piecemeal for the fight-
ing on the YSER and at YPRES, both at this period
and later on ; and they describe the situation so as
to give the impression that they had held up with
inferior numbers the simultaneous attacks of all these
Corps from the outset. They go further and use the
figures obtained in this way to turn their defeat into
a victory. They boast of having held out against
great odds, gladly forgetting that their original inten-
tion both before and during the battle had been to
overrun our positions and drive us back to the Rhine.
The character of the fighting which began with the
appearance of the new German Army Group on the
scene had almost the savagery of the Middle Ages in
it. The enemy turned every house, every wood and
every wall into a strong point, and each of them had
to be stormed by our men with heavy loss. Even
when the first line of these fortifications had been
taken they were confronted by a second one immedi-
ately behind it ; for the enemy showed great skill
in taking every advantage of the ground, unfavour-
able in any case to the attacker. To the east and
south-east of YPRES, even more developed than in
the north, there were thick hedges, wire fences and
broad dykes. Numerous woods also of all sizes with
dense undergrowth made the country almost impass-
able and most difficult for observation purposes. Our
movements were constantly being limited to the roads
which were swept by the enemy's machine-guns.
Owing to the preparatory artillery bombardments
the villages were mostly in ruins by the time the
infantry reached them, but the enemy fought desper-

66 THE BATTLE ON THE YSER AND OF YPEES

ately for every heap of stones and every pile of bricks
before abandoning them. In the few village streets
that remained worthy of the name the fighting gene-
rally developed into isolated individual combats, and
no description can do adequate justice to the bravery
of the German troops on such occasions. Our men
advanced to the attack as if they were back on the
barrack square, and an Englishman writes : ' They
advanced towards us singing patriotic songs and with
their bands playing.' There was such enthusiasm
that even the weakest were carried along by it, and
made regardless of losses. The battle of YPRES in
the autumn of 1914 will be a memorial to German
heroism and self-sacrifice for all time, and will long
remain a source of inspiration for the historian and
the poet.

By the 29th Field-Marshal French had realised the
importance of the attacks developing from the south-
east against YPRES . They threatened his position along
the high ground on the line GHELUVELT-PASSCHEN-
DAELE and aimed directly at, and by the shortest way
to, the town, the pivot on which all the Franco -British
offensive plans rested. On this day, therefore, the
British commander sent up the 7th Division into the
line again, although it had only just been relieved
owing to its heavy losses.1

Daybreak on the 30th October was dull and misty.
Our heavy guns began the bombardment of the enemy's
well-constructed lines at about 7.45 A.M., but observa-
tion was made very difficult by the weather condi-

1 The 1th Division had never left the line ; a few battalions only
liad been given a day's rest, but the division as a whole had not been
relieved.

THE ATTEMPT TO BKEAK THROUGH 67

tions, and could only be carried out from the foremost
infantry lines. The telephonic communication ren-
dered necessary was frequently cut by the enemy's
shells ; but, in spite of this, our heavy batteries were
able to make such excellent practice that at the most
vital points of the enemy's position the spirit of the

THE ATTACK OF THE ARMY GROUP FABECK.
ON OCTOBER 307" 1914.

^RESERVE CORPS

(belonging to Fourth Army)

Wytschaete
Messines

defenders appeared to be completely broken. The
high ground about ZANDVOORDE offers a typical case.
Although only 130 feet high, it was a corner-stone of
the British defence and one of the main observation
posts for the artillery. At 9 A.M. our troops charged
the hostile position there, and by 11 A.M. ZANDVOORDE
itself was in the possession of the 30th Infantry Divi-
sion ; the 4th, 10th and 1st Bavarian Jdger battalions
of the Army Cavalry took a great share in the success.

68 THE BATTLE ON THE YSER AND OF YPRES

Soon afterwards the high ground north-east and
immediately west of the village fell into German
hands. Two whole British squadrons with their
machine-guns lay, dead and wounded, completely
annihilated in one meadow on the battlefield.1 Further
south the II Bavarian Corps had driven back British
cavalry supported by part of the III British Corps.
After a severe hand-to-hand encounter it took pos-
session of the chateau, and finally also of the village
of HOLLEBEKB. The left wing of the Corps pushed
forward as far as the WAMBEKE stream, north of the
village of the same name, but had here to put in all
its reserves to hold its ground against strong hostile
counter-attacks .2

On the left of the Bavarians the 26th Infantry Divi-
sion was engaged in heavy fighting, the position con-
fronting it being a particularly strong one. It lay
along a prominent ridge from 180 to 250 feet high,*
running north and south, eastwards of Mount KEMMEL,
and gave the enemy an extensive view eastwards over
our lines. The defence of this ridge was greatly
facilitated by the villages of WYTSCHAETE and MES-
SINES on it. These had been turned into fortresses,
and were connected by deep trenches protected by

* Messines ridge.

1 These squadrons belonged to the 1st and 2nd Life Guards, each of
which regiments had a squadron cut off when Zandvoorde was stormed.
None of the III British Corps were in this area, the extreme left of the
Corps being about the river Douve, south of Messines.

2 There was no strong counter-attack in the Wambeke area : the
very thin line of the 2nd Cavalry Division (perhaps 3000 rifles on a
front of two miles) was forced back to a position much nearer Wytschaete
and St. Eloi, where it received reinforcements amounting to about a
brigade of French infantry.

THE ATTEMPT TO BREAK THROUGH 69

broad wire entanglements.1 Owing to observation
difficulties, and to the misty weather preventing the
airmen from giving assistance, our artillery was
unable from its positions in the valley to bring a
sufficiently heavy bombardment on the enemy's lines ;
and, though the Wiirtemburg troops attacked with
great gallantry, the enemy was too well prepared for
the assault. On the right wing the 122nd Fusilier
Regiment (Emperor Franz Joseph of Austria) took
the fortified village of WAMBEKE, and on the left wing
the 51st Infantry Brigade worked forward slowly
towards MESSINES. The ridge north-east of the last-
named village was stormed, but the assault on the
locality itself, which was to have been delivered at
7.10 in the evening, could not get on owing to heavy
enfilade fire from the south which held back the
attackers some hundred yards away from its edge.2
The Cavalry Corps 3 had gained ground at first, but,
in consequence of their weakness in artillery, they
had been unable to take ST. YVES or to make progress
against the strongly fortified wood south-west of it.
The same story describes the day's work of the XIX
Corps 4 fighting to the south of the cavalry.

1 The amount of work it had been possible to do there in preparing
the position for defence had been very much restricted by lack of time
and want of labour. ' Deep trenches protected by broad wire entangle-
ments ' is a much exaggerated statement.

2 An attack was made by the Germans on Messines about this time,
but was decisively repulsed.

3 / and II Cavalry Corps. See Order of Battle.

* The Germans at one time broke the line of the 19th Infantry Brigade
on the right of the III Corps near Bois Grenier, but were dislodged
by a counter-attack by the 2nd Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders and
1st Middlesex. In Ploegsteert Wood there was also heavy fighting, the
1st Hampshires distinguishing themselves in particular by a very
stubborn resistance.

70 THE BATTLE ON THE YSER AND OF YPRES

On the extreme right wing of the Army Group also
the attack on the 30th October had not had the success
expected. The combined efforts of the 54th Reserve
Division and the right wing of the 30th Division had
not been able to carry us into GHELUVELT.1 General
von Deimling and Major-General Wild von Hohen-
born went forward themselves into the front line to
encourage the men, but the enemy defended his posi-
tions desperately, and held on firmly to the main
points of his line. Another artillery bombardment
was therefore considered necessary.

From the enemy's point of view, however, the
situation was anything but rosy on the evening of the
30th October. The entry of General von Deimling's
troops into ZANDVOORDE endangered the southern
side of the YPRES salient, and the capture of HOLLE-
BEKE brought the Germans within three miles of
YPRES itself. YPRES was indeed in danger. Field-
Marshal French had put Indian troops into the fight-
ing line on the 30th, and he now brought all the avail-
able British and French reserves towards the line
ZANDVOORDE-HOLLEBEKE in order to support the
7th British Division, which had been fought to a stand-
still.2 During the night, therefore, the fighting never

1 Except at Zandvoorde the German attacks north of the Ypres-
Comines canal were not successful, and their success at Zandvoorde
was brought to a standstill by the arrival of two battalions of the 1st
Division under Brigadier-General Bulfin, and three of the 2nd Division
under Brigadier-General Lord Cavan, whose intervention enabled a
new line to be formed north-west of Zandvoorde. To the east of Zand-
voorde the 1th Division was forced to fall back nearer to Gheluvelt, but
east of Gheluvelt itself the Germans made no progress.

2 The arrival of the Meerut Division on 29th October allowed some
of the most exhausted units of the II Corps to be relieved on the front
east of Fesiubert, south-east of Richebourg St. Vaast, west of Neuve

THE ATTEMPT TO BREAK THROUGH 71

ceased : attacks and counter-attacks continued along the
whole front, and under cover of darkness the indefatig-
able Wiirtemburg troops again tried to storm MESSINES.

On the 31st October the Germans had at first but
few fresh troops to meet the enemy's reinforcements ; l
so the 6th Bavarian Reserve Division was brought up
in readiness north of the LYS behind the II Bavarian
Corps. General von Fabeck had from the outset
realised that the WYTSCHAETE-MESSINES ridge was
of decisive importance, and that every effort must
be made to take it ; on the 31st, therefore, the main
pressure was to be exerted along the southern sector
of attack of the II Bavarian Corps.

According to the enemy's accounts the 31st October
1914 was one of the most critical days at his head-
quarters. For us it was a day of great glory, and the
British state unreservedly in their reports of the fight-
ing, that the bravery of our men was beyond all praise.
It is true that this last October day of the first war-
year did not give us YPRES, but our semicircle around
the town became so reduced that it was brought within
range of our artillery from three sides, and there could
be no more threats of a big hostile offensive based on
the YPRES district. The fact that neither the enemy's
commanders nor their troops gave way under the
strong pressure we put on them, but continued to
fight the battle round YPRES, though their situation
was most perilous, gives us an opportunity to acknow-

Chapelle, but these battalions were not destined to enjoy a very long spell
of rest.

1 The ' reinforcements ' which the Allies had received on 29th-3Qth
October were not even sufficient to redress the balance against them.
(See note 2, page 70.)

72 THE BATTLE ON THE YSER AND OF YPRES

ledge that there were men of real worth opposed to
us who did their duty thoroughly.

At dawn on Sunday the 31st October, in fine weather,
a heavy artillery bombardment of the new hostile posi-
tions was begun on a front of ten and a half miles . The
enemy's batteries were not long in replying ; being so
difficult to locate they had not suffered much in the
previous fighting. Terrific artillery fire lasted through-
out the morning, the British and French shells fell long
distances behind our lines, blocking streets and bridges,
and devastating the villages as far back as the LYS,
so that any regular transport of supplies became im-
possible. At GHELUVELT, however, the important
northern corner of the Army Group Fabeck, the enemy's
hail of shells had but little result, because our capture
of the high ground at ZANDVOORDE had made the
work of observation very difficult.

After sufficient artillery preparation the British
stronghold of GHELUVELT was to be attacked from
south and east simultaneously. Colonel von Alders-
hausen, commanding the 105th Infantry Regiment,
was to direct the attack from the east. Besides two
battalions of his own regiment, there were placed under
his command the 1st Battalion of the 143rd Infantry
Regiment and a strong mixed detachment from the
54th Reserve Division, mainly belonging to the 245th
Reserve Regiment and the 26th Reserve J tiger Battalion.
The 99th Infantry Regiment was to make the attack
from the south.1 During the morning, in spite of the

1 The troops holding Gheluvelt consisted of two battalions of the
3rd Infantry Brigade, with portions of two of the 2nd Infantry Brigade,
at most 2000 men. Against these the Germans by their own account
put in about eight battalions.

THE ATTEMPT TO BREAK THROUGH 73

heaviest fighting, no success was achieved, and isolated
attacks were repulsed by British counter-movements.
At about 11 A.M. our converging attack was begun.
The commanders of the 54th Reserve and 30th LI-

THE ATTACK OFTHE ARMY GROUP FABECK.
ON OCTOBER 3I$T 1914.

Scale. I:I2B.OOQ.

[Enemysposit/on on
\ morning of October 31 it
f Enemy's position on
\ evening of November /*f

fantry Divisions with their artillery leaders, as well as
the general commanding the XV Corps, were again in
the foremost lines, though the last, General von Deim-
ling, was wounded almost at once by a shell-splinter.
Towards midday the attack began to gain ground.
His Majesty the Kaiser, who had arrived at the battle

74 THE BATTLE ON THE YSER AND OF YPRES

headquarters of the Sixth Army, watched the infantry
working its way through the maze of the enemy's
obstacles and entrenchments. It was well supported
by artillery, some of the guns being moved forward
with the front line. The British and French artillery
fired as rapidly as they knew how,1 and over every bush,
hedge and fragment of wall floated a thin film of smoke,
betraying a machine-gun rattling out bullets. But it
was all of no avail : the attackers kept on advancing.
More hostile strongholds were constantly being dis-
covered ; even all the points known to be of importance
could not be given sufficient bombardments by our ar-
tillery, so that many attacks had to be delivered against
fresh troops in good sheltered entrenchments untouched
by our guns.2 Many of our gallant men were killed,
and the officers, who were the first to rise in the assault,
were the special target of the enemy's sharpshooters,
well trained in long colonial wars.3 Once our troops
entered an enemy's position, the resistance was only
slight, and the German showed his superiority in single
combat. It was only the enemy's counter-attacks,
delivered with remarkable accuracy and rapidity, that
regained some of his lost ground, but they did not,
however, compromise the general success of the day.

1 It would not be gathered from this account that the British artillery
had, as was the case, already been severely restricted as to ammunition
expenditure.

2 The statement that ' many attacks had to be delivered against fresh
troops in good sheltered entrenchments ' is almost ludicrous in its travesty
of the facts.

3 It was not in ' long colonial wars ' but in careful training on the
ranges that the majority of the defenders of Ypres had learnt that
mastery of the rifle which was the mainstay of the success of the defence.
Between the close of the South African War (1902) and the outbreak of
war in 1914, scarcely any British troops had been on active service.

THE ATTEMPT TO BREAK THROUGH 75

The XXVII Reserve Corps pressed forward into the
dense woods near REUTEL/ which were defended by
a strong system of obstacles and by a quantity of
machine-guns, hidden in some cases up in trees.2

While this was in progress the last assault on GHELU-
VELT was taking place. The attacks from east and
south both broke into the village, and by 3 P.M. the
whole place with its chateau and park was in German
possession.3 Colonel von Hugel took his storming
parties of the 54th Reserve Division northwards through
and beyond the village, while Captain Reiner galloped
his batteries close up to it. It was then, however,
that fresh hostile reserves were launched against GHELTJ-
VELT. The 1 6th Reserve Regiment of the 6th Bavarian
Reserve Division was hurried up to meet them, its
gallant commander, Colonel List, dying a hero's death

1 The position west of Reutel was maintained intact on 3lst October,
the right of the 2nd Division and left of the 1st Division holding on
successfully even after the centre of the 1st Division had been pierced at
Gheluvelt.

2 The picture of the great profusion of machine-guns in the British
possession is a little dimmed by the recollection that the war estab-
lishments allowed two machine-guns per infantry battalion, that by
3lst October there had been no time to produce enough machine-guns to
increase the establishment ; indeed, most battalions had already one or
both their guns put out of action. The Germans clearly took for
machine-gun fire the rapid fire which the infantry of the original
Expeditionary Force could maintain.

3 The capture of Gheluvelt was earlier than 3 p.m. by at least an
hour, 1 or 1.30 p.m. seems more like the correct time. The f chateau and
park,' north of Gheluvelt, were held by the 1st South Wales Borderers, who
maintained their ground, although their right was left in the air by the
loss of the village, until the 2nd Worcesters came up and delivered their
celebrated counter-attack past the right of the S. W.B. This apparently
occurred about 2 p.m. The German account is, however, accurate in say-
ing that Gheluvelt was not retaken ; what the Worcesters did was that they
completely checked the German efforts to push forward ; the position their
counter-attack reached enabled them to flank any advance west of Gheluvelt.

76 THE BATTLE ON THE YSER AND OF YPRES

during the movement. For a short time our own
artillery fired into the backs of the Bavarian ranks :
for the men were wearing caps and were thus mistaken
for British troops. Nevertheless the enemy's counter-
attack failed and GHELUVELT became and remained
ours, and we captured besides 17 officers and 1000
men, and 3 guns.1 The enemy prevented our further
advance beyond GHELUVELT by a heavy fire from a
new and strong position along the edge of the woods
west of GHELUVELT. Here a new fortress had been
made, which would have to be broken down by our
artillery before it could be attacked. On the left wing
of the XV Corps the German assaults also failed in
front of some small woods which had been turned into
strong points ; the 39th Infantry Division was able
to advance only some 500 yards, though it took a
number of prisoners.2 The artillery of the XV Corps
had an accidental success on this day which must
have interfered with the enemy's staff work for some
time. During the bombardment of HOOGE, a direct
hit was made on a house in which the Staff of the 1st
British Division were working : one general and
several staff officers were killed.3 After heavy fighting

1 The German claim to have captured three guns does not seem
founded on fact : one gun of the \\lth Field Battery was lost, but was
subsequently retaken.

2 The left of the X V Corps, which was in action against the detach-
ments under Brigadier-Generals Bulfin and Lord Cavan, and the right
of the 1th Division, in the woods later known as Shrewsbury Forest,
was successfully held in check : it gained but a little ground, and at one
point a most successful counter-attack drove the Germans back a long
way, many casualties being inflicted and prisoners taken.

8 The Staffs of both 1st and 2nd Divisions were there. Major-
General Lomax, commanding the 1st Division, and Major-General
Munro, commanding the 2nd Division, were wounded. Neither was
killed, but the former died many montJis after of his wounds.

THE ATTEMPT TO BREAK THROUGH 77

at close quarters the II Bavarian Corps gained ground
along the whole of its wide sector of attack on the 31st
October. The right wing took possession of the edges
of the woods west of HOLLEBEKE, whilst the left of
the Corps advanced as far as OOSTTA VERNE. The 6th
Bavarian Reserve Division had been brought into line
immediately south of it, in order to make the attack
on WYTSCHAETE.

We now come to the most vital point of the battle :
who was to be the victor in the fight for the WYT-
SCHAETE-MESSINES ridge ? The 6th Bavarian Reserve
Division had worked forward by daylight towards
WYTSCHAETE, regardless of the heavy artillery fire
directed from the high ground on our troops moving
up from the valley.1 At nightfall the left wing of the
II Bavarian Corps was still hanging back, unable to
break the strong resistance opposed to it, but in spite
of this the Bavarian Reserve Division dared to make
its attack. The 17th Reserve Infantry Regiment
was to enter WYTSCHAETE from the east and the 21st
from the south. All the preparations had been care-
fully made. The men wore white arm -bands as a
distinguishing mark when at close quarters with the
enemy in the darkness. Water bottles were packed
away in the haversacks ; rifles were unloaded and
bayonets fixed. It was hoped to take the enemy by

1 During the course of 3lst October French reinforcements of the
X VI Corps had arrived and were taking over the left of the line held by
the Cavalry Corps, relieving the 3rd and 5th Cavalry Brigades north-
west of Hollebeke and south-east of St. Eloi. The French were, fiow-
ever, unable to make much ground by their counter-attacks, and further
to the British right the 4th Cavalry Brigade was heavily pressed. It was
here that the London Scottish were put in to recover trenches ivhich had
been lost east of the Messines-Wytschaete road.

78 THE BATTLE ON THE YSER AND OF YPRES

surprise, and not a light betrayed our arrival in the
assembly positions. The hostile artillery fire slackened
during the night, but frequent star-shells lighted up
the darkness and showed that our opponents were
keeping a careful watch. The clear moon must have
helped them to see our movements. At 2 A.M. (1st
Nov.) the Bavarians advanced from their assembly
positions, taking little notice of the enemy's artillery
which began to open on them. The general direction of
the attack was given by the windmill of WYTSCHAETE,
which was clearly outlined in the moonlight against
the sky. The 17th Reserve Infantry Regiment under
Colonel Hofmann rapidly reached the edge of the
village and pushed through to the western exit. The
surprise had succeeded, and numbers of the enemy
who still held out in isolated ruins were either killed
in a hand-to-hand fight, or taken prisoner.1 Unfor-
tunately, however, our own guns continued to bombard
the village, as the news of the victory of the 17th
Regiment was not communicated to them sufficiently
quickly. At about 6 A.M. Colonel Hofmann there-

1 Accurate details of the fighting which went on through the night
of Blst October-lst November round Wytschaete are extremely difficult
to disentangle. It seems that the 4th Cavalry Brigade was forced out
of the village somewhere between 2 and 3 a.m., that the advance of the
Germans was then held up west of the village, counter-attacks by two
battalions of the 3rd Division, which had just arrived from La Bassee-
Neuve Chapelle area, assisting to check them. Subsequently these
battalions (1st Northumberland Fusiliers and 1st Lincolnshires) were
also forced back, but by this time more French reinforcements were
coming up with some of the 5th Cavalry Brigade, and their counter-
attacks, though not wholly successful, prevented further German pro-
gress. But the admission of this account that two whole German regi-
ments (six battalions) were engaged in the attack is a fine testimony to
the resistance made by the 2nd Cavalry Division and attached infantry
at Wytschaete with odds of more than two to one against them.

THE ATTEMPT TO BREAK THROUGH 79

fore decided to withdraw his victorious troops tempor-
arily to the eastern edge of WYTSCHAETE, and to re-
organise there. It so happened that the 21st Reserve
Regiment arrived on the southern side of the village
at this moment, its advance having been delayed by
a heavy enfilade fire from the south-west. When the
men of the 21st Regiment in the first dim light of
dawn saw the figures of men wearing caps running
eastwards among the ruins, they immediately opened
fire on them. Nevertheless, in spite of the losses
incurred through this mistake, the 17th Regiment
held its ground at the eastern edge of the village.
The error was quickly remedied by singing patriotic
songs and by flag-signals, and communication was
regained with the neighbouring infantry and with the
artillery. A strong counter-attack, however, was now
made by six regiments of the XVI French Corps, which
had arrived during the night, and the gallant 17th had
slowly to withdraw again from the high ground.

The fighting around MESSINES on the 31st had been
equally severe. On the 30th the 26th Infantry Divi-
sion under Duke William of Urach had already got its
patrols up to the edge of the village, but before any
assault could be made an artillery preparation was
required, especially against the northern sector. On
the morning of the 31st October our howitzers and
trench -mortars bombarded the enemy in his trenches,
and by 10.30 A.M. the moment had arrived for the
Wiirtemburg troops to advance.

The 122nd Fusilier Regiment was to attack the ridge
north of MESSINES, along which runs the road to
WYTSCHAETE, whilst the 125th Infantry Regiment
was to advance against MESSINES itself, and the 119th

80 THE BATTLE ON THE YSER AND OF YPRES

Grenadier Regiment against the enemy's trenches
immediately south of it. The hostile position was so
strong that a force greatly inferior in strength would
be able to hold it against an attack coming up from
the valley. Bare sloping ground lay in front of it, and
only a few hedges limited the field of view, so that
every advance and assembly position for miles round
could be seen. A strong British garrison held MESSINES :
the trenches had been well made, and were covered
by a continuous and broad system of obstacles.1

The way in which the Swabian troops 2 broke down
the enemy's resistance was indeed a masterpiece.
Neither the enemy's artillery fire, which imperilled the
advance of the reserves, nor the British machine-guns,
a large number of which enfiladed the attack from
the south, could restrain the dash of the Wiirtemburg
troops. At 11 A.M. the 125th Stuttgart Infantry
Regiment had got possession of the north-east corner
of MESSESTES. The road entering the village from
GAPAARD was blocked by a barricade ; and after storm-
ing it, another one, a hundred yards further inside
the village, closed the way. The streets could not be
used for our advance, being choked with debris, and
under heavy rifle and machine-gun fire, so the attackers
had to make their way through or over the walls.

1 The forces available for the defence of Messines were the 1st Cavalry
Division, much reduced by the previous fighting, assisted by portions
of the 51th Rifles (Lahore Division) and two battalions of the 5th Divi-
sion (the 2nd King's Own Scottish Borderers, 2nd King's Own Yorkshire
L.I., both recently relieved from the trenches near Neuve Cluzpelle and
much below strength). The twelve battalions of the 26th (Wiirtemburg)
Division were thu& in overwhelming superiority. The only artillery
available to assist the defence were the 13-pounders of the R.H.A.
batteries attached to the Cavalry Corps.

8 i.e. Wiirtemburg.

THE ATTEMPT TO BREAK THROUGH 81

There are a number of large, well-built houses in
MESSINES, which the enemy had turned into a succes-
sion of strongholds, but they were rapidly blown up
by our sappers. The convent looked especially im-
pregnable with its walls a yard thick, and strong

THE CAPTURE OF MESSINES.

on OCTOBER 3I?T 1914 BY THE

26TH INFANTRY DIVISION.

jv

I2ISTJAGER

REGIMENT

Direction of attack.

Position on evening of October 3/?f

_»• Enemy's positron.
MM Convent.

towers from which machine-guns and rifles fired fran-
tically. Captain Heinrich's Wurtemburg battery of
the 65th Field Artillery Regiment was therefore brought
up, the men dragging the guns through the streets, as
horses could not move along them, and the infantry
carrying up the ammunition. The convent was soon
in flames, burying its stubborn defenders under its
ruins. Lieutenant Mosner of the 125th Infantry

82 THE BATTLE ON THE YSER AND OF YPRES

Regiment, following a narrow footpath through gardens
and backyards, was the first to make an entry into the
market-square. With a few stout-hearted followers
he occupied a large building there which he defended
without any support till the evening against great
odds. Not until nightfall were others of his regiment
able to reach him, and secure the position he had held
so courageously. This day of street fighting had cost
very dear, and our casualty list was a large one. A
part of the 122nd Fusilier Regiment fighting north of
MESSINES had a^o had to be directed on to the village,
and by the evening a continuous line had been success-
fully formed through the centre of it. Isolated fight-
ing continued throughout the night, and in order to
keep up communication amidst the ruins and recognise
one another in the dark, the Wiirtemburg troops sang
folk-songs. The chorus of voices mixed with the
rattle of machine-guns, the roar of artillery in the
streets, and the crackle of the burning and falling
houses, all combined to make a magnificent and un-
surpassed piece of battle -music.

North of the village the left wing of the 122nd
Infantry Regiment established itself on the MESSINES-
WYTSCHAETE road : but its right wing was unable to
capture the high ground, as WYTSCHAETE itself was
still in British hands. The 119th Grenadiers suffered
severely : the progress of the other regiment of their
brigade, the 125th Infantry Regiment, had roused
their ambition, but a heavy enfilade fire swept their
ranks from the south where the Cavalry Corps were
still unable to advance. They were compelled by
heavy losses to be content with the task of securing
the left flank of their division.

THE ATTEMPT TO BREAK THROUGH 83

On the evening of the 31st the gallant attackers
were rewarded for their deeds of immortal fame by a
message of warm praise from the Emperor.

The final objective, however, had not yet been
attained, although in the south the high ground had
been reached and artillery observers sent forward there,
so that the enemy's positions could be accurately
ranged on right up to Mount KEMMEL. The main
pressure of the attack would therefore have to be con-
tinued here, on the left wing of the Army Group Fabeck.

During the 1st November the 3rd Infantry Division
arrived in the area COMINES-WARNETON, north of the
LYS, as reserve to the Army Group.

On the morning of the 1st November a thick mist
lay over the country, so that the infantry got a few
hours' rest before the continuous shelling of the enemy's
artillery began. As soon as the mist cleared, the
battle broke out anew, on a twelve-mile front. In the
north the Saxon and Wurtemburg divisions of the
XXVII Reserve Corps further extended their suc-
cesses of the previous days. The line was advanced
up to the chateau of POEZELHOEK, which was taken
from the 1st British Division after a heavy fight.1

The divisions of Deimling's XV Corps attacked with
the right wing on the GHELUVELT-YPBES main road
and the left on KLEIN ZILLEBEKE. They advanced

1 This is not accurate. Poezelhoek Chateau had to be evacuated
during the night of 3lst October-lst November, owing to the witlidrawal
of the, line made necessary by the loss of Oheluvelt ; but the Germans
did not molest the retirement to the new position, and such attempts as
they made in the course of 1st November to press on westward beyond
Oheluvelt were unsuccessful. The British accounts do not give the
impression that the German attacks on this day were very heavily
pressed in this quarter ; at any rate they failed to make any ground.

84 THE BATTLE ON THE YSEK AND OF YPRES

but slowly, fighting hard the whole day. The small,
dense woods, defended with the utmost tenacity, again
made progress very difficult. The 30th Division
managed to reach the eastern edge of the HEREN-
THAGE Wood, where the 3rd British Cavalry Division,
supported by infantry, was in position. The wood
north of ZANDVOORDE gave exceptional trouble, but it
was finally outflanked on both sides, and its defenders
taken prisoner.1

The II Bavarian Corps advanced to the attack on
both sides of the COMINES- YPRES canal, and drove
the enemy back as far as the sharp bend in it. The
left wing captured the small wood west of OOSTTA-
VERNE which was defended by Indian and British
troops. The treacherous methods of the Indians
greatly exasperated our men : crouching in the hedges,
and with machine-guns concealed up trees, the defeated
Asiatics allowed our troops to pass them, and then
got up and stabbed them in the back with their knives.2
The 6th Bavarian Reserve Division had withdrawn, on

1 The hardest fighting of 1st November in the Ypres salient was
in the area north-west of Zandvoorde where the detachments under
Brigadier-Generate Bulfin and Lord Cavan were sharply engaged, as
were also the remnants of the 1th Division, now holding a position
south-east and south of the Herenthage Wood. A feature of this day's
fighting was a counter-attack by the 26th Field Company R.E., acting
as infantry in default of any infantry reserves, which checked the efforts
of the Germans to advance north of Groenenburg Farm (north-west of
Zandvoorde).

2 The Indian units hitherto employed under the Cavalry Corps (81th
Rifles and 12,9th Baluchis) had already been withdrawn to Kemmel,
and were not in action near Oosttaverne on 1st November. This
account of the ' treacherous methods of the Indians ' smacks of the con-
ventional ; it is wJiat was attributed to the GhurkJias in some sections
of the German Press, and seems inserted rather to excite odium against
the British for calling in Asiatics to oppose the disciples of ' KulturS

THE ATTEMPT TO BREAK THROUGH 85

the morning of the 1st November, to its positions of
the previous evening, and at midday began its attack
once more. Confidence and enthusiasm served to
obliterate the bad memories of the past night, and the
dense lines now rose simultaneously from their posi-
tions as if on parade. Very many of their dead or
wounded still lay at the foot of the heights, but the
gallant division stormed the slopes again, and by

4 P.M. had reached the eastern edge of WYTSCHAETE.
It was not possible to push up reserves owing to heavy
artillery fire, and at this moment the enemy counter-
attacked with two fresh divisions.1 The Bavarians,
who had become disorganised during the assault, were
forced to evacuate the village again under cover of
darkness, after having actually entered it at about

5 P.M. They had suffered very heavily during the
attack, being fired at from flank and rear, for the right
wing of the 26th Infantry Division was unable to
take all the high ground north-west of MESSINES until
the evening of the 1st November. Fierce street fight-
ing had gone on in MESSINES throughout the day, till
finally the Wiirtemburg troops gained the upper hand
and cleared the enemy out of the village to its western
edge. The British were driven back down the western
slope of the ridge, and had to entrench themselves in
the valley, losing heavily in the operation. As soon
as its right wing reached the MESSINES-WYTSCHAETE
road that evening the 26th Infantry Division held
almost the whole of the famous ridge, and the pre-
liminary condition for the capture of WYTSCHAETE

1 French Divisions. By the afternoon of 1st November the French
had taken over the defence of Wytschaete. The 2nd Cavalry Division
assembled on a line east of Kemmel and Wulverghem,

86 THE BATTLE ON THE YSER AND OF YPRES

was obtained. The 6th Bavarian Reserve Division, how-
ever, was not able to carry out a third assault without
assistance, and General von Fabeck during the night
of the lst-2nd therefore advanced the 3rd Prussian
Division from its assembly area WAMBEKE-GARDE
DIEU into the fighting line, in order to carry forward
the attack through and beyond WYTSCHAETE towards
KEMMEL.

After a comparatively quiet night the battle opened
again on the morning of the 2nd November along the
whole front of the Army Group Fabeck. His inde-
fatigable troops, some of whom had already endured
twelve days of the heaviest fighting that had taken
place in the campaign, attacked their strongly en-
trenched opponent once more. The enemy was at
least as strong as they were in fighting units on the
battle -front, and besides was able to bring up rein-
forcements of newly arrived British and French
troops.1

On the eastern side of the YPRES salient General
von Deimling attacked on a front of nearly four miles.
His Corps, which had won its laurels in Alsace, in Lor-
raine and in Northern France, again, in spite of heavy
casualties, continued its advance of the previous days.
The 30th Division entered VELDHOEK and established
itself firmly in the north-eastern corner of the KEREN -
THAGE Wood.2 The attack had been facilitated by

1 These ' reinforcements of newly arrived British troops ' are
imaginary.

2 The Germans, attacking along the Menin road, succeeded in break-
ing our line at this point and captured two guns which had been pushed
up into the front trenches. However, the \st Scots Guards, though taken
in flank, held on north of the road till a counter-attack by the 1st Black
Watch re-established the line, while south of the road a counter-attack

THE ATTEMPT TO BREAK THROUGH 87

a simultaneous advance of the XXVII Reserve Corps,
which had pressed forward some hundred yards north
of VELDHOEK. Von Deimling's left wing had advanced
in the direction of KLEIN ZILLEBEKE, but was held up
by the difficult wooded country east of ZWARTELEEN.
It had to wait here for assistance from the neighbouring
troops on its left.

The II Bavarian Corps had been held up early on
the morning of the 2nd November by strong hostile
counter-attacks in the sector west of HOLLEBEKE.
They were all, however, repulsed and the Corps was
even able to make a slight advance on the right wing
during the day.

WYTSCHAETE was again the centre of the heaviest
fighting on this day.1 The Bavarian Reserve Divi-
sion was, at its own request, to attack the village ; the
enemy's position immediately south of it was allotted
as objective to the 3rd Division. The 42nd Infantry
Regiment and an Abtheilung (3 batteries) of the
17th Field Artillery Regiment remained in Army
Reserve. At 7 A.M. a fierce artillery duel began, and
the enemy, quickly realising the danger threatening
him, hurried up strong reserves to WYTSCHAETE.
Kiefhaber's brigade of the 6th Bavarian Reserve Divi-
sion rose to the assault. Under a hail of shrapnel

by the remnants of the 2nd and 3rd Brigade cleared the Herenthage
Wood completely, but did not regain the front trenches a little eastward.
Further to the right Lord Cavan's detachment (Brigadier-General
Bulfin had been wounded on 1st November, and his battalions had come
under Lord Cavan's orders] and the remnants of the 1st Grenadiers
and 2nd Border Regiment (1th Division] held their own successfully
and inflicted very heavy losses on the Germans, i.e. Deimling's left
wing.

1 The credit for the gallant defence of Wytschaete on this day belongs
solely to the French • no British troops were in action there,

88 THE BATTLE ON THE YSER AND OF YPRES

the youngsters stormed the eastern and southern
slopes of the WYTSCHAETE ridge for the third time,
though with considerable loss, the enemy's machine-
guns causing great havoc in their ranks. As soon as
the foremost of them had reached the windmill the
enemy launched a counter-attack ; but this time the
Bavarians were not content with simply holding their
ground ; their supports were brought up at the critical
moment and pressed forward into the village. Furious
street fighting now ensued, and the Bavarians having
to deal with every house became greatly disorganised.
Taking advantage of this the British and French com-
manders sent forward fresh masses into the line,
trying to turn the balance in their favour at this
important point by employing every available man.
It was 3.10 P.M. when a cry for help reached the Pome-
ranian (3rd) Division from their Bavarian neighbours,
and it was not uttered in vain. Shortly before, the
Stettin Grenadier Regiment had captured the long-
coveted high ground south-west of WYTSCHAETE, the
struggle for a large farmhouse on it having been
especially severe. Without possession of this the
south flank of the village could not be held. Count
Gneisenau's Colberg Grenadiers were then sent forward
to support the Bavarians, and the enemy was unable
to hold out in WYTSCHAETE against the rifle -butts and
bayonets of the united Pomeranians and Bavarians.
Soon after 5 P.M. the village, as far as its western edge,
was in German hands, although the fighting continued
till well into the night among the ruins with detach-
ments of the enemy who would not surrender.

By the capture of WYTSCHAETE a fine commanding
position had been obtained? but the village itself, once

THE ATTEMPT TO BREAK THROUGH 89

so pleasant to the view, was now terrible to look upon.
The church was in flames, and the windmill flared like
a beacon in the darkness. Friend and foe lay wounded
side by side among the smouldering ruins. The
enemy was fully aware of the importance of WYT-
SCHAETE, but he had been so weakened that he was
unable to recover for another big counter-attack.
He therefore contented himself with small and fruitless
efforts, only one of which succeeded in temporarily
entering the village during the 3rd. Nevertheless for
the next few days it lay under the constant fire of
heavy artillery, though our heroic observers did not
allow this to interfere with their work.

Many of the inhabitants still remained in WYT-
SCHAETE, as in MESSINES, and it was pathetic to see
how they clung to their devastated patches of ground,
regardless of danger. In spite of many offers from
the Germans, these Belgian inhabitants remained with
their last scrap of property, preferring to die by the
shell that destroyed their homes.

A small wood north-west of WYTSCHAETE, called the
Park, was still a dangerous point. This dense copse
was surrounded by a system of trenches and several
rows of obstacles. With the help of skilfully sited
flanking arrangements and shell-proof shelters, it
had been turned into an almost impregnable strong-
hold, and cost us many days of heavy fighting before
it was finally taken.

The 26th Infantry Division, after its capture of
MESSESTES, immediately put the high ground into a
state of defence. Its left brigade, the 51st, which
was in position there, was relieved on the 2nd November
by the llth Landwehr Brigade, and sent^back to the

90 THE BATTLE ON THE YSER AND OF YPRES

Army Reserve. The 52nd Brigade, on the right wing
of the division, in co-operation with the 3rd Infantry
Division, advanced across the STEENBEEK stream.
However, no progress of importance could be made
there, as every movement could be immediately
brought under most effective artillery fire from the
commanding positions on Mount KEMMEL.1

On the 3rd November the formation of a ' Group
Urach 5 was ordered, consisting of the 3rd and 26th
Infantry Divisions, to continue the attack against
the high ground east of KEMMEL ; but in the follow-
ing days it was unable to make any essential altera-
tion in the general situation in this sector.

A part of the Army Cavalry was still in action south
of, and co-operating with, the 26th Infantry Division,
in spite of the small force of artillery and engineers
included in it. On the 2nd November it made a
surprise attack on foot against the farm KLEIN DOUVE
with complete success.2 On the 4th November the
I Cavalry Corps was relieved by the II, consisting of
the 3rd and 7th Cavalry Divisions.

In the early days of November the conduct of the

1 After the capture of Messines and WytscJiaete the severity of the
fighting in this quarter died down rapidly. The French made some
attempts to recover Wytschaete, while the Germans managed to capture
Hill 75 (Spanbroekmolen), but could advance no further, and the British
Cavalry Corps established itself firmly in trenches north-east of Wulver-
ghem. Supported by the artillery of the 5th Division, it maintained
itself on this line till relieved by the infantry of the 5th Division about
the middle of November.

8 The chaplain of the Guard Cavalry Division, ' Hofprediger ' Dr.
Vogel, in his book ' 3000 Kilometer mit der Garde-Kavallerie ' (p. 212),
says the attack was made and failed, but ' next day the English aban-
doned the farm : this may have been due either to the power of our
S-inch howitzers, or to the moral effect of the attack of the Guard
Dragoons.'

THE ATTEMPT TO BREAK THROUGH 91

enemy's operations against the Army Group Fabeck
underwent a very noticeable change. The German
attacks had destroyed any prospect of success for the
big offensive movement which had been planned.
The British troops, especially the I and IV Corps,1
were so played out that they had to be relieved by
parts of the French Army. The enemy's commanders,
however, realised that even these fresh troops would
be unable to make much headway against our men,
and they therefore decided to remain on the defensive
and to create a deep zone of trench -systems. The
heavy fighting had made havoc of their front trenches,
or at least had badly damaged them. The civil popu-
lation and all other available labour, therefore, were
now called upon to dig successive lines of rearward
positions for a long way westwards.2 These prepara-
tions were soon discovered by our airmen.

During the early days of November the commander
of the Sixth Army came to the conclusion that the
offensive of the Army Group Fabeck could lead to no

1 What other British troops were present in the Ypres salient except
the I and IV Corps this narrative does not pause to state, for the simple
reason that there were none. The I Corps was not relieved, though some
French battalions were put into the line near Veldhoek ; but in the
course of 5th November the remnant of the infantry of the 1th Division
was relieved by the two composite brigades from the II Corps composed
of battalions which had had three weeks' fighting near La Bassee and
had then to be thrust in after only two or three days'" rest to hold some of
the most difficult parts of the line south-east of Ypres. The 1th Infantry
Division when relieved amounted to less than a third of their original
strength, without taking into account the drafts that had joined since
they landed, which amounted to 2000 or more. Most of the battalions
of the 1st Division were in scarcely better case.

2 These ' successive lines of rearward positions ' did not exist except
on paper during the period to be included in the ' Battle of Ypres,' i.e.
to 17 th November,

92 THE BATTLE ON THE YSER AND OF YPRES

decisive results. The forces available were still too
weak to break through the enemy's strongly entrenched
positions, particularly as he was continually bringing
up fresh reinforcements to the battle-front.

If the attempt to break through south of YPRES was
not to be entirely abandoned, and a purely defensive
war on the Western Front thereby avoided, more
troops would have to be brought up for the YPRES
battle from other sectors of the front. As a beginning
the 2nd and the Bavarian Cavalry Divisions were
affiliated to the Army Group Fabeck, the Bavarian
Cavalry Division being allotted to the XV Corps and
the 2nd Cavalry Division to the II Bavarian Corps.
The German General Staff also placed the II Corps
and the 4th Infantry Division at the disposal of General
von Fabeck, and they began to detrain at LILLE on
the 5th November. On the 3rd Crown Prince Rupert
of Bavaria ordered the XXIV Reserve Corps and the
25th Reserve Division to be taken fron the Sixth
Army, west of LILLE ; and this was followed by an
order on the 4th to withdraw all the troops of the
Guard Corps available from their positions, and for
their sector of the front to be taken over by the IV
Corps at ARRAS. Accordingly a composite Division
of the Guard Corps, consisting of the 1st and 4th
Guard Infantry Brigades, under Lieutenant -General
von Winckler, marched for ROUBAIX, which was reached
on the 7th. More heavy artillery was also handed
over to the Army Group Fabeck, and, in addition, all
the artillery ammunition allotted to the Sixth Army.
The intention of the German General Staff, com-
municated to the commander of the Sixth Army on
the 4th November, was : to push the attack to the

THE ATTEMPT TO BREAK THROUGH 93

immediate north (of the elbow) of the COMINES-YPRES
canal, and to put in all available forces to break
through there. In the meantime, however, General
von Fabeck, in accordance with instructions previously
issued by the commander of the Sixth Army, had
placed the XXIV Reserve Corps and the 25th Reserve
Division on the left wing of the II Bavarian Corps,
and had there formed a Group Gerok, to which the
6th Bavarian Reserve Division was added. Thus for
the offensive north of the COMINES-YPRES canal there
were left the II Corps and Guard Corps (the 4th Divi-
sion and the mixed Division of von Winckler), besides
the XV Corps which was already in position there.
The fighting continued along the front of the Army
Group until the 10th, when these troops were ready
to attack. No time was to be given the enemy to
recover, or to strengthen his positions.

The XV Corps, which in the meantime had extended
its left wing to the COMINES-YPRES canal, won ground
daily, especially on the 6th November, when the 39th
Division delivered a heavy attack near KLEIN ZILLE-
BEKE and drove the recently arrived French troops
from their position, capturing four hundred prisoners in
the farm buildings. The troops, advancing with their
bands playing, also stormed parts of ZWARTELEEN, a
village widely scattered among the woods and meadows.
The artillery fired at point - blank range, as the
November mist made observation impossible at any
distance. French counter - attacks and an attack
by British cavalry, which attempted to make good
the retirement of the French, were repulsed. Their
casualties were heavy, the 1st and 2nd British Life
Guards being decimated. The enemy's counter-attacks

94: THE BATTLE ON THE YSER AND OF YPRES

on the 7th and 8th November, in which the much
weakened 7th British Division, as well as the Zouaves,
took part, had also no success. On the 8th November
the 148th Infantry Regiment captured the fortified
position along the western edge of VELDHOEK ; with
a strong counter-attack the French made a bid to
recover the lost ground. Lieutenant-Colonel Linker,
the gallant regimental commander, hastily gathered to-
gether all the supports within reach, including Landwehr
men of the 54th Reserve Division, and led them forward
to meet the advancing enemy ; he himself was mortally
wounded at the head of his victorious followers. The
French hurriedly retired, suffering considerable loss.1

The II Bavarian Corps was kept busily employed
by the hostile counter-attacks near the canal ; the
enemy offered very stubborn resistance in order to
keep possession of the high ground from which YPRES
can be seen. The Bavarians, however, not only main-
tained their positions, but, by an irresistible attack on
the 9th and 10th November, took the high ground

1 During the period 2nd-llth November the most serious fighting on
the British front was between 6th and Sth November. On the 6th the
Germans attacked near Zwarteleen and gained ground, some of which
was recovered by a fine counter - attack delivered by the 1th Cavalry
Brigade (cf.page 93, line 30), while further counter-attacks by the 22nd
Infantry Brigade, brought back just as it had been drawn out for a rest,
and by portions of the 1st Division further improved the line next day.
On that day (1th November] a sharp attack on the 3rd Division, which
had now taken over the line south of the Menin road, gained a little
ground east of the Herenthage Wood. This part of the line was again
attacked in force on Sth November, and the line was broken near Veld-
hoek, but was restored after some sharp fighting and several counter-
attacks. Further north again, in Polygon Wood and to the east of it, the
2nd Division, though repeatedly attacked, more than held its own. In
the fighting near Veldhoek a prominent part was taken by two battalions
of Zouaves who had fitted a gap in the line of the 1st Division.

THE ATTEMPT TO BREAK THROUGH 95

on which ST. ELOI is situated.1 To the 5th Bavarian
Infantry Brigade is due all the credit for this fine feat.
The enemy remained for a long time in the houses of
ST. ELOI, but the high ground was of primary, perhaps
even decisive, importance ; for it gave us a bird's-eye
view of the country east of YPRES, where the mass of
the British field artillery was in position.

The fighting further south which the troops of the
Group Gerok had in and north of WYTSCHAETE was
equally heavy. The northern edge formed the divid-
ing line between the Groups Gerok and Urach. The
enemy kept the village under heavy fire in order to
hinder the work of our observers, the mere sight of a
man anywhere being sunicient to draw his artillery
fire. Our stereo -telescopes were therefore used through
loopholes in the ruins or at the chimney openings,
and the observers were often far safer on such lofty
perches than our reserves in the cellars of the battered
village. Only slow progress could be made in the
woods lying to the north-west.

The Group Urach also was unable to make much
headway. On its right wing, the 3rd Infantry Divi-
sion struggled hard to get possession of the Park
north-west of WYTSCHAETE. After a whole day's
fighting the 34th Fusilier Regiment forced its way
into the hospice, a fine old convent at the northern
entrance to the village ; from its roof the enemy had
been able to get a splendid view of our positions in
the valley south of WYTSCHAETE. In spite of a most

1 St. Eloi is Jiardly situated ' on high ground,1 as it is on the down
slope where the Warneton-Ypres road descends into the low ground
after crossing the north-easterly continuation of the Messines-Wyt-
scJiaete ridge.

96 THE BATTLE ON THE YSER AND OF YPRES

thorough bombardment our attack was very costly,
and although the Park was enveloped on two sides, it
was found impossible to enter it. From this patch of
wood heavy enfilade fire swept the positions of the
6th Bavarian Division to the north, and the trenches
of the 3rd Prussian Division to the south. It was
surrounded by a wall and moat as well as by wire
entanglements, the impenetrable undergrowth being
entangled with a maze of wire. Frenchmen with
machine-guns were roped to the trunks of some of
the trees, and they were found dead hanging from
the shell-torn stumps when the Park of WYTSCHAETE
was finally stormed on the 13th November by the
21st Reserve Infantry Regiment of the 6th Bavarian
Division, with the 2nd Grenadiers and 34th Fusiliers
of the 3rd Prussian Division. There is a legend con-
nected with WYTSCHAETE Park, and the scene was
worthy of it.1

The 26th Infantry Division during these days had
advanced its lines to the western slopes of the WYT-
SCHAETE-MESSINES ridge, and in places across the
valley, by sapping. This operation cost many casualties,
as the British on Mount KEMMEL were able to watch
every movement in our trenches, and could immediately
bring them under the fire of field or heavy artillery,
or even of long-range naval guns, and they were by
no means sparing with their ammunition. Fortu-
nately our losses were for the most part only in the
front lines, but our shortage of ammunition com-
pelled us to husband it.2 Owing to the conformation

1 The allusion is not understood.

2 The heavy artillery at Sir John French's disposal at this period
was still extremely limited, and its effectiveness was greatly hampered

THE ATTEMPT TO BREAK THROUGH 97

of the ground and to the weather preventing any air-
reconnaissances, we were unable to range accurately
on the enemy's artillery, and the most we could do
was to disturb their means of fire -direct ion. Their
observation posts on Mount KEMMEL were soon dis-
covered, and the fight now began against the observers
there as well as against those posted in the towers of
YPRES. So the blame must not be laid on us for the
gradual destruction of those magnificent buildings of
YPRES, which gave such a fine view of the whole
countryside.

Further to the south no noteworthy progress was
made either by the Cavalry Corps, or on the front of
the Sixth Army.

Such then was the general situation when, on the
10th November, the new forces lay ready to take the
offensive in their positions north of the COMINES-
YPRES canal. Before going further, however, the
operations of the Fourth Army from the last days
of October must for a moment be touched on.

by the lack of ammunition, stringent restrictions having to be placed on
the ammunition expenditure of guns of all calibres. Fortunately for
the Allies a similar handicap was beginning to make itself felt among
the Germans ; even their preparations had been hardly equal to the
vast ammunition expenditure which had been incurred.

THE OPERATIONS OF THE FOURTH ARMY
FROM THE END OF OCTOBER TO THE
9TH NOVEMBER 1914

WHILST the northern wing of the Sixth Army under
General von Fabeck was engaged in the heavy fight-
ing just described, the Fourth Army of Duke Albert
of Wurtemburg had been doing its utmost, by means
of constant attacks, to prevent the enemy from
withdrawing any troops from his front to support
his endangered positions near YPBES. By 11 A.M.
on the 3rd November the reorganisation of the German
forces rendered necessary by the inundation of the
front between the coast and DIXMUDE had been suffi-
ciently completed to enable an offensive to be delivered
on this day, on the line DIXMTJDE-GHELUVELT. The
right flank, from DIXMUDE to the coast, was secured
by the 38th Landwehr Brigade, 4th Ersatz Division,
and part of the 43rd Reserve Division, all under the
orders of the general officer commanding the XXII
Reserve Corps. The dispositions of the attacking
troops were as follows : the XXIII Reserve Corps
in the sector NOORDSCHOOTE-BIXSCHOOTE ; the III
Reserve Corps, including the 44th Reserve Division,
on both sides of LANGEMARCK, facing the front HET
SAS-ST. JULIEN (this was the most important group
in the offensive) ; the XXVI and XXVII Reserve

98

THE OPERATIONS OF THE FOURTH ARMY 99

Corps were to the south again, with the left flank
resting on the GEELUVELT-YPRES main road.1

By the evening of the 5th the XXIII Reserve Corps
had been able to gain ground at and north of Bix-
SCHOOTE, while the 5th Reserve Division advancing
from the north had forced its way close up to the
western edge of LANGEMARCK. But all our efforts
to capture this place by attacks from north and east,
in spite of reinforcements being brought up, failed.
It became evident that the enemy's skilfully placed
and more numerous artillery, combined with his well-
wired infantry positions in a country so favourable
for defence, were more than a match for our guns,
especially at a time when ammunition was scarce,
and the misty weather prevented observation from
aeroplanes. A continuation of the offensive here
would only have meant a useless sacrifice of life. It
was therefore decided with deep regret to resort to
the long and wearisome task of sapping in order to
hold the enemy. The situation of the Fourth Army
indeed was no enviable one. Here in the plains of
Flanders, operations were effected by the November
weather and heavy rains, far more than in the country
east and south of YPRES. The troops had to endure
great hardships ; their trenches rapidly filled with
water, and were necessarily so shallow as to give in-
sufficient protection against artillery fire. In several
places they had to be evacuated altogether, and the
men lay out in the open with only a hastily con-
structed wire entanglement in front to secure them

1 The portion of the Ypres salient attacked by the XXIII Corps was
defended by French troops alone ; there were no British north of the
Broodseinde cross-roads.

100 THE BATTLE ON THE YSER AND OF YPRES

against surprise attacks. Sapping too proved most
difficult in this water-logged district. Frequently it
could only be carried on by piling up sand-bag parapets,
and these being easily seen by the enemy were promptly
shelled. Thus the attack made slow progress. Regular
reliefs for the troops in the front line were out of
the question, for the units available at that time were
too weak ; and in any case, the men found relief time
a very dangerous moment, as the enemy was able to
observe every movement, especially where he still
held good observation points, as at BIXSCHOOTE and
LANGEMAECK.

A very extensive system of espionage served to com-
plete his knowledge of our intentions . Individual soldiers
were left behind in civilian clothing, with concealed
telephonic communication ; they kept hidden during
the daytime in attics and cellars, and reported our
movements and dispositions quickly and accurately
to their headquarters.1 A great deal of information
was also given away by the Belgian population, who
crossed the German lines by secret bypaths, or sent
news across by carrier-pigeons, or by lights and signals.
Although the punishment meted out to espionage
was severe, the Belgians always kept up this form
of patriotic work. It was extremely harmful to us,
and its effect could be diminished only by main-
taining thorough surveillance of the country in rear
of our lines. Our reserves, about which the enemy
was always well informed, had for the above reasons
to be kept close up behind the front lines in order to
be near at hand at the critical moment. Their move-
ments, as well as the sending up of all the necessary

1 The enemy is giving the Allies credit for his own tricks.

THE OPERATIONS OF THE FOURTH ARMY 101

supplies, were often matters of extreme difficulty.
Generally the reserves had to bivouac on sodden
meadows, the farms in the neighbourhood being
insufficient to provide shelter for them all. The
troops who were withdrawn from the front line and
put in reserve had therefore small opportunity for
either rest or recreation.

The insecurity of our communications back into
the interior of Belgium must be passed over almost
without mention, except to say that here too a colossal
task had been set ; for the weak force allotted to the
General-Governor had not only to garrison Belgium,
but to provide observation posts along the Dutch
frontier. In carrying out these duties, the old Land-
sturm troops showed a spirit of endurance which said
much for the military training they had received
many years before. The work of keeping watch over
the excited population was not without its dangers,
and all praise is due to these garrison troops and to
the auxiliary troops sent from Germany to their
assistance. Thanks to them, the long lines of com-
munication through conquered Belgium were not
disturbed, and the supply of the northern wing of our
army suffered no interruption from the enemy. For
the honour of all concerned this must be put on record.

On the 4th and 7th November the enemy made
attacks on a larger scale along the coast. On the 4th,
believing that we had left only weak outposts behind,
even opposite NIEUPOBT, when we retired to the
eastern bank of the canal, two to three Belgian regi-
ments advanced through LOMBABTZYDE. At first
they gained a slight success, but were shortly after-
wards attacked by part of the 38th Landwehr Brigade

102 THE BATTLE ON THE YSER AND OF YPRES

from the east, and by the 33rd Ersatz Brigade from
the south, and driven back. Detachments of the
Marine Division pursued the fleeing Belgians. The
second attack made by about five thousand French
troops, which took place on the 7th, fared far worse ;
the whole of LOMBAETZYDE was taken by our counter-
attack, and the enemy losses were very heavy.1

On the 9th November the 38th Landwehr Brigade
was relieved by parts of the Marine Division, for the
10th November was the day on which the new offen-
sive was to be made with fresh troops against YPRES
from the south-east.

1 However, when British troops took over the coastal sector in 1917
Lombartzyde was in Attied possession.

THE LAST PHASE

WHEN the 4th Division and von Winckler's Guard
Division were sent forward on the 9th November into
the northern part of the fighting line, formerly occupied
by the XV Corps, the II Bavarian Corps, from the
heights of ST. ELOI it had just stormed, was able to
look right down on YPBES. The orders of the Sixth
Army commander, dated the 7th and 8th November,
had given all the necessary instructions for the em-
ployment of the new units. The 4th Infantry Divi-
sion and von Winckler's Guard Division were placed
under the commander of the Guard Corps, General
Baron von Plettenberg, and were to be called Pletten-
berg's Corps. The XV Corps and Plettenberg's Corps
formed the Army Group Linsingen.*

The task set the troops of General von Linsingen
was ' to drive back and crush the enemy lying north
of the canal (CoMmES-YpBEs) ; the main weight of
the attack is to be delivered by the left wing. The
Army Group Fabeck is to maintain its positions west
of the canal, its task being to continue pressing forward
and at the same time to support the attack of the
left wing of the Army Group Linsingen, by as powerful
enfilade fire as possible from its right flank batteries.'
The decisive attack was to begin on the 10th November,
when another strong reinforcement of engineers would

* For Order of Battle, see Appendix.

103

104 THE BATTLE ON THE YSER AND OF YPRES

have arrived. All the other units of the Sixth Army
and the whole of the Fourth Army were also, accord-
ing to arrangement, to attack on this day with in-
creased energy, so that the enemy should be allowed
no rest, and held to his positions along the whole
front.

On the stroke of 7 A.M. the Fourth Army advanced
to the attack. This tenth day of November was to be
a famous one in its history. The sectors of attack
for each of the Corps remained, generally speaking,
the same, except that the left wing of the XXVII
Reserve Corps had been closed in slightly to the north.
Strengthened by the Guard Jdger Battalion, a Guard
Machine-Gun Detachment * and the 9th Machine-
Gun Detachment, this Corps was to advance towards
the POLYGON Wood.

The orders for the XXII Reserve Corps ran as
follows : * The XXII Reserve Corps * in co-opera-
tion with the Marine Division will secure the YSER
canal front, and will take DIXMUDE.' Immediately
north of DIXMUDE the 4th Ersatz Division was in posi-
tion, with the 43rd Reserve Division to the east and
south, the two divisions together making a semi-
circle of steel round the objective. This time our
troops were determined to take the town so stubbornly
defended by the French infantry. The enemy fully
realised the importance of this bridge-head. Besides
holding a strong German force always in the vicinity,
it covered the canal-crossing nearest to Calais. On

* Consisting of the 4th Ersatz Division and the 43rd Reserve
Division.

1 A Machine-Gun Detachment (Abtheilung) is a mounted battery
with six guns.

THE LAST PHASE 105

the 9th its garrison was further reinforced by the
arrival of fresh French troops.

The rain of the previous days had made the ground
over which the attack on DIXMUDE was to be carried
out very heavy going. The HANDZAEME canal,
running east and west, divides it into two parts, the
northerly one being particularly swampy and diffi-
cult to cross. The main attack had therefore to be
made from the east and south-east on a comparatively
narrow front. The town itself comprised both modern
and obsolete fortifications, but the first strongholds
of the defenders were the railway buildings and
cemetery situated to the east of it. The railway
embankment had been transformed into a very strong
defensive position, and a heavy fire was expected
from it when we advanced from the high embank-
ments of the YSEE. Under the cover of darkness
the division was able to push its front line to an
assault position within two hundred yards of the enemy,
and at dawn on the 10th the artillery bombardment
began. Our heaviest guns took part and countless
shells from our Minenwerfer did their utmost to
break down the enemy's resistance. By 7.40 A.M.
our first attempt to take the enemy's advanced posi-
tions had failed, and another artillery bombardment
against his obstacles and flanking posts was ordered.
At 9.30 A.M. the advanced stronghold at the cemetery
was stormed. Our infantry had scarcely got into
position there before the artillery observers arrived
to direct the fire of their batteries from the front line
on to the next strong point. The artillery bombard-
ment lasted throughout the morning until 1 P.M.
when the general assault was ordered. The infantry,

106 THE BATTLE ON THE YSER AND OF YPRES

with detachments of sappers carrying hand-grenades
and various material useful in an assault, had worked
its way forward close up to the line of obstacles.

The 201st Reserve Infantry Regiment advanced
rapidly at first by frontal attack. North of it, the
15th Reserve Jdger Battalion under Captain Hameln
worked forward across the deep marshes between the
canal and the railway. The 202nd Reserve Infantry
Regiment came under a heavy enfilade fire from the
YSEE embankment, and at 1.30 P.M. orders were
issued for the Corps reserve under Colonel Teetz-
mann, consisting of a few battalions of the 43rd
Reserve Division and of the 4th Ersatz Division, to
be brought up into the line. Its task was to help
carry forward the attack of the 202nd Regiment
against the railway embankment, and to secure the
left flank of the advance. The nearer the attack
approached to the town, the more desperate became
the resistance of its defenders. The gallant com-
mander of the 201st Reserve Regiment, General von
Seydewitz, always in the front line encouraging his
men, was killed leading the attack just as his regi-
ment and the Jdger entered the devastated town at
about 3.30 P.M. Our well-directed artillery fire had
cleared the front at the critical moment, and the
enemy withdrew to the flanks of and behind DIXMUDE,
but did not cease to offer resistance. He held the
railway embankment south of the town with par-
ticular tenacity. Even when this had been finally
stormed, the 202nd Regiment had to continue the
fight, with heavy loss, among the burning houses in
the southern part of the town, until the 201st Regi-
ment by a wheel southwards were able to give assist-

THE LAST PHASE 107

ance. Teetzmann's brigade in its attack on the
YSER embankment, to protect the flank of the divi-
sion, had meanwhile reached the river. Thence it
pressed on towards the bridges west of the town, so
that the enemy's retreat was threatened. In spite
of this, however, he gave nothing up without a
struggle, and every block of houses had to be cap-
tured : in fact the street fighting that ensued was
hardly less bitter and terrible than at WYTSCHAETB
and MESSINES.

During the struggle in DIXMUDE, the French
artillery fired into the place regardless of friend or
foe, and both suffered alike. The fight was still
raging among the houses at the northern exit, where
von Beerst was only making slow progress with the
advanced detachments of the 4th Ersatz Division,
when our reserves were assembled in the market -
square to deliver the final blow. The French infantry
and Marine Fusiliers put up a desperate defence, but
finally had to give way, for though not numerically
superior, the offensive spirit of the German troops
overcame all resistance. It was not until the west
bank of the canal had been reached, that the mass
of the enemy put up another defence.

DIXMUDE was captured, and the French had been
driven back across the canal. A combined counter-
attack by Belgians, Zouaves and French, which began
during the evening and continued into the night,
was unable to alter the situation, and though DIX-
MUDE in consequence was under the heaviest fire,
our troops held their ground. Weak detachments
of the 4th Ersatz Division were even able to cross
the river north of the town under cover of darkness,

108 THE BATTLE ON THE YSER AND OF YPRES

though the extreme swampiness of the ground pre-
vented them carrying their success any further. The
enemy had prepared the bridges, west of DIXMUDE,
for demolition some time before and had constructed
strong positions along the west bank of the YSER.

THE CAPTURE OF DIXMUDE.

ON NOVEMBER 10™ 19I4-.

These were especially good, as the ground there is
higher and overlooks that on the east bank. Our
artillery had therefore to make another preparatory
bombardment. The spoils taken at DIXMUDE were
considerable, and in spite of the fact that the British
assert that the Allies only lost a few hundred men,
we took in prisoners alone 17 officers and 1400 men.1

1 It is not clear why a British assertion about the defence of Dixmude
should be quoted, nor indeed is it clear what shape this assertion can have
taken, as no British troops were concerned in the Dixmude fighting, nor
could there have been any occasion for any official British announce-
ment about Dixmude.

In the diagram above, for 2Qlst, 202nd, and 203rd Bes. Jdger Regt.
read Res. Infantry Regt.

THE LAST PHASE 109

Our allied enemies had also been driven back over
the canal, south of DIXMUDE, on the 10th November.
The XXIII Reserve Corps had made a successful
attack on NOOBDSCHOOTE and through BIXSCHOOTE
against HET SAS. A long and bitter struggle took
place for the high ground south-west of BIXSCHOOTE ;
but by evening the canal had been reached along
almost its whole length between NOORDSCHOOTE and
BIXSCHOOTE, whilst about a brigade of the 45th
Reserve Division and weak detachments of the 46th
had crossed it. The inundation had however gradually
extended southwards as far as this district, and put
any far-reaching extension of this success out of the
question. The XXIII Reserve Corps took prisoner
about 1000 men and captured a considerable number
of machine-guns in this operation.

The reinforced III Reserve Corps had had a particu-
larly hard fight on both sides of LANGEMARCK. Through-
out the 9th November and during the following night
the French delivered heavy attacks there and had
been everywhere repulsed. Rows of corpses lay in
front of the III Reserve Corps, on the left wing of
which the 9th Reserve Division, now affiliated to
the Fourth Army, had been brought up into the
line. Making every use of the element of surprise,
General von Beseler had ordered the assault to begin
at 6.30 A.M. Punctually at this moment, as dawn
was breaking, the bugles sounded the attack. On
the right wing the 44th Reserve Division pushed
forward till close up to HET SAS, taking prisoner
14 officers and 1154 men. The official despatch,
in reporting this advance, says : ' West of LANGE-
MARCK our young regiments advanced against the

110 THE BATTLE ON THE YSER AND OF YPRES

enemy's front line singing " Deutschland, Deutsch-
land uber alles" and captured it.' The left wing of
the division hung a good way back, as the 5th Reserve
Division on its left was unable to push on so rapidly.
It had broken into the enemy's first position, but its
eastern wing was completely held up in front of
LANGEMARCK. The 6th Reserve Division had attacked
the place from north and east, without being able to
take it. Documents discovered afterwards prove
that the enemy had concentrated strong forces here
for a big attack that he himself intended to make on
the 10th, and these were now defending every yard
of ground with the utmost determination. The 9th
Reserve Division had at first made good progress in
the direction of ST. JULIEN, but it came under a heavy
cross-fire, and was thereby compelled to give up a
large part of the ground gained. General von Beseler
therefore decided to pull out the main body of the
9th Reserve Division, and move it to his right wing,
where the 44th and 5th Reserve Divisions had had a
decided success in the direction of HET SAS.

After the first line of trenches had been taken, the
attack of the XXVI and XXVII Reserve Corps was
very soon held up by wire entanglements which had
not been destroyed by our guns, and by a second line
of trenches provided with every modern device.
The XXVII Reserve Corps spent most of the day
in making such disposition of its forces as would
enable it to give the utmost support to the Army
Group Linsingen, which was getting ready to attack
further south on the morrow.

In the Army Group Linsingen, however, the pre-
parations of Plettenberg's Corps for an offensive on

THE LAST PHASE 111

the morning of the 10th were not sufficiently advanced
to allow it to take place on that day. Further, the
dense autumn mists prevented the necessary recon-
naissances. With the concurrence of General von
Linsingen, and after arrangement with the neigh-
bouring troops, General Baron von Plettenberg there-
fore decided to attack on the llth November. On
the front of Deimling's (XV) Corps the 10th November,
up to four in the afternoon, was spent in a preparatory
artillery bombardment ; especially good work was
done by means of heavy enfilade fire from the south,
carried out by a massed group of artillery consisting
of three batteries of heavy howitzers, three batteries
of mortars, a battery of 10-cm. guns and a battery
of long 15-cm. guns, all under the orders of Colonel
Gartmayr, commanding the 1st Bavarian Field
Artillery Regiment. After the bombardment both
divisions of the Corps advanced to the attack and,
in co-operation with the II Bavarian Corps fighting
on the high ground of ST. ELOI, were able to gain
some hundreds of yards.

On the llth November the combined offensive of
the Fourth Army and the Army Groups Linsingen
and Fabeck took place. The remainder of the Fourth
and Sixth Armies continued their attacks. The
great efforts made by the Fourth Army on the 10th
had considerably weakened it, and further handi-
capped by a heavy rain-storm which beat in the faces
of the attacking troops, no special success was gained
by it on the 1 1th ; nevertheless the enemy was every-
where held to his ground and prevented from trans-
ferring any troops to other parts of the front. On the
extreme right wing the Marine Division made a sue-

112 THE BATTLE ON THE YSER AND OF YPRES

cessful attack on NIETJPORT, capturing several hundred
prisoners. At the same time the Guard Cavalry Divi-
sion, affiliated to the Fourth Army, was sent up to

THE ATTACK OFTHE SIXTH ARMY
ON NOVEMBER III" 1914.

Zonnebeke 0

Direction of attack.
Enemy's position.

Scale. /:/30000.

/ 2 3 + s

Armentieres

the YSEB, in order to relieve part of the 4th Ersatz
Division, which went into Army Reserve. On the
left wing of the Army, the XXVI and XXVII Reserve

THE LAST PHASE 113

Corps worked their way towards the hostile positions
by sapping, whilst the units on the extreme south
flank of the XXVII Reserve Corps attacked in close
co-operation with Plettenberg's Corps.

On the llth, in pouring rain, the Army Groups
Linsingen and Fabeck began the last phase of this
severe and terrible struggle for YPRES ; and it was
destined to fix the general line on which the opposing
armies were to remain rooted till the spring of 1915.

Von Winckler's Guard Division fought on the right
wing of the Army Group Linsingen, and for us the
day was to be a historic, though costly one. In
former wars the Guard had always been in the heat of
the fray at its most critical stages, and the sons were
to show themselves worthy of their fathers. The
spirit of Frederick the Great and the glory of St.
Privat shone again on the battlefield of YPRES.
The British speak of the attack of the Guard as a
most brilliant feat of arms.

Before the infantry of the Division could come into
immediate contact with the enemy, a broad zone had
to be crossed under his artillery fire : through the
hail of shell the pride and iron discipline of the Guard
brought its regiments unshaken. At 7.30 A.M. the
German batteries opened, and a furious bombard-
ment continued for two and a half hours, and then
the infantry attack began. It struck against two
divisions of the I British Corps, a war experienced
foe, whose fighting methods were well adapted to
the country.1 The artillery preparation however had

1 The frontage attacked by the twelve battalions of General von
Winckler'a Guard Division, far from being held by two British Divisions
was held from north to south by the 1st Infantry Brigade, now reduced

H

114 THE BATTLE ON THE YSER AND OF YPRES

been a thorough one, and in spite of the enemy's
superiority in numbers the advance made good pro-
gress, so that shortly after 10 A.M. the strong position
along the southern edge of the POLYGON Wood was
in the possession of the 3rd Guard Regiment.1

At the same time the butt ends and bayonets of
H.M. the Emperor's 1st Guard Regiment had forced
a way through the wire entanglements and trenches
in front of VERBECK farm, and it was taken in the
first assault. The regiment had thereby captured
an excellent position from which to support the right
wing of the attack.2 Led by its fearless commander,
Prince Eitel Friedrich of Prussia, it then pressed on
without a moment's delay into the wood north-west
of the farm. Meanwhile the 3rd Guard Regiment
was still engaged along the southern edges of the woods

to some 800 bayonets, a battalion of Zouaves and the left brigade of the
3rd Division, little over 1200 strong. Even if the whole of the 3rd
Guard Regiment may have been absorbed in the task of covering the
main attack from the British troops lining the southern edge of the
Polygon Wood, the superiority of the attacking force was sufficiently
pronounced.

1 The Germans do not appear to have penetrated into the Polygon
Wood at any point. The northern end of the breach in the British line
was marked by a ' strong point ' which had been erected near the south-
west corner of the wood, known later as ' Black Watch Corner ' : this was
successfully defended all day by a very weak company of the Black Watch.
Attacks were made on the 1st King's lining the southern edge of the
wood, apparently by the 3rd Guard Regiment, and also further east-
ward and to the left of the King's, on the 2nd Coldstream Guards. The
Germans in this quarter would seem to have belonged to the 54th Reserve
Division : at neither of these points did the attackers meet with any
success.

2 A thick mist which prevented the troops holding the front line
trenches from seeing far to their front undoubtedly played an important
part in concealing the advance of the German Guard, and contributed
appreciably to its success.

THE LAST PHASE

115

west of RETJTEL, with its front facing north, and it
put in its last reserves to help forward the left wing
of the 54th Reserve Division.

At 10 A.M., on the last artillery salvo, the battalions
of the 4th Guard Brigade advanced to the assault on

THE ATTACK OF THE 2"? GUARD DIVISION,
ON NOVEMBER III" 1914.

eel

fcbKw*as&

GRENADIER GUARDS
REGIMENT

\ *->•••

-— •-_ Enemy's position before attack.
.^•WMI Direction of attack.
|MHI|> Enemy's counter- attack.

both sides of the YPEES-GHELUVELT main road,
and they took the front British trenches in their
stride.

The Emperor Francis' 2nd Guard Grenadier Regi-
ment attacked from VELDHOEK against the corner

116 THE BATTLE ON THE YSER AND OF YPRES

of the HERENTHAGE Wood, north of the YPRES-
GHELTJVELT road, and took its edge. The wood itself
gave the infantry endless trouble, for it was impossible
to see a yard ahead in its thick undergrowth, which
was over six feet high.1 Suddenly at a few paces'
distance, machine-guns would open on our troops
from behind a bush or a tree-trunk. Thus the task
set the Grenadiers proved to be an extremely difficult
one, the more so as they had lost many of their officers
and N.C.O.'s in the first rush across the open. Never-
theless, the defence -works inside the wood were quickly
taken one after another, but more strong points pro-
tected by wire entanglements untouched by our
artillery fire were encountered. The Fusilier Battalion
forced its way through to the chateau of VELDHOEK,
which was surrounded by a marsh and an impene-
trable hedge. The men were trying to work their
way one by one through the latter by cutting gaps in
it, when suddenly a deafening roar of rifle and machine-
gun burst upon them. It came from the chateau on
their right, from some flanking trenches on their left,
and from trees behind the line. A number of the
few remaining officers fell, and finally the battalion
had to retire a short distance in order to reorganise.
But it soon came forward once more, and the com-
panies pressed on till they were close up to the chateau
itself, when another annihilating fusillade was opened
on them from all sides. Simultaneously the British
made a flank attack along the hedge in order to cut
ofi the men who had got through. Machine-guns

1 This is the eastern part oj the wood known later as ' Inverness
Copse.'

THE LAST PHASE 117

firing from trees and from the chateau windows
completely stopped any communication with them.
Very few only of these foremost troops, who were
commanded by Captain von Rieben, succeeded in
getting away. Those who did were assembled by
Captain Baron von Sell at the eastern edge of the
wood and were, with part of the 1st Battalion, led
forward again to the relief of the Fusiliers who were
surrounded. The attack of Captain von Sell developed
however into small isolated combats, and though the
boldest followed their leader nearly up to the chateau
again, they were received there with such heavy fire
from right and left that it appeared that they would
have to retire again and reorganise. Before this
could be carried out, a British counter-attack was
launched ; but our men, disorganised and mixed up
as they were, held fast to their ground and stopped
the attack, although at first both their flanks were in
the air.1

Queen Augusta's 4th Guard Grenadier Regiment,
advancing south of the main road, at once suffered
such heavy losses that the first two attacks made no
headway. When however part of the regiment near
the main road pushed forward along it, echeloned
behind its sister -regiment on the right, and then
turned southwards, the advance made good progress,
and a firm footing was gained in HERENTHAGE Wood
south of the road. The reverses met with by the
Emperor Francis' 2nd Grenadiers unfortunately enabled
the British to bring such a heavy enfilade fire to bear

1 This counter-attack may be identified with one delivered by the
1st Scote Fusiliers and one company 2nd Duke of Wellington's*

118 THE BATTLE ON THE YSEK AND OF YPRES

on Queen Augusta's 4th Grenadiers, that their advance
had to be stopped.1

At 5 P.M. German Guard troops had a tussle with
the British Guards. The King's Liverpool Regiment
made a counter-attack from the NUN'S Wood (Nonne
Bosch) against the extreme left of the 1st Guard Foot
Regiment and the northern wing of the 2nd Guard
Grenadiers. The point of attack was well chosen,
and took both the regiments in flank, for the 1st Guard
Infantry Brigade was at this time heavily engaged,
and held up in the woods (POLYGON Wood and the east-
ern part of the NONNE BOSCH), with its front facing
north, and the 2nd Guard Grenadier Regiment, having
spent all its energies against the chateau of VELDHOEK,
lay with its front facing west.2 However, the British

1 The 4th (Queen Augusta's] Guard Grenadiers seem to have attacked
the right of the line held by the $th Infantry Brigade and to have been
repulsed by the 1st Lincolnshires and 1st Northumberland Fusiliers.
Further to the British right the 15th and 1th Infantry Brigades were
also attacked, but by the 4th Division, not by the Guards. Here the
Germans made no progress.

2 This part of the German account is not borne out by the British
versions. The main body of the 1st Guard Regiment, which broke
through the thinly held line of the 1st Infantry Brigade, pressed on north-
west into the Nonne Bosch Wood, pushing right through it, and coming
out into the open on the western edge. Here their progress was arrested
mainly by the gunners of XLI Brigade, R.F.A., who held them up with
rifle flre at short range. Various details of Royal Engineers, orderlies
from Headquarters, transport men, rallied stragglers of the 1st Brigade,
assisted to stop the Germans, but the situation was critical until about
noon or a little later the 2nd Oxford and Bucks L.I. arrived on the scene.
This battalion had been engaged for several days near Zwarteleen, and
had just been brought up to Westhoek to act as Divisional Reserve.
Though under 400 strong the battalion promptly counter-attacked the
Nonne Bosch Wood and drove the Germans out headlong. Many of
them were caught as they escaped on the eastern and southern sides by
the fire of the 2nd Highland L.I., now on the western edge of Polygon

THE LAST PHASE 119

troops ran into their own artillery fire near the NONNE
BOSCH, and the attack broke up and came to a stand-
still in front of our thin and scattered lines. Any
further advance on the llth November by our Guard
troops north of the road was now out of the question.

In the southern part of the HERENTHAGE Wood the
4th Infantry Division pushed on, though here too
great difficulties were encountered. Deep trenches,
broad obstacles, and enfilade machine-gun fire com-
bined to make our progress slow, especially on the
right wing.

The XV Corps in close co-operation with the left
wing of the Pomeranians gained ground in the woods
near and around ZWARTELEEN ; the capture of Hill
60 near ZWARTELEEN was of exceptional importance.
From this elevation another direct view over the
country round YPBES was obtained.

South of the canal the II Bavarian Corps with much
thinned ranks stormed forward again. The bit of

Wood, and of the 1st Northamptonshires, who had come up to Glencorse
Wood, south-west of the Nonne Bosch, and with other units of the
2nd and 3rd Infantry Brigades had fitted the gap which extended thence
to the Menin road. Thus those of the 1st Guard Regiment who had
pushed straight on westward were prevented from penetrating any
further. The King's, to whom this account gives the credit for the
Oxfordshire's counter-attack, had been engaged with the 3rd Guard
Regiment further to the north, completely defeating their attacks on the
Polygon, but not making any counter-attack. It is worth recalling that
at the critical moment of the battle of Waterloo it was the 2nd Oxford
and Bucks L.I., then 52nd Light Infantry, who played the chief part
in the defeat of Napoleon's Guard.

The defeat of the 2nd Guard Grenadiers does not appear to have
been the work of the 2nd Oxford and Bucks L.I., but of the other bat-
talions, chiefly from the 2nd and 3rd Infantry Brigades, who were
pushed forward rather earlier between Glencorse Wood and Inverness
Copse.

120 THE BATTLE ON THE YSER AND OF YPRES

wood north-east of WYTSCHAETE, which had already
changed hands several times, was now taken by it.
The heavy artillery again rendered invaluable services.
Several strong hostile counter-attacks were held up
chiefly owing to the way in which at the critical
moment our guns always protected the infantry lines
by a barrage.

In the area near WYTSCHAETE, the llth November
was the day of the heaviest fighting. In the woods
north of it, Bavarians and Hessians pressed forward
together, slowly but surely. A French battery and
four machine-guns were taken by the 168th Infantry
Regiment at a farm about 150 yards north of WYT-
SCHAETE, but the guns were so firmly embedded in
the sodden ground, that they could not be got away
by the infantry. When the buildings were evacuated
again, owing to the heavy fire of the French on them,
the guns, made unserviceable by us, remained as a
neutral battery between the lines. It must be re-
corded here that in the fight for one single farm the
Hessians took prisoners belonging to three different
regiments, a fact that proves what masses the enemy
had put in to the fight on the YPRES front, and to
what an extent he had to concentrate his units to
ward off our attacks.

On and to the west of the MESSINES ridge the line
remained almost unaltered during the 1 1th November.
The very severe effect of the enemy's artillery fire
from Mount KEMMEL on this front and the enfilade
fire of artillery and machine-guns from PLOEGSTEEBT
Wood compelled our men to remain in their trenches.

Taken as a whole the operations on the 1 1th Novem-
ber were a great success. A series of brilliant feats,

THE LAST PHASE 121

many of which it has been impossible even to mention
in this short account, far less adequately describe,
gave us unchallenged possession of positions from which
any concentration of the enemy near YPRES could
be seen, and immediately opened on by artillery.
It is true, however, that no break through of the
enemy's lines had been accomplished : his numerical
superiority and, more especially, the strength of his
positions held up our offensive. The weather condi-
tions, storm and rain, had also contributed towards
the result.1

The furious character of the fighting on the llth
November did not abate on the following day, but
on the whole the situation remained unaltered. The
general character of the operations on the entire front
of the Fourth and Sixth Armies was now changed,
and sapping was eventually resorted to, though here
and there successes in open warfare were gained.
For instance the XXII Reserve Corps managed to
strengthen its detachments across the YSER at Dix-
MUDE, and on the 12th the 201st Reserve Infantry

1 The author must be thankful for minor mercies if he can reckon
1 \th November as a day of great success. The gain of ground at Veld-
hoek was trifling in extent and value, and though ' Hill 60 ' and the
wood north of Wytschaete were more important points, there is no doubt
that the throwing of the German Guard into the struggle had been
expected to produce a break-through. The ' numerical superiority '
once again attributed to the Allies was about as unreal as the alleged
strength of the positions, hastily dug, imperfectly wired and almost
wholly lacking supporting points and communications, which had such
a much more formidable character in the eyes of the Germans than they
ever possessed in reality. The gallantry and vigour with which the
German Guard pushed its attack will be readily admitted, but the
honours of \\th November 1914 go to the weary men who after three
weeks of incessant fighting met and drove back these fresh and famous
troops.

122 THE BATTLE ON THE YSER AND OF YPRES

Regiment, under Major Baron von Wedekind, stormed
the enemy's defences opposite it on the western bank
of the YSER, and held them under great difficulties.
Constant rain had filled the badly constructed trenches
with mud so that our troops had to support the enemy's
bombardment and resist his counter-attacks lying
in the open.

At BIXSCHOOTE the enemy again attempted strong
counter-attacks, but they were stopped largely by
the muddy state of the country. On the 14th
November there was a recrudescence of severe fight-
ing. Owing to the misty weather our relieving troops
occupied a reserve position instead of the original
front line ; by the time the error was discovered, our
watchful opponents were already in the front German
position. Our men, however, gave them no rest
there, for their honour would not suffer the surrender
in this manner of their success of the 10th November.
Without waiting for any orders from higher authority
or for reinforcements they attacked and retook the
strong position on the rising ground south-west of
BIXSCHOOTE. On the front of the Sixth Army HEREN-
THAGE Wood was completely taken by the Guard on
the 14th November after severe hand-to-hand fighting.1

1 This statement is not true. After an attack on 13th November in
which prisoners were taken from the 4th (German) Division, the 9th
and 15th Infantry Brigades drew back from the eastern edge of the
Herenthage Wood to a line about 200 yards in rear (night ISth-lfah
November). This line was strongly attacked next day, and the Heren-
thage Chateau fell for the time into German hands, only to be recovered
by the 2nd King's Own Yorkshire L.I., while a further counter-attack
by a company of the Northumberland Fusiliers, assisted by a gun of
the 54th Battery R.F.A., ousted the Germans also from the stables of the
Chateau. Further to the British right the 1th and 15th Infantry
Brigades successfully repulsed vigorous attacks*

THE LAST PHASE 123

After the artillery had prepared the way as far as
was possible in that difficult and wooded neighbour-
hood, the infantry, whose fighting spirit was by no
means damped by the events of the llth November,
advanced to the assault. In the chateau of HEREN-
THAGE a large number of British snipers surrendered.
The XV Corps had another success in the wooded
district of ZWARTELEEN after being reinforced by
Hofmann's composite Division. A strong system of
trenches and dug-outs were taken, as well as a large
number of prisoners.

On the 13th November the Park of WYTSCHAETE
was captured from the French by the Pomeranians
and Bavarians. A counter-attack, in which the
French advanced against our positions shouting,
' Don't shoot/ in German, cost them heavy losses ;
and the Bavarians, whose tempers were roused by
this treachery, drove them back to their original
positions .

On the 20th November the farm 150 yards north
of WYTSCHAETE, for which such a severe fight had
been made on the llth, was finally captured by us.
We thereby obtained a position in the WYTSCHAETE
salient which, although overlooked from Mount
KEMMEL, gave us such a commanding view of all
the ground between Mount KEMMEL and the WYT-
SCHAETE-MESSINES ridge that surprise attacks by the
enemy in this district were now out of the question.1
On the rest of the Flanders front only small fights
took place, and on the 17th November the com-
mander of the Fourth Army decided to give up any

1 The surprise came in 1917 in spite of this*

124 THE BATTLE ON THE YSER AND OF YPRES

idea of continuing the offensive ; a decision to which
he was compelled by the low fighting strength of his
troops and the bad autumn weather, which was
affecting their health.1 The frequent downpours of
rain during November had caused a constant rising
of the water-level, and it became urgently necessary
to provide regular reliefs for the troops, for they were
worn out by the constant fighting under such bad
weather conditions. Clear signs of exhaustion in the
enemy's ranks on the front opposite the Fourth and
Sixth Armies were also noticed. This permitted our
gallant Fourth Army gradually to construct a good
line of trenches and erect wire entanglements. As
soon as these were completed rest -billets were
allotted further to the rear and the men found quiet
and pleasant quarters in the villages of Flanders
untouched by war, with a not unfriendly popula-
tion. The German General Staff fully concurred
in the decision of the commander of the Fourth
Army made on the 17th November. They at the
same time expressed the hope that the Army
would be prepared to hold its positions even
against superior hostile forces. This expectation
was completely fulfilled by the Fourth Army, and
although at that time there were four and one-
half French Corps, as well as the 25,000 Belgian
troops, opposed to the forces of Duke Albert of Wiir-

1 One reason why the O.O.C. Fourth Army came to this decision on
llth November is omitted. An attack in force had been attempted on
this day by his 4th Division, but the 1th and 1 5th Infantry Brigades,
holding the line attacked, had proved equal to the occasion, had driven
the Germans back, recovering some advanced trenches carried by the
first rush and inflicting heavy losses. This discouraging reception
undoubtedly assisted Duke Albert in making his decision.

THE LAST PHASE 125

temburg, they never obtained a success of any con-
sequence.

The threat against our right flank ceased soon
afterwards. British monitors appeared a few times
towards the end of November off the roadstead of
OSTEND. They bombarded the canal exit and our
positions near by : but their fire was as ineffective
as before. The ' glorious ' activities of the British
Grand Fleet along the Flanders coast came to a speedy
end as soon as our ill-famed sea -rats, the U-boats,
began to put in an appearance there.1

The developments on the front of the Sixth Army
during the second half of November 1914 were similar
to those of the Fourth Army. For some time the
sapping was continued, but from the 20th onwards
strong detachments were taken from it and entrained
for the Eastern Front, where General von Hindenburg
was able, in the fighting round Lodz, to bring the
Russian steam-roller to a standstill, and finally make
it roll back again.

From this time onwards the line of demarcation
between the Fourth and Sixth Armies was the COMINES-
YPRES canal.

1 If was the U-boats that came to a speedy end.

CONCLUSION

As the November storms passed and frost and icy
winds heralded to the mild climate of Flanders the
approach of winter, the unbroken defensive lines of
both sides were being slowly strengthened. The
effect of artillery fire compelled them to make cover
in good trenches and behind thick breast -works.
As the armament in use became more and more power-
ful, artificial shelter, where the surface water allowed
it, had to be made deeper and deeper in the earth.
At first passive defence was little understood by the
German troops, as instruction in the offensive had
dominated all other in their peace -training, and in
the short period available after they were called up
the volunteers had only been trained in the prin-
ciples of attack. Their sense of superiority over their
opponents did not let them rest content with merely
holding positions. The high sense of duty in each
individual was of assistance, and the methods of
defensive warfare were quickly learnt. The con-
tinuous bad weather in the autumn and winter in
this water -logged country caused great suffering ;
and the troops sent off to Russia to fight under the
great victor of TANNENBURG were much envied. The
despatch of men eastward showed those left behind
that any hope of a final decision at YPRES had dis-
appeared.

126

CONCLUSION 127

The first battle of YPRES was a German victory,1
for it marked the failure of the enemy's intention to
fall on the rear of our Western Armies, to free the rich
districts of Northern France and the whole of Belgium
(thus preventing us from making use of their valuable
resources), and to use the YPRES area as a base for
the Belgian, French and British advance on the RHINE.
The Belgian coast was now firmly in our possession,
and offered a good starting-place for naval operations
against England. But we had not succeeded in
making the decisive break-through, and the dream of
ending the campaign in the west in our favour during
1914 had to be consigned to its grave. It is only
natural that the German General Staff found it diffi-
cult thoroughly to realise this unpleasant fact, and
only did so with reluctance ; but endeavour has been
made in this account to bring out the main reasons
which led to this result of the battle. Nevertheless,
great things had been accomplished. The Army of
Duke Albert of Wurtemburg, by its advance and
determined attack, had prevented the big offensive
planned by the enemy ; the Fourth and Sixth Armies
together had forced a superior opponent into the
defensive, and, in spite of his having called in the sea
to his assistance, had driven him back continually,
until positions had been reached which enabled
German troops to be spared to carry out an offen-
sive on the Eastern Front. As during the battle of
the Marne, so now the spectre of a Russian invasion
appeared threateningly before the German Nation,
and the whole country knew what it would mean if
it should materialise. Our forces on the Eastern

1 See remarks in Introduction*

128 THE BATTLE ON THE YSER AND OF YPRES

Front were far too weak, and even the genius of a
Hindenburg could not decisively defeat the masses
of the Grand Duke Nicolas without reinforcements.
Thus it came about that we had to lie and wait in
front of the gates of YPRES, while all the available
men from Flanders were hurried across to Poland,
to help Hindenburg pave the way to victory.

There was never peace on the YPRES front. The
belt of steel with which we had invested the town by
our operations in October and November 1914, was
a source of constant annoyance to the British, whilst
our position on the Belgian coast seemed to our cousins
across the Channel like an apparition whose shadow
lay over the British Isles and especially menaced the
traffic -routes between England and France. The
British therefore continually tried their utmost to
free themselves of this menace and their pressure
produced counter measures. Thus in December 1914
heavy fighting again occurred, especially near the sea
at NIETJPORT, and also at BIXSCHOOTE and ZWAR-
TELEEN. On Christmas Eve the French vainly
attacked BIXSCHOOTE : their hope of catching the
Germans dreaming heavily on that evening was of
no avail. When spring lifted the mist that hung
over Flanders, a German offensive took place during
April and May that forced the northern part of the
YPRES salient back to within three miles of the town.1
After this the positions only altered very slightly.
In March 1916 the British blew up our front trench
positions at ST. ELOI by five colossal mines, but were

1 The first use of gas by the Germans on this occasion might have been
mentioned.

CONCLUSION 129

unable to hold on to the ground thus destroyed. In
1917 the death-agony of YPEES was renewed, and for
months war raged over the plains of Flanders ; the
fighting was as furious as in October and November
1914. The young soldiers of those days have now
become veterans, who know war and do not fear it
even in its most terrible forms. The enemy are those
same British against whom Crown Prince Rupert
of Bavaria, in exhorting the troops to battle in 1914,
once said : ' Therefore when you are fighting this
particular enemy retaliate for his deceit and for having
occasioned all this great sacrifice ; show him that the
Germans are not so easy to wipe out of the world's
history as he imagines, show it by redoubling the
strength behind your blows. In front of you is the
opponent who is the greatest obstacle to peace. On !
at him ! '

He spoke as a prophet. Hate of the British who
were so jealous of us, who brought on the war for the
sake of their money-bags and spread the conflagration
all over the world, who at first hoped that it would
be but necessary to pour out their silver bullets to
annihilate Germany : all this steeled the hearts of our
warriors in Flanders, whose creed was the justice of
the German cause. And the British efforts to wrest
Flanders away from us again were stifled in mud and
in blood. The fighting in 1917 was perhaps more
severe than that of those stormy autumn days of
1914, but the objective for us was ever the same :
to keep the enemy far, far from our homes. In this
we succeeded in 1917 as in 1914.

Flanders ! The word is heard by every one in the
German Fatherland with a silent shudder, but also

I

130 THE BATTLE ON THE YSER AND OF YPRES

with just and intense pride. It was there that the
British were made to realise that German heroism
was not to be vanquished, not even by the use of the
war material which the whole world had been manu-
facturing for years. When we read that up to the
14th November 1914, 40 divisions had been put
into the battle round YPRES by the Western Allies,
whilst only 25 German divisions were opposed to
them,1 and that in the course of the Flanders battle
of 1917, 99 British and French divisions struggled
in vain against a greatly inferior German force, it
says much for our troops. But far from all. For
the enemy's superiority in material, in guns, trench-
mortars, machine-guns, aeroplanes, etc., was two,
three, and even fourfold. Who can doubt but that
a nation whose sons know how to fight like this,
must win ? Let us only hold the hope that the seeds
of blood sown in Flanders will bring forth rich and
splendid fruio for the German Fatherland. This
indeed would be the highest reward that could be
bestowed on those of us who fought there.

1 It is not to be read in this monograph. See Introduction.

APPENDIX

ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE FOURTH ARMY

from 10th Oct. 1914 to 16th Nov. 1914.

Commander . . General Duke Albert of Wurtem-

burg.
Chief of Staff . . Major-General Ilse.

Ill Reserve Corps . (General of Infantry von Beseler).
5th Reserve Division.
6th Reserve Division.
4th Ersatz Division.

XXII Reserve Corps . (General of Cavalry von Falken-

hayn).

43rd Reserve Division.
44th Reserve Division.

XXIII Reserve Corps . (General of Cavalry von Kleist).

45th Reserve Division.
46th Reserve Division.

XXVI Reserve Corps . (General of Infantry von Hiigel).

51st Reserve Division.
52nd Reserve Division.

XXVII Reserve Corps . (Lieut.-General von Carlowitz,

relieved on 27th Oct. by General
of Artillery von Schubert).

53rd (Saxon) Reserve Division.

54th (Wurtemburg) Reserve Division.

131

132 THE BATTLE ON THE YSER AND OF YPRES

The following units were also attached at various times : —
9th Reserve Division.
6th Bavarian Reserve Division.
Marine Division.
38th Landwehr Brigade.
37th Landwehr Brigade.
2nd Ersatz Brigade.
Guard Cavalry Division.

ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE ARMY GROUP
FABECK

from 27th Oct. 1914 to 20th Nov. 1914.

Commander . . General of Infantry von Fabeck,

Commanding XIII (Wiirtem-
burg) Corps.

Chief of Staff . . Lieut.-Colonel von Lossberg.

XV Corps . . . (General von Deimling).
30th Infantry Division.
39th Infantry Division.
(This Corps left the Army Group Fabeck on
the 8th Nov. 1914.)

II Bavarian Corps . (General of Infantry von Martini,

relieved on the 5th Nov. 1914
by General of Cavalry von
Stetten).

3rd Bavarian Infantry Division.

4th Bavarian Infantry Division.

26th (Wiirtemburg) In- (Lieut. -General William, Duke of
f antry Division . Urach) .

Group GEROK was also temporarily in the Army
Group FABECK.

APPENDIX 133

ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE GROUP GEROK

Commander . . General of Infantry von Gerok,

Commanding XXIV Reserve
Corps.

1st Cavalry Corps . (Lieut. -General von Richthofen).
2 Cavalry Divisions.1

2nd Cavalry Corps . (General of Cavalry von der

Marwitz) .
2 Cavalry Divisions.2

6th Bavarian Reserve Division.
3rd Infantry Division.
25th Reserve Division,
llth Landwehr Brigade.
2nd Cavalry Division.
Bavarian Cavalry Division.

ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE ARMY GROUP
LINSINGEN

from 8th Nov. 1914 to 18th Nov. 1914.

Commander . . General of Infantry von Linsingen,

Commanding II Corps.

Chief of Staff . . Colonel von Hammerstein-

Gesmold.

1 4th and Guard Cavalry Divisions (see page 64).

2 3rd and Itli Cavalry Divisions (see page 90).

134 THE BATTLE ON THE YSER AND OF YPRES

XV Corps . . . (General of Infantry von Deim-

ling).

30th Infantry Division.
39th Infantry Division,
also from 16th Nov., Hofmann's Composite Division.

Plettenberg's Corps . (General of Infantry von Plet-

tenberg, Commanding Guard
Corps).

4th Infantry Division.

Winckler's Composite Guard Division.

INDEX

ALBEBT or WUBTEMBUBG, Duke, 6 ;
see also ABMY, FOUBTH.

ANTWEBP : value of, to Entente, 3 ;
capture of, 5 ; retreat from, 7
(note).

ABMY, FOTJBTH (German) : forma-
tion of, 6 ; advance of, through
BELGIUM, 19 ; dispositions on
20th Oct., 20 ; task of, 25, 27 ;
attack on 3rd Nov., 98 ; attack
on 10th Nov., 104; order of
battle of, 131.

— SIXTH (German) : position of
right wing of, 7 ; failure of attacks
of, 25 ; attack on llth Nov., 112.

ABMY GBOUP FABECK : constitu-
tion of, 60 ; plan for, 60 ; assem-
bly of, 63 ; artillery of, 63 ; at-
tack on 30th Oct., 67 ; attack on
31st Oct., 73 ; alteration of plan,
91 ; reinforcement of, 92 ; offen-
sive on llth Nov. of, 111 ; order
of battle of, 132.

LINSINGEN : composition

of, 103 ; task of, 103 ; offensive
of, 111 ; order of battle of, 133.

ABMY HEADQUABTEBS (German),
meetings at, 25, 26.

BECELAEBE : Anglo-French counter-
attacks at, 55 ; XXVII Res. Corps
takes, 41.

BELGIAN population, patriotiszn of,
100.

force, strength of, 12 (note).

BESELEB, General von, 5 ; see also
COBPS, III Reserve.

BBITISH FLEET, co-operation of, 22
and note, 61 and note, 28 (note),
125.

BBITISH force, strength of, 12 (note).

CALAIS : concentration about, 6 ;
German objective, 11.

CAVALBY, ABMY (German): objec-
tive of, 3 ; relief of, near LILLE,
64.

CAVALBY, FOUBTH (German) Army,
composition of, xvii (note).

SIXTH (German) Army : com-
position of, 56 57 ; capture
KBUISEIK, 57.

COBPS (German), III Reserve : cap-
tures Antwerp, 5 ; screens Fourth
Army, 19 ; crosses the YSEB, 30.

XV : attack on ZAND-

VOOBDE, 63 ; attack and capture
of GHELTJVELT, 72 ; captures Hill
60, 119.

XIX, captures LILLE, 7.

XXII Res. -XXVII Res. :

formation of, 4 ; transport of, 5.

XXII Res., attacks on

DIXMTTDE, 31, 53.

XXIII Res. : attack on

HOUTHTTLST Forest, 34; attack on
LANGEMABCK, 99.

XXVI Res., takes PAS-

SCHENDAELE, 40.

XXVII Res.,

BECELAEBE, 41.
II Bavarian, dispositions

of, 64.

(French) II, arrival of, 62, 64.

IX, arrival of, 41, 62, 64.

DEIMLING, General von, wounded,
73 ; see COBPS (German), XV.

DIXMUDE : topographical, 15 ; at-
tack by French Marine division
on, 45 ; capture of, 108.

EASTEBN FBONT, German units
leave for, 125.

EMPEBOB, German : proclamation
to Fourth Army, 27 ; watches at-
tack on GHELUVELT, 73.

FABECK, General von, see ABMY

GBOTJP FABEOK.
FRENCH force, strength of, 12 (note).

GEKOK, General von, see GBOTJP
GEBOK.

135

136 THE BATTLE ON THE YSER AND OF YPRES

GHELUVELT : attack on, 72 ; cap-
ture of, 75 ; British force holding,
72 (note).

GLOUCESTERSHIRE Regiment afc
LANGEMABCK, 37 (note).

GBOUP GEBOK : formation of, 93 ;
order of battle of, 133.

UBACH : formation of, 90 ;

attack on WYTSCHAETE Park, 95.

GTTABD (German) Division (von
WINOKLEB) : marches to Ron-
BAIX, 92; attack of, 116.

GUARDS, British Life, cut up, 68
and note.

KEMMEL, Mount, topography and
importance of, 13, 68, 96, 123.

KING'S LIVERPOOL Regiment, coun-
ter-attack by, 118 and note 2.

LILLE : value to Entente, 3 ; cap-
ture of, 6.

LINSINGEN, General Baron von, see
ABMY GROUP LINSINGEN.

MESSINES : importance of, 68 ; at-
tack on, 79 ; British force hold-
ing, 80 (note).

NIEUPOBT : topographical, 15 ; at-
tack on llth Nov., 112.

OXFOBDSHIBE AND BUCKINGHAM-

SHIBE L.I., counter-attack German
Guard, 118 (note 2).

PLETTENBEBG'S Corps, attack on
llth Nov., 111.

UBACH, General von, see GBOUP
UBAOH.

WOBCESTEBSHIBE Regiment, coun-
ter-attack at GHELUVELT, 75 and
note 3.

WYTSCHAETE : importance of, 68 ;
German attack on, 78 ; Anglo-
French counter-attack on, 79 ;
second German attack, 85 ; third
attack and capture of, 88 ; cap-
ture of Park of, 123 ; gallant de-
fence by French troops, 87 (note).

YOBKSHIBE L.I. retake HEBEN-
THAGE Chateau, 124 (note).

YPRES : topographical, 16 ; his-
torical, 14 ; attack from the
north against, 38 ; attempt to
break through south of, 59 ;
battle of, begins, 113.

YSEB, canal : topographical, 16 ;
flooding the, 51 ; crossed by III
Res. Corps, 30.

ZANDVOOBDE : importance of, 67 ;
capture of, 67.

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